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This dissertation generalizes the seminal model of financial contagion by Allen and Gale (2000)
to allow an aggregate liquidity demand shock to occur with positive probability. A shock with
positive probability can affect the ex ante portfolio choices of banks as well as the welfare of
consumers. I numerically characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative
game between two representative regional banks. The solution fully characterizes banks’ ex-
ante optimal choices. I obtain the following results: (i) when the probability of the shock ap-
proaches zero, the allocation of Allen and Gale (2000) is obtained; (ii) in general, the equilibrium
has three distinct characterizations, depending on the parameters: a no-default equilibrium,
where no bank defaults; a single-default equilibrium where only the shocked bank defaults;
and a mutual-default equilibrium, where the shock leads to contagion. When banks are able to
internalize the ex-ante threat of a shock, contagion is rare: it is possible in, at most, 4% of the
parameter space, and only for small shock probabilities.
Additionally, optimal risk-sharing is studied analytically in two novel aggregate bench-
marks: a global bank with full information and a global bank with asymmetric information. A
global bank with full information can observe consumer types. The allocation of a global bank
with full information involves default after a large but sufficiently unlikely aggregate liquidity
demand shock. Where default is not optimal, the allocation involves (i) holding excess liquid-
ity when the shock is relatively likely, (ii) partial liquidation of the investment after a small and
unlikely shock, and (iii) both excess liquidity and partial liquidation for shocks of intermediate
size and probability. Under asymmetric information, a global bank cannot observe consumer
types, and can offer less liquidity insurance than under full information.
iv
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Finally, when the numerically approximated Nash equilibrium is characterized by either
no default or contagion, the decentralized solution attains the welfare of the benchmarks within
numerical precision. However, when the Nash equilibrium is characterized by single default,
the decentralized equilibrium is superior to the aggregate benchmarks. Thus, a global bank





In hierdie proefskrif word die model van die oordraagbare verspreiding van finansiële prob-
leme van Allen en Gale (2000) uitgebrei om ’n universele likiditeitskok met positiewe waarskyn-
likheid toe te laat. So ’n skok kan die ex ante keuse van bateportefeulje van banke asook die
welsyn van verbruikers beïnvloed. Hierdie tesis los die simmetriese Nash ekwilibrium van die
spel tussen twee verteenwoordigende plaaslike banke numeries op. Die belangrikste resultate
is as volg: (i) die model lewer dieselfde verbruikerstoedeling as in Allen en Gale (2000) soos
die waarskynlikheid van die algemene likiditeitskok na nul afneem; (ii) in die algemeen het die
Nash ekwilibrium drie eienskappe, wat afhang van die parameters van die model: daar is ’n ek-
wilibrium waar geen bank bankrot gaan nie; ’n ekwilibrium waar slegs een bank bankrot gaan;
en ’n algemene bankrotskap ekwilibrium, waar die bankrotskap van een bank oorgedra word
en die bankrotskap van die ander bank veroorsaak. Selfs wanneer banke die ex ante risiko van
’n likiditeitskok kan antisipeer, is die ekwilibrium met oordraagbare bankrotskappe skaars: in
slegs 4% of minder van die totale ruimte van modelparameters is oordraagbare bankrotskappe
moontlik. Boonop gebeur oordraagbare bankrotskap slegs as die waarskynlikheid van ’n skok
klein genoeg is.
Die optimale verdeling van risiko word ook bestudeer, deur middel van suiwer analitiese
metodes. Twee nuwe welsynsmaatstawwe word op die makrovlak aangebied: ’n globale bank
met volledige inligting en ’n globale bank met asimmetriese inligting. ’n Globale bank met
volledige inligting kan die verbruikerstipe identifeer. As die skok groot en onwaarskynlik ge-
noeg is, behels dié oplossing die bankrotskap van die globale bank, en derhalwe die volledige
likwidasie van alle bates. Andersins het die oplossing een van die volgende eienskappe: (i) oor-
vi
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matige likiditeit, as die skok relatief onwaarskynlik is; (ii) gedeeltelike likwidasie van investering,
as die skok klein en onwaarskynlik genoeg is, of (iii) beide oormatige likiditeit en gedeeltelike
likwidasie van investering, as die skok gemiddeld groot en waarskynlik is. ’n Globale bank met
asimmetriese inligting kan nie die verbruikerstipe identifiseer nie. Die resultaat is dat ’n globale
bank met asimmetriese inligting minder likiditeitsversekering aan ’n verbruiker kan bied.
Laastens dui die resultate dat ’n enkele, globale bank in hierdie model sub-optimaal is
wanneer die Nash ekwilibirium slegs een bankrotskap voorspel. Andersins lewer die Nash ek-
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An aggregate liquidity demand shock was at the heart of the recent global financial crisis. Specif-
ically, there was an aggregate shock to the market liquidity of a number of bonds linked to sub-
prime mortgages (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Since these subprime bonds
were widely used as collateral in bilateral repo transactions, the adverse shock to their market
liquidity was amplified and spread across the financial sector (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2008; Copeland et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2014). Even without infre-
quent catastrophic events such as financial crises, aggregate liquidity varies across the business
cycle, as reflected in the time-varying spreads between liquid and illiquid assets (see, for exam-
ple, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006). This dissertation contributes to the literature by studying the
contagious spread of liquidity shocks across financial institutions, in particular, the theoreti-
cal literature focusing on deposit-taking banks that follows from the models of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000) and Castiglionesi (2007).
The term contagion is commonly used in the financial intermediation literature to de-
scribe the spill-over of negative shocks in one part of the financial system to another, or to the
real economy. Contagion is central to the arguments in this dissertation. However, the exact
definition and measurement of contagion is not uncontroversial in the literature. In this dis-
sertation, the definition of contagion corresponds with that of Forbes (2012), who documents
the development of the usage and meaning of the term from 1990 onwards: Contagion is the
spillover to financial intermediaries from "extreme negative events" that occurred elsewhere in
the system. Common shocks or general imbalances are therefore ruled out1. Specifically, con-
1For instance, de Bandt and Hartmann (2000) argue for three different sources of systemic risk: (i) contagion,
(ii) common shocks, and (iii) the general build up of widespread imbalances in the financial system.
1
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tagion, as the term is used here, occurs when one financial intermediary defaults due to a large,
localized shock, and this event induces the default of another intermediary (that did not experi-
ence the initial shock) that has positive balance sheet links to the aforementioned intermediary.
While the financial intermediation literature documents contagion across various types
of financial intermediaries and markets, and resulting from various types of shocks, this dis-
sertation focuses on deposit-taking banks. In the related literature, a deposit-taking bank is
defined as a financial intermediary that offers an ex-ante welfare-improving demand-deposit
contract to consumers who face privately observed idiosyncratic liquidity demand risk.
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model is the starting point of most studies of deposit-
taking banks. In this three-period model there are consumers who face idiosyncratic liquidity
demand risk; that is, they are initially uncertain about whether they will prefer to consume
in the intermediate period (early consumers) or in the final period (late consumers). In the
intermediate period, consumers privately learn their type (early or late). While the type of
a specific consumer is private information, the aggregate proportions of early and late con-
sumers are common knowledge. Therefore, there is no aggregate uncertainty. There is a single
deposit-taking bank that can pool the resources of consumers, and can offer them the first-best
risk-sharing allocation, which improves on the outcome that consumers can obtain via private
trade. The mechanism the bank employs is a demand-deposit contract, where all withdrawals
in the intermediate period receive the same return, unless the bank fails. In other words, the de-
posit returns are risk-free (equivalently, non-state-contingent), providing that the bank survives
to honour the contract.
Risk-free deposit returns is a key assumption in this dissertation and in much of the con-
tagion literature2. This assumption serves as a reduced-form way of capturing the feature of real
world demand-deposit contracts that offer a known, risk-free return that is independent of the
moment of withdrawal, conditional on a bank not going into default. Such a non-contingent
demand-deposit contract can also be motivated as an optimal mechanism. For instance, Dia-
mond and Rajan (2001) show that non-contingent demand-deposits arise as a natural commit-
2E.g. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) Allen and Gale (1998, 2000, 2004a,b), Freixas et al. (2000), Dasgupta (2004),
Castiglionesi (2007), and Allen et al. (2009).
2
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ment mechanism to prevent banks from extracting surplus after receiving deposits.
The assumption of a non-contingent demand-deposit also provides a mechanism for
modelling the causes of bank failure. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the non-contingent demand-
deposit contract is augmented with a sequential-service constraint: consumers who attempt to
withdraw in the intermediate period are served in the (random) order in which they lodge their
claims. This induces multiple equilibria, one in which there is a run on the bank, where all
consumers attempt to withdraw early due to self-fulfilling beliefs. In other models3, as in the
one studied in this dissertation, it is assumed that there is uncertainty about the proportion of
consumers who wish to withdraw early. Whatever the mechanism, when the early demand is
so large that a bank has insufficient resources to offer all consumers at least the non-contingent
deposit return, a run occurs and the bank defaults.
The contagion literature typically adds two components to the basic Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) setting: (i) more financial institutions, and (ii) risk at the aggregate as well as the insti-
tutional level. Institution-level risk creates an incentive for the financial institutions to form
balance sheet links in order to cross-insure against individual risk, while the aggregate risk can
induce contagion. A common feature in the theoretical literature on contagion is the resilient-
yet-fragile property: balance sheet linkages provide a buffer against small shocks, but provide
the mechanism for the contagious spread of larger shocks4. Therefore, the implications of di-
rect balance sheet links between banks for financial fragility are ambiguous: they depend on the
reason for and size of the links. The default at a specific bank occurs if the initial shock is large
enough relative to the ex ante buffers held by that bank, but contagion (or a banking crisis) en-
sues if the balance sheet links across banks are large and pervasive enough to cause other banks
to fail. Therefore, the ex-ante portfolio choices of banks, which include their balance sheet links
to other banks, are paramount to understanding the risk of contagion.
The model in this dissertation allows the study of the ex-ante portfolio choices of banks
that may lead to contagion. The starting point is the seminal models of financial contagion of
3E.g. Allen and Gale (2000),Dasgupta (2004),Ennis and Keister (2006) and Castiglionesi (2007).
4See, for example Gai and Kapadia (2010), Elliott et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2015) (and the extensive literature
that follows) who study contagion in more realistic network settings.
3
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Freixas et al. (2000) and in particular of Allen and Gale (2000)5. The economy extends over three
dates. There are consumers with preferences as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and all con-
sumers are initially identical. In the intermediate period, consumers learn their types as private
information: a proportion of them wishes to consume at the interim date (early consumers)
and the remainder wishes to consume at the final date (late consumers). The consumption
preferences of consumers are initially unknown, and banks provide insurance against such id-
iosyncratic liquidity risk by offering demand-deposit contracts.
The bank chooses its portfolio at the initial date, allocating its resources between liquid-
ity, a productive asset and an interbank deposit. Liquidity is simply a storage technology with
zero net return in all periods. The productive investment has a positive net return if held to
maturity (until the final date) but a negative net return if liquidated early (at the interim date).
The interbank deposit has an endogenous return that depends on the equilibrium choices of
the banks and the state of nature that realizes.
There are two regions, and in the absence of an aggregate liquidity demand shock, some
regional variation in liquidity demand, which motivates insurance across regions. When an
aggregate liquidity demand shock occurs, by contrast, there is a higher aggregate proportion of
consumers who wish to consume at the interim date. The aggregate shock cannot be diversified
away across regions.
The model in this dissertation follows that of Allen and Gale (2000) as closely as possible,
but contributes by augmenting their model in one important aspect: it introduces aggregate
liquidity demand shocks with positive probability. This is not a trivial addition to the model,
because in their model, the aggregate liquidity demand shock is completely unanticipated (it
has zero probability). This means that the shock can have no impact on the ex-ante choices of
banks or the ex-ante welfare of consumers. Furthermore, banks attain the deterministic first
best allocation, so that there can be no ex-ante role for policy. When the aggregate liquidity de-
mand shock occurs with positive probability, banks can internalize the risk, which affects their
5Both models yield very similar results and were published at the same time. The focus is on the model of
Allen and Gale (2000) as the benchmark because it yields more tractable analytical solutions. The methodology,
however, could just as well be applied to the equally appealing model of Freixas et al. (2000).
4
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ex-ante portfolio choices. This generalization of the Allen and Gale (2000) model therefore al-
lows the study of the impact of simultaneous variation in the probability and size of aggregate
liquidity risk on portfolio choices and on risk-sharing across states and over time. It also al-
lows for a possible role for policy to improve the outcome over that which banks would choose
independently.
The analysis of Allen and Gale (2000) shows that, in the absence of aggregate liquidity de-
mand shocks, the first-best allocation is deterministic (both early and late consumers face no
consumption risk) and incentive compatible (where the consumption of late consumers is at
least as large as that of early consumers, so that late consumers have no incentive to run on the
bank). The first-best allocation can be feasibly decentralized if banks hold interbank deposits
in each other that are large enough to provide the necessary liquidity transfers to cover regional
liquidity demand shocks. Next, they show that, if an unanticipated and sufficiently large aggre-
gate liquidity demand shock hits a representative bank in one region, it will be unable to offer
an incentive-compatible allocation. This induces a run on that bank, so that the bank defaults
and liquidates fully. Lastly, depending on the structure of the network of cross-holdings of in-
terbank deposits, a default in one region can spill over to cause a default in the next region that
did not experience the aggregate liquidity demand shock. In Allen and Gale (2000), contagion
occurs only when the network is sufficiently incomplete.
The key contribution of this dissertation is the full characterization of strategic interbank
market determination and the prevalence of contagion in a situation where the probability of
the aggregate liquidity demand shock is positive. This is novel in the literature. Other studies of
interbank market contagion assume no interbank deposit market6, or a perfectly competitive
interbank market7, or they study a different solution concept8.
The solution concept of the model studied here is the symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the non-cooperative game between two representative regional banks9 subject to regional and
6E.g. Diamond and Rajan (2011), Duarte and Eisenbach (2018) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008). In these
models banks are exposed to each other via other channels than direct balance sheet links, such as correlated
investment, fire sales of liquid assets or correlated information.
7E.g. Allen and Gale (1998) and Allen et al. (2009)
8E.g. Dasgupta (2004) who studies a global games coordination equilibrium.
9This is a simplified version of the model in Allen and Gale (2000) where there are four regions, each with a
5
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aggregate liquidity risk. The two regional banks independently choose their asset portfolios
(holdings of liquidity, productive investment, and the interbank deposit in the demand-deposit
contract of the bank in the other region), as well as the deposit return on early withdrawals
(which is subject to a non-state-contingency constraint unless default occurs). As a bank can-
not observe the type of consumer, it must offer an incentive compatible contract in any state
where it wants to avoid a run. That is, late consumers must receive a greater return by waiting
until the final period to withdraw. Otherwise they will attempt to withdraw in the intermediate
period, which constitutes a run on the bank.
Ex ante, there are three distinct types of symmetric Nash equilibria that may arise: one
in which neither bank ever defaults, one in which only the bank that experiences the aggre-
gate liquidity demand shock defaults, and an equilibrium where both banks default whenever
either bank experiences the aggregate liquidity demand shock. The last situation represents
the definition of contagion in this model. As in Allen and Gale (2000), the aggregate liquidity
demand shock is localized in one region. In the contagion case, the bank that experiences the
aggregate shock does not hold enough resources to offer an incentive-compatible contract that
satisfies the non-state-contingency constraint on deposit returns. It thus experiences a run,
and defaults. The consequent return on the interbank deposit of the other bank (that did not
experience the aggregate liquidity demand shock) is so much lower that it also cannot offer an
incentive-compatible return on the deposit contract, and thus it also faces a run and defaults.
The contagion case is thus equivalent to the mutual-default equilibrium type in this disserta-
tion.
The formal problem facing a representative bank in an arbitrary region is ex-ante fully
symmetric across the two regions. This defines a single symmetric best-response function that
is applicable to the representative bank in either region. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the game is defined by the fixed point of this symmetric best-response function.
This problem is extremely difficult to study analytically due to the structure of the best-
response function. The best-response function is complicated as a result of several potentially
representative bank. The difference to the setup is immaterial for the results obtained, but studying a two-player
game is analytically and computationally more tractable than studying a four-player game.
6
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binding constraints faced by the banks. The full analytical characterization of the fixed point of
the best-response function may require up to 36 distinct cases, based on the different patterns
in which the many constraints may bind or be slack. Hence, the symmetric Nash equilibrium
of the full strategic game between the two banks is approximated numerically across the full
range of model parameters.
The numerical approximation of the symmetric Nash equilibrium is an iteratively stable
fixed point of the implied symmetric best-response function of one bank to the choice vector
of the other bank. The best-response choice of a bank (to a given choice of the other bank) is
constructed by direct numerical optimization of the constrained objective function of an arbi-
trary bank. The constrained objective function is given by the strategic problem of an ex ante
symmetric bank in an arbitrary region. The constrained objective function of a regional bank is
the regional ex-ante expected utility of an arbitrary consumer in that region, subject to a set of
incentive-compatibility and non-negativity constraints.
For each parameter set and for each of the three potential equilibrium types indepen-
dently, standard constrained numerical optimization routines are used to solve for the approx-
imate best response of the representative bank in one region to a feasible initial choice of the
bank in the other region. The algorithm then replaces the choice of the counterparty bank with
the found best response and then iterates over the best-response function until the sequence of
best responses converges to a fixed point, within numerical precision. This yields a candidate
symmetric Nash equilibrium for each potential equilibrium type. Finally, the approximate sym-
metric Nash equilibrium type is selected from the three candidate types as the one that attains
the maximum expected utility for the given parameter set.
The numerical approach yields several results in the decentralized setting:
(i) As the probability of aggregate risk approaches zero, the numerically approximated sym-
metric Nash equilibrium converges on the deterministic first-best allocation, replicating
the analytic results of Allen and Gale (2000). This serves as an important validation of the
reliability of the numerical approach.
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(ii) There are parameter ranges in which contagion never occurs in equilibrium, given the
positive probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. Specifically, this occurs
when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is small enough.
(iii) If the aggregate liquidity demand shock is large enough to make contagion possible, the
symmetric Nash equilibrium has one of three different characterizations10: if the prob-
ability of the shock is small enough, the equilibrium is characterized by both banks de-
faulting if the aggregate shock realizes (i.e. contagion occurs). If the probability is inter-
mediate, the equilibrium is characterized by only one bank (the one hit by the aggregate
liquidity demand shock) defaulting (i.e. default without contagion occurs). If the proba-
bility of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is high enough, the banks choose portfolios
and deposit returns such that neither bank ever defaults.
(iv) Across parameter ranges where the three equilibrium types have positive measure, op-
timal choices are discontinuous functions of the parameterization, i.e. at the parame-
ter boundary where one equilibrium type switches to another, there is a discontinuity
in the optimal choice. This mirrors similar discontinuities in the aggregate benchmark
allocations where the solution switches from one type to another (the benchmarks are
discussed below).
(v) The endogenous interbank deposits are always symmetric and positive, which implies
that the interbank network is always complete in equilibrium. This contributes to the
study of contagion in the endogenous network formation literature11. Thus, when con-
tagion occurs, it occurs in a complete interbank network, in contrast to Allen and Gale
(2000).
(vi) Contagion is a rare phenomenon in the parameter space of this model. In an exercise
where model parameters where drawn independently from their allowable ranges, con-
tagion is possible in approximately 4% of the parameter draws. This is an upper bound
on the prevalence of contagion, as one of the randomly drawn parameters is the proba-
10These different equilibrium types have positive measure in the numerically studied parameter space.




bility of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. Contagion only occurs in a parameter set
where it is possible if the aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized. Taking into ac-
count the probability of the shock in parameter sets where contagion is possible, the ex
ante likelihood of contagion falls to approximately 0.5%.
To analyze the welfare outcomes in the numerically approximated decentralized equilib-
rium, a novel aggregate benchmark is presented as a comparison allocation. This allocation
is fully characterized analytically, and is augmented with numerical examples to provide a full
comparison of the outcomes in the benchmarks with those from the numerically approximated
decentralized equilibrium. The benchmark is labelled a global bank and is studied under two
information assumptions: under full information and under asymmetric information.
A global bank is defined as single banking company with two branches, one in each re-
gion12. Therefore, the two regional banks in the decentralized case become the regional branches
of a global bank in the aggregate benchmark. The objective of a global bank is to maximize the
ex ante welfare of a consumer from an arbitrary region. As such, a global bank invests in its
portfolio at the aggregate level, and treats consumers from different regions identically13. Im-
portantly, this means a global bank either survives as a whole, or fails as a whole. It cannot allow
default in just one region. In the decentralized situation, in contrast, it is possible for the bank
in one region to fail while the bank in the other region survives.
I study the global bank benchmark under two information assumptions: under full in-
formation, a global bank is not subject to the information constraint: it can observe the type
of consumer (early or late). This means it can force a late consumer to withdraw in the final
period and hence, avoid a run by assumption. The implication of this is that a fully informed
global bank is not subject to an incentive compatibility constraint - it can offer late consumers
12This benchmark can loosely be related to the empirical work on the historical features of national banks by
Calomiris and Carlson (2016, 2017). While national banks are somewhat less relevant in economies like the US,
they are still important in countries with more concentrated banking systems like South Africa.
13The global bank allocation is therefore different from a standard benevolent global bank allocation that is typ-
ically used as an aggregate benchmark. Such a global bank allocation would be be subject only to the defining
characteristics of the economy studied. It would be able to treat consumers in different regions differently and of-
fer state contingent consumption allocations to all consumers. This benchmark is formally identical to the autarkic
allocation characterized in Castiglionesi et al. (2017), and hence omitted from the dissertation.
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a lower return than early consumers without experiencing a run and defaulting. However, a
fully informed global bank is still subject to offering a non-state-contingent early consumption
unless it defaults (default of a global bank is the aggregate benchmark equivalent of contagion
in the decentralized setting).
One of the contributions of the dissertation is to show that the non-state-contingency
constraint on early consumption is sufficient to make default optimal for a global bank with full
information (for some parameter regions). Thus, even though a fully informed global bank can
always avoid a run (and default), it is sometimes optimal for a global bank to choose to allow a
run and default. This is because default is the only tool available to the global bank whereby
consumption risk can be transferred from late to early consumers. The optimality of default
in this dissertation is similar to results on optimal default and financial crisis in Allen and Gale
(1998).
The global bank allocation under full information represents the optimal risk-sharing ar-
rangement when the types of consumers are observed, but with the constraint that early con-
sumption is non-state-contingent, except if the global bank optimally chooses to default in the
intermediate period. The ex-ante choice of whether or not to default in the intermediate period
thus is a choice between two regimes that are distinct because each is subject to a different set
of economically motivated constraints. In the no-default regime, the global bank is subject to
the constraint of non-state-contingent early consumption; in the default regime, it is not. The
solution to the global bank problem can thus have one of two distinct possible characteriza-
tions, depending on whether the default or the no-default regime is ex-ante optimal. Moreover,
at the boundary of the parameter regions where the optimal regime switches from one type to
the other, the optimal choices of a global bank can be discontinuous.
For an aggregate liquidity demand shock that is both sufficiently large and sufficiently
unlikely, a global bank optimally chooses to default and fully liquidate all assets in the event of
such a shock (under both full and asymmetric information). All proceeds from the liquidation
of asset is then proportionally distributed to all consumers. Effectively, this is the only tool
that allows a global bank to avoid the constraint that a deposit contract must provide risk-free
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deposit returns at the interim date, which can be quite costly ex ante. This result agrees with the
insights of Allen and Gale (1998), who emphasize the value of bank default as a tool to manage
aggregate solvency shocks.
In contrast, when a global bank optimally does not choose to default after an aggregate
liquidity demand shock, there are two tools that balance the marginal utility of early and late
consumers. These tools are labelled excess liquidity and partial liquidation. Excess liquidity
may be optimally used in the state in which the aggregate liquidity demand shock does not
realize. In this case, some liquidity is used to finance late consumption (which is ex-post inef-
ficient). In contrast, partial liquidation of the productive investment may be necessary after an
aggregate liquidity demand shock does realize. In this case, some of the productive investment
is liquidated early in order to finance early consumption (which is also ex-post inefficient). The
extent of the usage of these two ex-post inefficient tools depend on the probability of an aggre-
gate liquidity demand shock, which in turn determines their relative ex-ante efficiency. For a
likely aggregate liquidity demand shock, a global bank holds only excess liquidity. For a small
and unlikely shock, however, only partial liquidation is used. For shocks of intermediate size
and probability, a global bank uses both excess liquidity and partial liquidation. This is differ-
ent from the study of Allen and Gale (2000), where liquidity is used exclusively to finance early
consumption, and the productive investment is used exclusively to finance late consumption.
Next, I study the global bank under asymmetric information. A global bank that cannot
observe consumer types must offer an incentive compatible consumption allocation to avoid
a run. In other words, late consumers must receive a larger consumption allocation when they
withdraw in the final period than early consumers receive by withdrawing in the intermediate
period, otherwise all consumers would attempt to withdraw in the intermediate period and the
bank will default. I show that this information constraint is economically important by charac-
terizing the parameter regions where it binds and analyzing how the choices of a global bank
under asymmetric information differs from its choices under full information. The results show
that, due to the incentive compatibility constraints, a global bank that cannot observe con-
sumer types relies more on excess liquidity and less on partial liquidation, both on the intensive
margin (levels) and on the extensive margin (for a larger range of parameters). As a result, there
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are parameter regions where a global bank can provide less insurance against liquidity risk to
consumers under asymmetric information than it can under full information.
The final contribution of this dissertation is a comparison of the welfare outcomes in
the analytical aggregate benchmarks with the numerical results in the decentralized problem.
There are two key findings:
(i) When the parameter set is such that the Nash equilibrium of the decentralized problem is
characterized by either no default or mutual default (i.e. contagion), there is no evidence
that the decentralized allocation is inferior to the benchmark. Therefore, for these pa-
rameter sets, the decentralized equilibrium attains the same level of welfare as the global
bank benchmark.
(ii) When the parameter set is such that the Nash equilibrium of the decentralized problem
is characterized by single default, the decentralized allocation is often significantly supe-
rior to the global bank allocation (under full or asymmetric information). Since the global
bank is a single bank with two regional branches where consumers must be treated iden-
tically, it loses a degree of freedom; that is, the global bank does not have the option of
allowing the branch in one region to fail while the other survives. This extra degree of
freedom in the decentralized problem yields the superior outcomes. This result is tan-
gentially related to results in the literature where banks can become inefficiently similar
either by excessive integration on the interbank market, which exposes all banks to the
same aggregate risk (Castiglionesi et al., 2017); or, by excessive diversification in invest-
ment, so that all banks face the same returns on investments and their depositors receive
identical returns (Wagner, 2010).
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 presents a review of the related litera-
ture. It reviews in some depth the closest papers to the model presented here. These are models
that have considered banking and contagion in the face of either pure liquidity risk or a com-
bination of liquidity and investment risk. The following sections of the literature review covers
other possible sources of contagion: correlated investments, fire sales of assets, and correlated
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information. A final section reviews the literature on the impact of interconnectedness on con-
tagion. Chapter 2 sets out the environment that defines the economy subject to liquidity risk,
and chapter 3 provides the analytical results on the benchmarks in this economy. Chapter 4
sets out the strategic problem of independent regional banks, provides a discussion the nature
of the interbank market and defines the Nash equilibrium. It concludes by presenting a discus-
sion on the numerical approach used to solve for the Nash equilibrium. Chapter 5 presents the
results of the characterization of the numerically approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the strategic interbank problem. Chapter 6 provides a comparison of the welfare outcomes of






This literature review is structured as follows. In the first section, I provide a review of historical
banking crises, including the global financial crisis of 2007/8, and the central role of liquidity
uncertainty in the propagation of localized shocks that result in large-scale financial contagion.
To study this effect, economists have proposed numerous models based on pure liquidity risk,
or a combination of liquidity and investment risk. The second section provides a review of mod-
els taken from the strand of literature that is closest to the work done in this dissertation, which
consider only pure liquidity risk. The third section considers models that are also close to the
one in this dissertation, except that they consider a combination of liquidity and investment
risk. The fourth section considers models where financial contagion can arise for reasons other
than pure liquidity or investment risk. These are situations where contagion can arise due to (i)
correlated investments, where banks invest in similar (illiquid) types of projects, (ii) fire sales of
assets, where banks structure the asset side of their balance sheets using similar assets that are
subject to price disturbances in crises, and (iii) correlated information, where a shock to one
part of a banking system reveals information about other parts of the system. In the final part
of the review I shift attention away from shocks to the banking system to consider the inter-




1.1 The global financial crisis and why liquidity matters
Brunnermeier (2009) places a "liquidity crunch" at the centre of the global financial crisis of
2007/8. He identifies the vicious liquidity spirals that occurred during the crisis: as falling as-
set prices reduced the capital positions of financial institutions, this led to liquidity hoarding
and reductions in lending. Combined with a high degree of interconnectedness, these liquidity
shocks spread contagiously throughout the financial sector, causing massive reductions in the
stock market value of financial institutions, further reducing lending, inducing real reductions
in output and consumption, and increases in unemployment.
The primary vector of contagion during the crisis was the broad reliance of the intercon-
nected banking sector on short term financing via the collateralized repo market (Copeland
et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2014). Distress in the mortgage market
caused panic over the value of securitized mortgage backed securities, which served as collat-
eral for a substantial proportion of the repo market. For instance, Gorton and Metrick (2012)
present evidence of a "run on repo", documenting a massive increase in the margins in repo
transactions which corresponds to a dry up of interbank liquidity during the global financial
crisis – the margins became so high that the assets backing a potential repo transaction had
essentially no value as collateral. Banks therefore could not use a large portion of their assets as
collateral in short term borrowing, and hence could not generate the liquidity needed to satisfy
short term liquidity demand. Thus, a localized shock in the housing sector led to large scale
liquidity shortages in the banking sector.
The reliance of the banking sector on the repo market is a relatively recent phenomenon,
but bank crises and financial contagion are not (Friedman and Schwartz, 2008; Minoiu and
Reyes, 2013). Direct interbank lending has also been a source of interconnectedness, which
has led to contagion in historical banking crises. Similar to the global financial crisis, aggregate
liquidity reductions that spread across banks connected via direct interbank deposits occurred
during the Great Depression. Mitchener and Richardson (2013, 2019) document how liquidity
shocks to peripheral banks led to a "cascade of interbank withdrawals" (and therefore a reduc-
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tion of aggregate liquidity in the system) that spread first to the regional financial centres and
then to central reserve cities.
Several theoretical reasons for aggregate liquidity problems have been suggested. I review
two salient contributions that argue for two distinct reasons why banks might hoard liquidity
and hence cause aggregate liquidity disturbances: Acharya and Skeie (2011) present the argu-
ment that, during a crisis, banks might hold on to liquidity rather than lend it to counter party
banks that are in need of liquidity for precautionary reasons, regardless of the level of counter
party risk, whereas Heider et al. (2015) argue that banks hoard liquidity because they fear an
increase in counterparty risk during a crisis and not for precautionary reasons.
Acharya and Skeie (2011) show theoretically that shocks to asset valuations can cause liq-
uidity hoarding, or even a complete market freeze, with correspondingly large interbank in-
terest rate premiums. These effects require that banks with high leverage face moral hazard
problems - the incentive to hoard is induced by the risk (after the shock) that the interbank
loans of highly leveraged banks may not be rolled over after the shock, therefore such banks
keep liquidity for precautionary reasons rather than lending to other banks1.
Another mechanism that may lead to aggregate liquidity problems is an increase in coun-
terparty risk during a crisis. Heider et al. (2015) present a model where liquidity hoarding occurs
due to increased counterparty risk stemming from an adverse selection problem, rather than for
precautionary reasons. In their model, the level of aggregate liquidity available to banks is an
endogenous consequence of their decisions. The adverse selection problem arises due to bank
specific investment risk that is only privately observable (to the investing bank). When interest
rates are high, only riskier banks want to borrow which could lead to reduced liquidity available
on the interbank market, or even to the complete collapse of the interbank market2.
It is an empirical question which of these two mechanisms – precautionary liquidity hoard-
ing or liquidity hoarding due to increased counterparty risk – better explain the aggregate liq-
uidity problems of the global financial crisis. Afonso et al. (2011) present an empirical study
1See also Allen et al. (2009), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Diamond and Rajan (2011)
2See also Flannery (1996) and Freixas and Jorge (2008).
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based on the daily transactions of banks on the Federal Funds Market. They found that the
main reason for the reduction in liquidity was counterparty risk, as riskier banks did not hoard
liquidity.
From the literature reviewed here, two key ideas are central to financial contagion based
on the most recent as well as historical banking crises3: financial contagion between banks has
been associated with aggregate liquidity disruptions, and the degree and cause of interconnect-
edness materially affect the severity of the ensuing crisis.
This dissertation contributes to the theoretical literature on financial contagion that as-
sumes exogenous aggregate liquidity uncertainty. The main contributions are to provide a
framework for understanding the endogenous formation of interconnections conditional on
aggregate liquidity risk, and to study the consequences for contagion of these endogenous links.
Since the dissertation contributes to the theory of financial contagion, this review turns now to
the precursors of the model described in later chapters.
1.2 Models with only liquidity risk
This dissertation adds to a narrow literature that considers contagion to be a consequence
of liquidity disturbances, based on the seminal theoretical structure of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) regarding banks that provide liquidity insurance.
The closest models to the one considered in this dissertation are those in Allen and Gale
(2000), Dasgupta (2004) and Castiglionesi (2007). These models all build on the standard three
period setting of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where information revealed in the intermediate
period yields the outcome of either an individual bank run or contagion. In all the papers re-
viewed in this section, there are two assets: a risk-free storage technology (called liquidity in
this dissertation) and a productive investment that can yield a higher return in the final period
3Of course, the global financial crisis and all previous banking crises are far more multifaceted than the brief
treatment devoted to them here, but the focus in this dissertation is not on such issues as risk-shifting, securiti-
zation or political influence on the mortgage market. For reviews of these issues see, for example, United States
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011).
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than liquidity. Various papers make different assumptions on the productive investment tech-
nology: it may be risky or risk free, liquid or illiquid. I provide the details for each case below.
A central assumption in these models is that consumers face liquidity risk; that is, they are
unsure whether they wish to consume in the short run (intermediate period) or long run (final
period). Banks provide a mechanism for insuring against this liquidity risk. A bank can pool
the resources of consumers and offer a demand deposit contract that yields a higher expected
utility than a consumer can obtain without a bank, for both types of consumer. The banks in the
literature reviewed here are all assumed to be subject to (local) competition, so that they cannot
extract any surplus, but make choices to maximize the ex-ante expected utility of an arbitrary
(local) consumer.
In the seminal model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the single bank problem is deter-
ministic. The productive investment is risk free but fully illiquid (i.e. it cannot be liquidated in
the intermediate period to finance early withdrawals). The key result is that the bank is exposed
to multiple equilibria due to a sequential service assumption in the intermediate period; that is,
withdrawing consumers are served in the sequence in which they lodge their claims. All early
consumers necessarily withdraw in the intermediate period, but late consumers are faced with
a coordination problem: if a late consumer believes that all other late consumers will withdraw
early, the best response would also be to withdraw early. By contrast, if a late consumer believes
that all other late consumers will not withdraw early, the best response would not be to with-
draw early. A bank run is therefore one of the Nash equilibria of the coordination game among
consumers. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is no way to determine which equilibrium
will occur, but policies like deposit insurance can make the no-run equilibrium unique. Ennis
and Keister (2006) add a signal to the model which consumers use to coordinate their decision
to run. They are thus able to characterize the probability of a run uniquely.
In much of the rest of the literature reviewed below, as in my model, the possibility of a run
induced by a coordination problem is ruled out by assumption, in order to focus on other types
of risk to the bank; for example, aggregate liquidity uncertainty and/or investment uncertainty.
I build directly on the model of Allen and Gale (2000). They study a situation with four
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regional banks which are subject to perfectly negatively correlated regional liquidity demand
shocks, augmented with an unanticipated (zero-probability) aggregate liquidity demand shock.
The productive investment is risk-free and partially liquid; that is, it can be liquidated early (in
the intermediate period) but at a negative net return. Runs due to coordination failure are ruled
out, so that all bank runs are efficient.
The first step in their analysis is to characterize the efficient benchmark. They show that
the first best is deterministic and can be feasibly decentralized by each bank holding a sufficient
proportion of its assets in the demand-deposit contracts of the other three banks. The regional
liquidity demand variation serves as incentive for banks to mutually insure via cross-holdings
of the demand deposit contracts. In section 5.1, I show the equivalent of this allocation for two
banks.
In this decentralized allocation, contagion can occur if an unanticipated (zero ex-ante
probability) aggregate liquidity demand shock occurs. Contagion occurs if (i) the aggregate
liquidity demand shock is large enough, and (ii) the network of direct balance sheet links is
incomplete enough. I add to these results by showing that, in a two-bank setting, contagion
can still occur even when the aggregate liquidity demand shock has positive probability ex ante,
and when the interbank network is complete, i.e. when each bank holds some of the demand
deposit contract of the other. In my model a similar requirement for contagion arises as in Allen
and Gale (2000) in the sense that the aggregate liquidity demand shock must be large enough
to induce contagion.
The next closest model to the one in this dissertation is that of Castiglionesi (2007), who
also builds directly on the four-bank model of Allen and Gale (2000). He studies whether a cen-
tral bank setting reserve requirements can avoid contagion when an aggregate liquidity demand
shock occurs with positive probability. The productive investment is risk free and partially liq-
uid, as in Allen and Gale (2000). As in my work, Castiglionesi allows for an aggregate liquidity
demand shock with positive probability, but this shock can hit only one bank. His key result is to
show that the central bank can indeed avoid contagion by imposing a sufficiently high liquidity
holding requirement. This result requires two features: (i) the central bank must be allowed to
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offer state contingent consumption when the aggregate liquidity demand shock occurs, and (ii)
the regional banks must not anticipate the aggregate liquidity demand shock while the central
bank must anticipate it with correct probability. Finally, when the central bank is constrained
to offer deposit returns that are not state contingent, the first best allocation cannot be imple-
mented, but contagion can still be avoided.
An important feature of the Castiglionesi (2007) model is that the aggregate liquidity de-
mand shock can hit only one region. As such there is no ex-ante reason for banks to consider
mutually insuring against the aggregate risk.
My model contributes several features and results to that of Castiglionesi (2007). First, I
consider a situation where the aggregate liquidity demand shock can hit any region with the
same, known probability, implying a symmetric ex-ante problem for banks in the decentralized
setting, and one in which there is an incentive to potentially insure against even the aggregate
liquidity demand shock. Second, I study a situation in which banks always have an accurate
belief of the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. Thus, my results do not rely
on an inaccurate understanding of the aggregate liquidity demand risk. Third, I study non-
cooperative choices over interbank deposits whereas the results in Castiglionesi (2007) rely on
a competitive interbank market (as opposed to the fully strategic problem in this dissertation).
Last, I show that it can be optimal to allow contagion, whereas Castiglionesi (2007) imposes that
the efficient allocation must avoid contagion. In my model, with a more complete benchmark,
if a central bank were to avoid contagion by imposing sufficiently high liquidity requirements on
regional banks, it would in fact be welfare decreasing. This comes from my result that contagion
can be optimal as in Allen and Gale (1998).
In the above models, contagion occurs in a financial system that is comprised of only
banks. A question that arises is whether augmenting the model with a competitive financial
market could avoid contagion. This is studied by Allen and Gale (2004a,b), who consider the
interaction between a system of competitive banks and a financial market. The productive in-
vestment is risk free and can be traded on a competitive secondary market. They show that, if
the financial market for aggregate risks is complete, then the full system implements the con-
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strained efficient equilibrium. If the market for aggregate risk is incomplete, there remains a
role for regulating liquidity provision. In an extension, Allen and Gale (2004a) show that this
setup implies financial fragility – even vanishingly small aggregate liquidity demand shocks are
sufficient to induce large financial crises.
My results show that, to be fully general, an aggregate banking benchmark must include
the option for a global bank to consider choosing to default (the benchmark equivalent of con-
tagion in the decentralized case). This is related to the work of Allen et al. (2009), who study a
situation with a competitive interbank market where there are also only idiosyncratic and ag-
gregate liquidity demand uncertainty as in this dissertation, but they constrain their analysis
to levels of uncertainty small enough not to induce any bank failure (or contagion). The inter-
bank market consists of the partial sale of the investment project in the intermediate period
in a competitive market, where the equilibrium price of the secondary market for investment
is the market clearing mechanism. They show that, in the presence of aggregate liquidity de-
mand shocks, the interbank market fails to attain the constrained efficient allocation, as price
volatility is needed to clear the market for liquidity provision in exchange for the productive in-
vestment. In their model, a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by
fixing interest rates.
My model nests their constrained efficient allocation as a special case. The competitive
interbank market with low prices for the productive investment functions like the penalty on
early liquidation of investment in my model. Since this is a purely market driven effect in their
model, the aggregate benchmark in Allen et al. (2009) is not subject to this penalty. As such, the
constrained efficient allocation in their paper does not employ any liquidation of the produc-
tive investment. My work therefore contributes a new benchmark that adds the feature that the
early partial liquidation of productive investment, or even default with full liquidation of all as-
sets, may be optimal, even when the benchmark is also subject to a penalty on early liquidation.
In other words, I characterize an aggregate benchmark in a more general setting.
My choice of a strategic interbank market where banks invest directly in each other’s de-
mand deposit contracts, rather than a competitive interbank market that is distinct from the de-
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mand deposit contract, avoids the problem of multiple equilibria found in Freixas et al. (2011).
They study a model where banks trade on a competitive interbank market with an endogenous
interbank interest rate that is distinct from the deposit returns that banks offer to their con-
sumers. The productive investment is risk free and illiquid. In their model there are two states:
one in which deposit demand is identical across banks, and a second where some banks have
low demand and others high demand. The key results are that there is a continuum of possible
equilibria across a range of equilibrium interbank interest rates and that the central bank that
selects the appropriate, state-contingent interest rate can implement the first best outcome (in
the absence of aggregate liquidity demand risk) or a Pareto-improved outcome (in the presence
of aggregate liquidity risk).
1.3 Models with liquidity and investment risk
The models discussed in the previous section consider only pure liquidity risk in order to isolate
these effects from other causes of bank distress. The next set of models I review are also close
to mine, but add investment risk as an additional cause of contagion. Thus, it is not possible to
disentangle the impact of pure liquidity risk. Nevertheless, the analytic approaches and results
in these models are sufficiently close to mine to deserve detailed treatment.
As in my aggregate benchmark, Allen and Gale (1998) find that contagion can sometimes
be optimal. They study the outcomes for a representative bank against several benchmarks. In
their model there is no aggregate liquidity risk, but there is aggregate risk in the productive in-
vestment, which they interpret as the effects of business cycles on bank value. They show that,
in a setting where banks are constrained to offer a deposit return that is non-contingent in the
absence of a run (or default), bank runs are efficient. In their model, they consider a represen-
tative bank, so could not study contagion. My result extends this optimal default outcome to a
situation with only liquidity demand risk. The result also requires the constraint on banks that
early consumption must be non-state-contingent (or risk free) in the absence of default.
My parameterization of the model includes all possibilities, from fully illiquid to fully liq-
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uid investment. I show that the constraint of a non-contingent deposit return in the absence
of default is sufficient to imply the optimality of global bank default (which is the aggregate
benchmark equivalent of contagion in the decentralized setting) when a large and rare enough
aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized and when the early liquidation return on the in-
vestment is low enough. I show that when contagion occurs in a non-cooperative, decentralized
setting, it remains as efficient as in the aggregate benchmark (within numerical accuracy).
One of my central contributions is to study the full strategic problem between two banks.
In a similar vein, Dasgupta (2004) considers a model with two regional banks, but uses a dif-
ferent equilibrium concept and a different type of shock that leads to contagion. In his model,
banks also choose cross holdings of deposits ex ante in order to insure against a regional liq-
uidity demand shock, but the productive investment option available to each bank is region
specific and risky. The equilibrium concept used is based on a coordination mechanism in
global games described in Morris and Shin (2003), where an imperfect signal is received in
the intermediate period on the size of the risky return on investment. If the signals are low
enough, contagion occurs4. Combined with a carefully chosen timing assumption on the ar-
rival of shocks and signals, the global games coordination mechanism allows Dasgupta (2004)
to solve for a unique equilibrium, in terms of the size of signals, that determines the probability
of contagion. My work differs in that I study how pure liquidity shocks can lead to contagion, by
considering a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium without signals in the intermediate period, and I
do not need to make a possibly delicate intra-period timing assumption.
One of my key results is that a global bank allocation can be less efficient than the decen-
tralized case. This mirrors a similar result found by Wagner (2010) in a model of investment risk.
In his model there are two regional banks, each with a local activity. Banks have the option of
investing in only the local activity, or diversifying into both activities. He shows that full diver-
sification is not optimal and that the equilibrium level of diversification chosen by individual
banks is also greater than optimal. The reason for this is as follows: while diversifying reduces
the probability of failure at a single bank, it makes the banks more similar and hence more likely
to fail due to a systemic crisis. He extends the model to show that the same effect holds for the
4See also Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
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trading of interbank deposits to cover withdrawal demand. In his model, the interbank contract
is structured such that banks agree to exchange sufficient resources to pay depositors in the in-
termediate period. My model differs in that the interbank deposit is chosen non-cooperatively
in the initial period. I show that this is sufficient to avoid inefficient interbank links. In my
model, for the range of parameters where full insurance would be inefficient, banks ex ante
choose a lower interbank deposit so that they do not experience contagion or a systemic crisis.
In this region my results are similar to that of Wagner (2010) in that full mutual insurance would
be inefficient, but they differ in that banks strategically choose portfolios such that they avoid
inefficient full mutual insurance in Nash equilibrium.
Finally, in my results, as in those of Allen and Gale (1998), when contagion occurs, it is
optimal. This is not always the case: Freixas et al. (2000) consider a situation where contagion
is possible as one of multiple equilibria, where technically solvent banks face a coordination
problem on whether to honour credit lines. These credit lines operate similarly to the interbank
deposits in my model but are in response to a spatial uncertainty - consumers face no liquidity
risk (all consumers can consume in the final period of the model) but are uncertain about which
region they will need to consume in.
Additionally there is investment risk because the return on investment differs across re-
gions. The interbank market in terms of credit lines allows the set of N banks to provide liq-
uidity insurance - banks with high local demand draw on credit lines from banks that have low
local demand. The key mechanism in their model is the multiplicity of equilibria – there always
exists an equilibrium where the interbank market vanishes (when bank renege on their agree-
ments in the intermediate period), leading to contagion, even when all banks are technically
solvent. They show that a central bank that functions as a lender of last resort, can implement
the efficient equilibrium by offering central lines of credit. In their model, this is without cost
as the mere promise of the central bank to provide lines of credit is sufficient for the multiplic-
ity of equilibria to vanish so that just the efficient equilibrium remains, in which the interbank
market functions perfectly. Thus, the central bank promises are without cost - in the efficient
equilibrium they are never used.
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My approach differs in that there is temporal rather than spatial uncertainty about con-
sumption, as in Allen and Gale (2000, 1998), and only liquidity risk, rather than a combination
of liquidity and investment return risk. Lastly, when contagion occurs in my model it is efficient,
as in Allen and Gale (1998), so that there is no role for a lender of last resort without imbuing
that policy entity with the ability to generate more real resources (i.e. a zero-cost lender of last
resort will not change my equilibrium outcomes).
1.4 Other mechanisms that can induce contagion
In the papers reviewed above, contagion (where studied) occurs due to direct balance sheet
links between banks. Contagion occurs when the failure of one bank reduces the value of the
direct claims on that bank to such an extent that another bank – one that holds a sufficient
amount of such claims in a failing bank – also fails, because of the reduction of value of the
claims.
Several mechanisms other than direct balance sheet links have been studied as potential
causes of contagion (or banking crises). I briefly touch on the most important of these channels
of contagion in this section.
The channels of contagion distinct from direct balance sheet links can be summarized as
follows:
(i) Contagion due to investment in correlated illiquid assets. All banks invest in potentially
illiquid projects (e.g. project-specific loans, where only the bank in question has the skills
to monitor the projects invested in (Diamond and Rajan, 2001)). When some banks in-
vest in dissimilar projects from others, they may be less capable of accessing affordable
interbank financing from the general corpus of banks. Thus, banks have an incentive to
invest in similar projects so that mutual monitoring capabilities yields lower costs of ac-
cess to interbank financing. This, however, exposes banks to similar risks and increases
the likelihood of contagion. I present some results in the literature on this channel in the
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first part of this section.
(ii) Contagion due to fire sales of assets. All banks hold liquid assets against mostly illiquid
loan investments to deal with unexpected liquidity demands. When these assets must
be liquidated by distressed banks in order to accommodate liquidity demands, the gen-
eral price of these assets can fall dramatically. Other banks, not facing large liquidity de-
mands, may then experience a deterioration of their asset positions if they price assets on
their balance sheets on a marked-to-market basis. Thus, the fire sale of commonly held
liquid assets by distressed banks may reduce the balance sheet positions of initially non-
distressed banks to such an extent that they are also at risk of failing. The second part of
this section consider contributions on this channel of contagion.
(iii) Contagion due to correlated information across different banks in a system. Banks that
invest in local projects that they have a comparative advantage in monitoring, are neces-
sarily opaque to the rest of the system and the outside investor. Nevertheless, informa-
tion about distress in one part of a system may convey information about the health of
the entire system. Thus, the effects of information on one part of the system may have
consequences for the rest of the system. Contributions to the literature along these lines
are considered in the third part of this section.
1.4.1 Contagion due to correlated investments
One alternative channel for contagion across banks is the result of banks investing in similar
types of illiquid assets. This mechanism is based on specialized monitoring skills. Banks that
are specialized in similar types of projects, are more likely to understand the structure of coun-
terparty banks and hence would be more willing to lend to such banks when they are in distress.
Diamond and Rajan (2005) extend their previous single bank setting in Diamond and Ra-
jan (2001) to consider contagion that arises not only from aggregate liquidity shocks, but also
from banks engaging in correlated investments. Their model consists of a system of banks en-
gaged in entrepreneur-specific loans, where only the bank lending to that entrepreneur has the
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skills to extract value from the project if ended early. This effect leads to two channels of con-
tagion that are hard to disentangle: aggregate liquidity shortages can lead to contagious sol-
vency problems, and solvency problems across banks that lend to correlated projects can lead
to aggregate liquidity shortages. The result of these entangled channels is that the appropriate
response to a crisis by a central bank is not obvious. Depending on the (unidentifiable) cause
of the liquidity problems, recapitalization of the most illiquid banks could cause contagion,
whereas a liquidity injection may not be effective.
1.4.2 Contagion due to fire sales of liquid assets
Another channel through which contagion can occur, other than through direct balance sheet
links, is through the mechanism of fire sales (Duarte and Eisenbach, 2018; Diamond and Rajan,
2011; Gromb and Vayanos, 2010; Acharya et al., 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). This
is distinct from the correlated investment in illiquid projects, because in the fire sale models
banks hold fully liquid assets. The mechanism leading to contagion is the result of the effect on
the market price of a liquid asset when many banks sell that asset simultaneously.
A fire sale refers to the large-scale sale of similar assets by distressed financial entities.
This can lead to contagion of financial shocks in the following way. Suppose there is a set of
banks that requires liquidity during a time when it is not available on the interbank market. This
means that they will be forced to sell off assets to raise liquidity. If there is limited liquidity on the
buyer side, sales of these assets (e.g. mortgage backed securities in the global financial crisis)
can only take place at fire sale prices - i.e. at prices that are significantly below the value of the
assets in ‘normal times’. Thus, the market price of these assets can fall dramatically, which can
affect initially non-distressed banks that practice marked-to-market pricing of assets. As the
price of the assets sold by distressed banks falls, this can harm the balance sheets of banks not
currently selling these assets, which in turn may drive the initially safe banks into distress. This
is a distinct channel from that studied in my work (direct balance sheet links) and from other
information spillover channels. Contagion occurs because banks are exposed to the same asset
classes. Duarte and Eisenbach (2018) document the empirical importance of this effect during
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the build-up to the global financial crisis.
The literature on fire sales suggests that the practice of marked-to-market accounting
standards may have contributed to the financial crisis. This is not undisputed. Laux and Leuz
(2010) show empirically that during the crisis banks used leeway allowed in accounting rules
to use alternative valuation methods for assets that were hard to value during the crisis. Thus,
while fire sale effects were an important mechanism of contagion during the crisis, there is lim-
ited and equivocal evidence that this was because of marked-to-market accounting practices.
Rather, contagion due to the fire sale effect runs primarily through liquid assets that were not
difficult to price during the crisis.
1.4.3 Contagion due to correlated information
Several studies have shown that contagion can occur through informational channels; that is,
bad news about one bank implies a bad signal about other banks in the system. I review three
salient studies here.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) study the ex ante behaviour of banks that are subject to
information spillovers. These banks are exposed to a common risk factor, but can choose the
idiosyncratic risk of the projects they invest in. The paper shows that information contagion
can increase the cost of borrowing if there is bad news about the common risk factor at other
banks, and that this increase is larger the less correlation there is between the idiosyncratic
components of the investments of different banks. This leads to an ex ante herding effect: banks
tend to invest in projects with similar properties (correlated idiosyncratic components). The
reason for this herding is that the increasing effect that bad news has on the cost of borrowing
for a specific bank is lower when it is part of a system of similar banks. This reduces the impact
of information shocks on an individual bank, but the greater similarity between bank increases
the risk of systemic problems.
Allen et al. (2012) study contagion due to information links across banks that swap claims
on each other’s projects in a bilateral network formation game. A key mechanism in their model
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is that the individual asset positions of banks are unobservable, but due to network links, cred-
itors can use aggregate information to infer the solvency of banks in the network. They show
that, if financing is short term, adverse information can cause creditors to stop rolling over bank
financing, leading to an inefficient contagion outcome.
Ahnert and Georg (2018) provide a nuanced view, based on the ex-ante investment choices
of banks, specifically regarding different sources of risk from potential information contagion.
If the source of risk is exposure to common factors, adding information contagion increases sys-
temic risk. However, if contagion is caused by counterparty risk, adding potential information
contagion channels reduces systemic risk, as banks respond to the possibility of information
contagion by reducing exposure to risky counter-parts ex ante.
1.5 The role of interconnectedness
The models above consider the causes of contagion. Two other key factors that determine
the extent and severity of contagion are the structure and degree of interconnectedness across
banks or financial institutions. There are a variety of ways to model such interconnections: a
given abstract network structure (e.g. a core-periphery model), an endogenously formed net-
work or an empirically constructed one.
The growing literature on contagion in networks is tangentially related to my work, so I
my coverage of it is brief. In these works the structure of the network stands central as both a
transmission and amplification mechanism of shocks. Networks of financial institutions can
be construed in a variety of ways, depending on the nature of the links: they can be in the form
of direct holdings of assets/liabilities in other institutions (e.g. Allen and Gale (2000)) or in the
form of direct equity holdings (e.g. Elliott et al. (2014)). I briefly review some core results of
different approaches and then conclude with how these features are related to my work.
Models of contagion in networks typically employ the method of Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
and the extensions by Rogers and Veraart (2013) to solve for the equilibrium payment outcomes
in a given network structure after the realization of a shock somewhere in the system. The cen-
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tral mechanism in these models is that a shock somewhere in the system can have indirect
effects on every part of the system that has some path of connection with the location of the
shock; for example, the direct holders of claims against the firm where a shock realizes expe-
rience a reduction in the value of those claims if the shock induces a default. If the entities
directly connected to a shocked entity (call them proximate entities) also default because of the
reduction of the value of their claims, those that only hold claims on the proximate entities also
face reductions in their claims. Therefore, a shock to one point in the system can spread even
to entities with no direct links to the shocked point in the system.
There are several papers that survey the general results in networks (e.g. Allen and Babus
(2009) and Cabrales et al. (2015)), so I will touch only briefly on some of the more prominent
contributions. The first set of models take the network structure as given. These are exemplified
by Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) (see also Gai and Kapadia (2010), Gai et al.
(2011) and Roukny et al. (2018)).
Elliott et al. (2014) consider a network of mutual holdings of equity. They show that the
effect of networks, in particular the degree of network connectivity, is non-monotonic. Starting
from a completely disconnected network, increasing the number of connections increases the
likelihood of a shock in one part of the system spreading and causing a "cascade of failures", i.e.
the increasing connectedness causes an increase in the likelihood and severity of contagion.
However, as the degree of connectedness increases even further, the set of mutual connections
eventually begins to act as an insurance device. As the network becomes more connected than
a threshold level, the exposure of any specific entity to a failing entity becomes diluted, so that
fewer points in the network are sufficiently exposed to a failing entity. Thus, above a threshold,
increasing connectedness decreases the spread and severity of contagion.
Acemoglu et al. (2015) also consider the impact of network structure on the resilience of
the system to shocks, but focus on direct balance sheet links (the cross holdings of assets or
liabilities). They also show a type of non-linearity. Below a threshold in the size and number
of negative shocks, more complete networks are more resilient. In contrast, when the shocks
become more numerous and larger, less completely connected networks are more stable than
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more complete ones. Similarly, Allen et al. (2012) study contagion due to the information effects
of an endogenously formed network in the form of direct balance sheet links. They show that if
the network forms unconnected parts, contagion is endogenously contained.
A second set of models asks how networks are formed endogenously (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Dutta and Jackson, 2003; Bloch and Jackson, 2006). These mod-
els typically study whether a network can be formed as a Nash equilibrium of a general strate-
gic game, whether such a network is stable, and whether it is efficient. The main result in this
extensive literature that is relevant to this dissertation is that several regularity conditions are
required for a Nash equilibrium network to be stable, and that these networks are typically not
efficient.
The last set of network models considers empirical networks by the using detailed trans-
action level data between banks. Glasserman and Young (2015) study whether the degree of
interconnectedness increases losses from contagion, under various assumptions about the dis-
tributions of shocks. They use the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) approach to theoretically consider
the expected losses with and without additional amplification mechanisms, over and above the
degree of connectedness. They then use an empirical approach (based on the part of the Euro-
pean banking system that participated in a 2011 stress test) to show that pure network spillover
effects are insufficient to generate large losses. Other amplification mechanisms are needed
to generate large losses from contagion. These are, for example, additional exogenous costs
to bankruptcy resolutions, or common asset value reductions due to fire-sales or marked-to-
market asset valuation practices. This empirical result is related to my work (tangentially), as I
show that contagion is a very rare equilibrium phenomenon.
The models above are related to mine in the following way. In my model there are two
banks, which can (endogenously) form only one of two network types by means of direct inter-
bank deposits in the counterparty bank: a complete network, where each bank invests in the
deposit contract of the other, or a completely disconnected network where both banks choose
not to invest in the other bank at all. One of my contributions is showing that in the Nash
equilibrium of a non-cooperative game, the (very simple) network is always complete in equi-
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librium: there is no parameter set where banks choose not to hold some of the other bank’s
deposit contract5. The links are symmetric in equilibrium, but the sizes of the positions vary
depending on the parameter set. Additionally, I show that such links do not necessarily lead
to contagion, and I can precisely quantify the prevalence of contagion as well as the parameter
regions where contagion is possible in equilibrium. My last contribution to the network for-
mation literature is that my ‘endogenous network’ does not require the regularity conditions
typically required in the network formation literature that follows Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Typically in this setting, some form of monotonicity and/or continuity is required. In my model,
the network connections are fully solved for, and are non-monotonic and discontinuous across
the parameter space.
1.6 Summary of contributions
In the literature reviewed above I show that there are many channels through which contagion
can occur in a system of linked banks. I also show that there are several gaps in the literature on
contagion that occurs through pure liquidity shocks. This dissertation provides several results
that close some of these gaps by means of a complete study of general benchmarks and the
equilibrium of a game between two non-cooperative banks that endogenously choose to hold
direct balance sheet links in each other. I summarize the contributions I make relative to the
reviewed literature in this closing section.
First, in my model environment (chapter 2), the stochastic setup considers only pure liq-
uidity risk where an aggregate liquidity demand shock can occur with any probability, but that
probability is common knowledge. This allows me to contribute results relative to the closely
related models of Allen and Gale (2000) and Castiglionesi (2007), whose results require unfore-
seen aggregate liquidity risk, or those of Allen and Gale (1998) and Dasgupta (2004), who require
investment risk combined with liquidity risk.
Second, I contribute a novel benchmark that admits contagion as an optimal outcome.
5There are no frictions in my model. Adding sufficient frictions may lead to an equilibrium where the network
is empty, as in Babus (2016).
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This extends the results of Allen and Gale (1998), who require investment risk to obtain an op-
timal contagion outcome, as well as those of Allen et al. (2009) and Castiglionesi et al. (2017),
whose efficient benchmarks do not consider contagion as a possibly optimal outcome.
Third, I solve the pure non-cooperative equilibrium in the interbank market between two
fully strategic banks. This adds to the literature, which typically studies either competitive equi-
libria (e.g. Allen and Gale (1998, 2004b,a), Allen et al. (2009), Freixas et al. (2011) or Wagner
(2010)) or uses a different equilibrium definition that requires coordination on signals about
investment risk (Dasgupta, 2004). My results may therefore be more in line with such market
features as bilateral over-the-counter contracts for liquidity. This also contributes tangentially
to the network formation literature (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Dutta
and Jackson, 2003; Bloch and Jackson, 2006), as I solve for the simplest possible network without
the imposition of any ex ante regularity conditions not derived from the fundamental economic
structure of the model.
Fourth, I show that a numerical approach is useful in quantifying the global ex-ante preva-
lence of contagion, albeit in a highly stylised abstract model. Previous studies have typically
stopped at showing that the probability of contagion could be determined, without providing
any indication of how likely contagion would be in their particular model (Dasgupta, 2004), or
have found that contagion was just one of many possible equilibria (Freixas et al., 2000).
Finally, I present a model where there is no obvious role for policy, when comparing the
outcome of the non-cooperative, decentralized equilibrium with a global bank that is con-
strained to offer non-contingent demand deposit returns in the absence of contagion. Indeed,
I find that the decentralized allocation is superior to the aggregate benchmark for some param-





There are three dates t = 0,1,2 and a single divisible good for consumption and investment.
Two safe, constant returns to scale technologies are universally available. Liquidity y yields a
unit gross return at each subsequent date. Productive investment x at t = 0 yields a gross return
of R at t = 2 and a liquidation value of r at t = 1, where 0 < r < 1 < R.
There are two regions, k = A,B , each inhabited by a unit mass of consumers. Consumers
have a unit endowment at t = 0 and are initially identical. At t = 1, they privately learn their
consumption preference, an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
A fraction of consumers νks ∈ (0,1) in region k and state s value consumption at t = 1 (early
consumers), and the remainder value consumption at t = 2 (late consumers):
U (c1ks ,c2ks) =
 u (c1ks) w.p. νksu (c2ks) w.p. 1−νks
where ctks denotes consumption at date t in region k and state s. The period utility function
u(c) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies the
Inada conditions, limc→0 u′(c) =∞ and limc→∞ u′(c) = 0.
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of regional liquidity demand νks . There are four possible
states s ∈ {1,2,3,4}, similar to Table 3 in Allen and Gale (2000). In each of states 1 and 2, there
is a regional liquidity shock ε > 0 that is symmetric and perfectly negatively correlated across
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regions. This regional liquidity shock generates an insurance motive across regions, for example
in the form of interbank deposits. In states 3 and 4, an aggregate liquidity demand shock hits
one of the regions, resulting in possible contagion across regions if such links are formed. The




and it occurs with probability p ∈
[0,1]. As p → 0, the Allen and Gale model (with two banks) is obtained as a special case of the
model.
Table 2.1: Distribution of regional liquidity demand νks .
State s Probability πs Region A Region B
1 1−p2 νA1 = γ−ε νB1 = γ+ε
2 1−p2 νA2 = γ+ε νB2 = γ−ε
3 p2 νA3 = γ νB3 = γ+2α
4 p2 νA4 = γ+2α νB4 = γ
At t = 1, the state is publicly revealed and consumers privately learn their preferences
(early or late). My convention is that, under asymmetric information, a bank cannot observe
the type of consumer withdrawing at t = 1. A late consumer who has deposited with a bank
can therefore pretend to be an early consumer; therefore banks have to offer a contract that is
incentive compatible, c1ks ≤ c2ks , to prevent a run on the bank in state s.
As in Allen and Gale (2000), consumption allocations offered by banks at the interim date
are not state contingent, c1ks ≡ c1k∀s, unless default occurs in state s. Default allows for greater
sharing of aggregate risk between late and early consumers, similar to the findings in Allen and
Gale (1998). While Allen and Gale (1998) consider investment risk, I consider liquidity risk.
Finally, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), it is possible that multiple equilibria exist, e.g.
a bank run due to self-fulfilling beliefs. The focus of this dissertation is on efficient (or essential)
runs. Therefore, whenever multiple equilibria exist, I assume the no-run equilibrium is played,





In this chapter, I present the benchmarks against which the properties of the decentralized re-
sults in chapter 4 are compared in chapter 6. I studied two benchmark allocations: a global
bank allocation that is novel in the literature, and the autarkic benchmark of a consumer with-
out access to a bank.
In the decentralized case, which is the main focus of the dissertation, there are two inde-
pendent representative banks, one in each region. A global bank benchmark is construed as a
single, representative banking entity with two branches, one in each region. This implies that
the depositors at the two branches must be treated identically in all states. This is motivated by
the real world resolution of a single banking company with branches in, for instance, two differ-
ent cities in the same country. Such a bank cannot have one branch that fails and is liquidated,
with the branch depositors receiving impaired returns; and another branch that survives with
its depositors receiving unimpaired returns. Put differently, the global bank is construed as a
single legal entity under a single resolution jurisdiction, with all investment done at the com-
pany level, not at the branch level. Therefore, if the global bank fails, it fails as a whole, and all
depositors receive the same pay-out, regardless of the regional branch at which they deposited
their endowment. Similarly, if the global bank survives, it survives as a whole and must provide
identical withdrawal returns at both branches. This contrasts with the decentralized case where
the bank in one region can fail while the bank in the other region survives.
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Let cGBtks be the consumption allocation provided by a global bank to consumers that with-
draw in period t ∈ {1,2}, in region k ∈ {A,B}, and in state s ∈ {1,2,3,4}. The interpretation of the
global bank as a single entity that operates two regional branches implies that it is subject to
the following constraints:
cGB1As = cGB1B s ≡ cGB1s (3.1)
cGB2As = cGB2B s ≡ cGB2s ,
where the second equality in each line defines the notation that drops the region subscript to
denote the identical treatment of consumers in different regions in any given state.
Moreover, given the fact that states 1 and 2 are symmetric, and so are states 3 and 4, this
constraint implies that the problem of a global bank is reduced to a two state problem: in state
L there is low per capita aggregate liquidity demand, νL = γ; while in state H there is high per
capita aggregate liquidity demand, νH = γ+α.
A global bank faces two further constraints that are commonly assumed in models of
banking that follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983): (i) banks are entities that offer deposit re-
turns (on early withdrawals in this model) that are not state-contingent, unless the bank fails
(defaults); and (ii) banks are typically subject to an information constraint: they cannot observe
the type of consumer that withdraws early. That is, banks cannot observe whether consumers
who attempt to withdraw in t = 1 do so because they must (because they are early consumers),
or because they prefer to (i.e. late consumers who believe they will receive greater consump-
tion by withdrawing early). Thus, in order to avoid a run (whereby all late consumers attempt
to withdraw early), banks must offer contracts that are incentive compatible with a no run out-
come: late consumers must prefer not to withdraw early.
The assumption that a bank must offer non-state-contingent consumption in t = 1, ex-
cept if it fails and defaults, is common in the literature that the dissertation contributes to, al-
though it is rarely given detailed discussion (see e.g. Allen and Gale (2000, 2004b,a), Dasgupta
(2004), Allen et al. (2009)). It serves as a reduced form way of capturing the real world feature




cGB1s = cGB1s′ in all states s, s′ where the bank does not default (3.2)
The key impact of this constraint is that default is the only tool whereby consumption risk
can be shared between early and late consumers, although at a high ex-post efficiency cost. One
of my benchmark results is to show that, for some parameter ranges, this constraint is sufficient
to render default by the global bank an optimal outcome when the aggregate liquidity demand
shock realizes. Default by a global bank is optimal when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is
sufficiently large and improbable. As there is only liquidity risk in the model in this dissertation,
this extends the results of Allen and Gale (1998), who also find that default (and financial crisis)
may be optimal, but they do so in a model which combines liquidity and investment risk.
Turning to the final constraint, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale
(2000) (among others), banks are typically assumed to be subject to an information constraint:
banks cannot observe the type of consumer (early or late) that withdraws in t = 1. To keep the
analysis tractable, this is the only information constraint in the model. Thus, all consumers can
observe the investment decisions of their bank in t = 0, as well as the realized state of nature
in t = 1. As such, consumers can (at t = 1) infer the final consumption allocation across time
induced by the investment choices of the bank and the realized state s. If this consumption
allocation is characterized by cGB2s < cGB1s , all late consumers will pretend to be early consumers
and attempt to withdraw in t = 1, and the bank will fail and default. Thus, in order to survive in
state s, a bank must choose a portfolio and promised early consumption level that is incentive
compatible. This means that the implied consumption allocation is such that late consumers
find it incentive compatible wait until t = 2 to withdraw, rather than to run on the bank. This
defines the final constraint on a global bank:
cGB2s ≥ cGB1s otherwise a global bank defaults in state s (3.3)
In summary, the primary benchmark in the dissertation, the global bank, is constructed
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as a single banking company with two regional branches. As such, it is subject to three defining
constraints:
(i) in any given state, the global bank must provide identical allocations in each region (equa-
tion 3.1),
(ii) the global bank must provide a non-state-contingent consumption allocation in t = 1
unless it defaults (equation 3.2), and
(iii) the global bank cannot observe consumer types and therefore must offer incentive com-
patible contracts in order to avoid a run by late consumers (equation 3.3, the information
constraint).
The global bank allocation is therefore different from the typical aggregate benchmark in
the information economics literature: the allocation chosen by a benevolent, omnipotent social
planner. The standard, unconstrained planner allocation would be subject only to the defin-
ing characteristics of the economy: the preferences of consumers, investment technologies
and possible states of nature. As such, an unconstrained planner would choose the first best
(fully efficient) allocation. A constrained planner, i.e. one subject to the information constraint
(equation (3.3)), would yield the second best (or constrained-efficient) allocation. I chose not
to include these benchmarks in the dissertation as they are formally equivalent to the results
presented by Castiglionesi et al. (2017) and would not constitute a contribution to the litera-
ture1.
In the global bank benchmark, the information constraint (equation (3.3)) may or may
not bind. Therefore, the global bank allocation is studied in two parts. First, the global bank al-
location is studied without the information constraint. This is called the global bank allocation
under full information. In this allocation, the bank is assumed to be subject only to constraints
1The setting and problem studied by Castiglionesi et al. (2017) are somewhat different from those in this disser-
tation, but the formal structure of their autarky benchmark is identical to that of the first and second best in the
model considered here. They show that the first best is allocation is always incentive compatible, and hence the
information constraint would never bind, implying that the first and second best allocations are identical. This
allocation is characterized by state contingent early consumption and default is never optimal.
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(3.1) and (3.2). In other words, it can observe the type of consumer and can prohibit late con-
sumers from with drawing in t = 1. Equivalently, it can offer contracts that are not incentive
compatible without inducing a run.
I show below that there are parameter regions where the global bank under full informa-
tion optimally chooses non-incentive-compatible allocations, which means that the informa-
tion constraint is economically important. I also show that there are parameter regions where
the global bank under full and asymmetric information optimally chooses an allocation where
it chooses to default when the aggregate liquidity demand shock realizes.
The second part of the analysis imposes the information constraint and is labelled the
global bank allocation under asymmetric information. This part studies the impact of the in-
formation constraint on the allocation chosen by the global bank. I characterize the parameter
regions where the information constraint is binding, as well as how this affects the optimal al-
location.
To distinguish the two different versions of the global bank allocation, I denote the global
bank under full information with superscript GB F , and the global bank under asymmetric in-
formation with superscript GB A.
I conclude the chapter by characterizing the autarkic allocation: the allocation chosen by
a consumer without access to a bank, but who has access to the same investment opportunities
as a bank. This allows an evaluation of the welfare improvement provided by deposit taking
banks.
For each benchmark, I present the full analytical characterization accompanied by nu-
merical examples that illustrate the many corner solutions that arise in this model.
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3.1 Global bank under full information
A global bank under full information2 observes the types of consumers. Because of free entry
in the global banking market, it maximizes the expected utility of a consumer from an arbitrary
region. The global bank can freely allocate resources across regions, but must treat consumers
from different regions identically. Therefore, the global bank faces two (aggregate) states of
nature which differ in the level of per capita liquidity demand (νs): in state H , which occurs
with probability p, the aggregate per capita liquidity demand is high (νH = γ+α); in state L,
which occurs with probability 1−p, the aggregate per capita liquidity demand is low (νL = γ).
At t = 0, the global bank chooses its portfolio and the consumption levels at each date, subject
to the aggregate resource constraint at each date as well as constraints (3.1) and (3.2). Utility is
strictly increasing, so all resource and budget constraints bind at the solution.
A key result is that the global bank may wish to default when aggregate liquidity demand
is high. Default is the only tool available to the global bank that allows it to shift consumption
risk from late to early consumers. This result is attributable to the defining constraint that con-
sumption levels at t = 1 cannot be state contingent, unless default occurs. Default may thus
be optimal because the constraint of non-state-contingent consumption at t = 1 is costly when
the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock (p) is low.
Therefore, I solve the problem of the global bank under full information in two steps. First,
I study the case in which the global bank does not choose to default in state H at t = 1. Call this
the no-default regime and denote it with a subscript N D . In the no-default regime, the global
bank is subject to the non-state-contingency constraint on early consumption.
Second, I study the case in which the global bank defaults in state H . Call this the default
regime and denote it with a subscript D . In the default regime, the global bank is not subject to
the non-state-contingency constraint on early consumption.
2I use full information and observable types interchangeably below. Similarly, for brevity, I sometimes refer to




The two parts of the global bank problem under full information are subject to two distinct
sets of economically motivated constraints, and they have to be treated separately. Let the value
functions of the two parts of the problem be V GB
F
N D and V
GB F
D . The complete problem of the











The global bank under full information, therefore, has two types of choices (for a given
parameter set): first, given the regime (default or no default), the global bank must choose its
portfolio and the deposit return on early withdrawals to maximize ex-ante expected utility, sub-
ject to the constraints that define that regime. Second, given the maximum expected utility that
can be attained in each regime, it must choose the optimal regime. In sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2
respectively, I study the optimal choices within each regime; then I study the choice of regime
in section 3.1.3.
3.1.1 No default after aggregate liquidity demand shock
Suppose the global bank chooses not to default in state H (denoted with N D). In this regime,
the global bank is subject to the constraint that early consumption in states L and H must be
equal:
c1L = c1H ≡ c1
Given some non-state-contingent choice of early consumption, c1, the bank has to op-
timally choose how to finance the chosen consumption allocation. Consider a given choice of
liquidity, y , and the implied choice of investment, x = 1−y . In state s, one of two situations may
arise: if y ≥ νsc1 there is excess liquidity of y−νsc1 ≥ 0 which is transferred to the late consumer,
which yields late consumption of c2s = y−νs c1+Rx1−νs . Otherwise, y < νsc1 and there is insufficient
liquidity to fully cover early demand. In this situation, some of the investment must be liq-
uidated early to finance t = 1 withdrawals. The required level of liquidation is νs c1−yr , which
means a late consumer receives c2s = R1−νs
(




It is clearly optimal at t = 0 to hold sufficient liquidity to avoid certain early liquidation of
the investment at t = 1, i.e. it is optimal to hold sufficient liquidity to fully cover the smallest
possible early withdrawal: y∗ ≥ γc∗1 . Since the early liquidation return in investment is r < 1,
it is more efficient to use only liquidity to provide for early consumption in the state with low
liquidity demand. Likewise, it is sub-optimal to hold more liquidity than required in the case of
high aggregate liquidity demand, therefore y∗ ≤ (γ+α)c∗1 . Since R > 1, it is more efficient to use
investment to finance late consumption rather than excess liquidity. Taken together, optimality
requires:
γc∗1 ≤ y∗ ≤ (γ+α)c∗1 .
Therefore, the problem of the global bank under full information without default in state
H (P1a) reduces to:
V GB
F
N D ≡ max{c1,c2L ,c2H }(1−p)[γu(c1)+ (1−γ)u(c2L)]+p[(γ+α)u(c1)+ (1−γ−α)u(c2H )] (P1a)
subject to: x + y = 1





x − (γ+α)c1 − y
r
)
Rather than solve problem P1a in terms of the portfolio choice of liquidity y and the
choice interim-date consumption level c1 (which affect welfare in both states), it is more il-
luminating and simpler to solve it in terms of the levels of excess liquidity (which is optimally
allowed for only in state L), e ≡ y − γc1 ≥ 0 and (early) partial liquidation of the productive
investment (which is optimally allowed for only in state H), λ ≡ (γ+α)c1−yr ∈ [0, x]. Redefining
choice variables in this way (which separates them by the states with and without the aggregate
liquidity demand shock) yields monotonicity of the optimal choices in the probability of the
aggregate liquidity demand shock p. Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal solution to the
global bank problem without default under full information.
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Proposition 1. Suppose the global bank chooses not to default in state H. The optimal allocation
with observable types is characterized by two unique thresholds of the probability of an aggregate





N D , with 0 < pGB
F
N D
< pGB FN D < 1. There are three cases:
(i) For a sufficiently probable aggregate liquidity demand shock, p ≥ pGB FN D , no partial liquida-
tion occurs, λ∗N D = 0. There exists a unique level of excess liquidity e∗N D > 0 that increases
in the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock,
de∗N D
d p > 0.
(ii) For a sufficiently improbable aggregate liquidity demand shock, p ≤ pGB F
N D
, no excess liquid-
ity is held, e∗N D = 0. There exists a unique level of partial liquidation λ∗N D > 0 that decreases
in the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock,
dλ∗N D
d p < 0.




p < pGB FN D , there exists a unique interior solution where both excess liquidity is held and par-
tial liquidation occurs, e∗N D > 0 and λ∗N D > 0, with
de∗N D
d p > 0 and
dλ∗N D
d p < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
With observable types and no default in state H , the global bank uses two instruments to
balance the marginal utility of consumers across states: excess liquidity and partial liquidation.
Whether it is optimal to use both or only one of these instruments depends on the parameters,
especially the probability (p) and size (α) of the aggregate liquidity demand shock.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the results of Proposition 1. If the global bank chooses not to default
in state H , there are three regions where the solution has different characterizations: only excess
liquidity in state L (for a high probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, p ≥ pGB FN D );
only partial liquidation in state H (for a low probability, p ≤ pGB F
N D
); or both excess liquidity in
state L and partial liquidation in state H (for an intermediate probability, pGB
F
N D
< p < pGB FN D ).
The figure also shows that the size of the region in p where interior solutions occur increases in
α.
To obtain intuition for the monotonicity of optimal choices in the probability of the ag-
gregate liquidity demand shock, I consider two cases. First, when the state L is realized, any
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Figure 3.1: The global bank allocation with observable types and without default in state H :
the usage of partial liquidation (λ) and excess liquidity (e) varies with the size and
the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ ,
ρ = 2, R = 2, r = 0.5, and γ= 0.3.
excess liquidity is inefficient ex post. More resources could have been invested, while whatever
level of partial liquidation chosen for state H does not affect ex post efficiency in state L. Sec-
ond, when state H is realized, any partial liquidation is inefficient ex post, since more liquidity
would have been desirable. Hence, an increase in the probability of state H makes allowing for
excess liquidity in state L relatively more desirable than allowing for partial liquidation in state
H .
The same argument does not apply to the choice of total liquidity y , which explains my
focus on excess liquidity in state L and partial liquidation in state H . When p is low, no excess
liquidity is held. As p increases, it becomes optimal to transfer more resources to state H . Since
c2H is the lowest consumption level when p is near zero, it has the highest marginal utility and is
therefore the targeted consumption level to be increased. Since e∗N D = 0 in this region, however,
this happens by reducing total liquidity (thus increasing the productive investment), which in-
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duces a more rapid increase in c2H than can be attained by only reducing partial liquidation
(keeping investment constant). As p increases further, it is eventually optimal to use excess liq-
uidity and it is possible to transfer resources to state H by increasing total liquidity along with
reducing partial liquidation. As a result, the optimal choice of total liquidity is not monotonic.
Figure 3.2 illustrates these features.
Note also in figure 3.2 that the global bank under full information chooses a consumption
portfolio that is not incentive compatible in state H when p is very low.
3.1.2 Default after aggregate liquidity demand shock
Next, suppose the global bank chooses to default in state H . Since the assumed default res-
olution mechanism is pro-rata distribution of resources, the early and late consumers obtain
the same level of consumption in state H . The implied consumption levels in state H are
c1H = c2H = y + r x. Since default in state H is used only as a tool to allow the global bank to
offer state contingent early consumption, and it would never be optimal to default in the state
with low liquidity demand (as shown in Allen and Gale (2000)), the allocation in this regime will
be characterized by c2L ≥ c1L ≥ c1H = c2H .
Again, the global bank, conditional on the choice to default in state H , must choose how
to optimally finance the implied consumption allocations with its two instruments: holding ex-
cess liquidity or partially liquidating the productive investment in t = 1. It will never be optimal
to use partial liquidation of the investment in state L, since certain liquidation can never be
optimal ex ante. Since the bank defaults in state H , and hence all assets are fully liquidated,
partial liquidation is no longer defined. However, it is still possible that some excess liquidity
e ≡ y −γc1L ≥ 0 may be held in state L, which would imply a consumption level c2L = Rx+e1−γ .
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Figure 3.2: Global bank allocation: optimal consumption (top panel) and portfolio (bottom
panel) with observable types and without default in state H : partial liquidation (λ)
is non-increasing, excess liquidity (e) is non-decreasing, and the other variables are

















subject to: x + y = 1
c1L ≤ y
γ
c2L = Rx + y −γc1L
1−γ
c1H = c2H = y + r x
Using the budget constraints in each period, I obtain an unconstrained problem in the following
choice variables: the ex-ante choice of liquidity (y) and the t = 1 excess liquidity in state L (e).
The solution to this problem is characterized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose the global bank chooses to default in state H. The optimal allocation
with observable types is characterized by two unique thresholds of the probability of an aggregate





D , with 0 < pGB
F
D
< pGB FD < 1. There are three cases:
(i) For a sufficiently probable aggregate liquidity demand shock, p ≥ pGB FD , all resources are
kept in liquidity, y∗D = 1 = c∗1L = c∗2L = c∗1H = c∗2H and e∗D = 1−γ.
(ii) For a sufficiently improbable aggregate liquidity demand shock, p ≤ pGB F
D
, the global bank
holds no excess liquidity in state L, e∗D = 0, and there exists a unique interior solution, 0 <
y∗D < 1 with
d y∗D
d p > 0 and associated consumption levels c∗2L > c∗1L > c∗1H = c∗2H .
(iii) For an intermediate probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, pGB
F
D
< p < pGB FD ,
there exists a unique interior solution, 0 < y∗D < 1 with
d y∗D
d p > 0, and some excess liquidity
held in state L, e∗D = y∗D (1+(R−1)γ)−Rγ. The associated consumption levels are c∗2L = c∗1L >
c∗1H = c∗2H .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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For a low probability of the aggregate shock (state L is the more probable), it is inefficient
to allow for excess liquidity in state L, since it is costly from an ex-post perspective, and the
consumption allocation is characterized by c∗2L > c∗1L . As the probability of state H increases,
the expected utility places more weight on state H , so the consumption allocation in this state
c∗1H = c∗2H = y∗D + r x∗D must increase, which requires an increase in liquidity, y∗D (and hence
a reduction in investment x∗D ). As liquidity increases, c
∗
1L increases and c
∗
2L falls, eventually
reaching equality. Since it cannot be efficient to allow c2L < c1L (because of strict risk aversion)
the equality c∗2L = c∗1L arises for a sufficiently likely aggregate liquidity demand shock. As p
increases further, excess liquidity is held in state L to maintain this equality. Eventually, facing
default in state H becomes so probable that it is optimal not to invest at all in order to avoid
costly liquidation of the investment entirely.
3.1.3 Complete problem
Finally, I describe the solution to the complete problem of the global bank with observable con-
sumer types. The maximum utility in each of the no-default and default regimes are character-
ized in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 above. The final choice of the global bank under full information
is to choose the optimal regime, conditional on a parameter set.
Fix the parameter set. If V GB
F
N D ≥V GB
F
D , the maximum expected utility obtainable is higher
under the no-default regime than under the default regime and the global bank chooses (in
t = 0) not to default in state H . In other words, the bank chooses to be subject to the non-state-
contingency constraint on early consumption. Otherwise the global bank chooses to default in
state H in order to avoid the non-state-contingency constraint. The key point here is that the
choice is between two distinct regimes, each subject to a different set of constraints. As such, the




I characterize the parameter region that yields optimal default in state H in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique upper bound on the probability of an aggregate liquidity
demand shock, p̆ ∈ [0,1), whereby the global bank chooses to default in state H if and only if
p ≤ p̆. Moreover, there are bounds (ᾰ, r̆ , γ̆) that define a setΨ≡ {α> ᾰ ∩γ> γ̆ ∩ r < r̆ } such that
p̆ > 0 for all levels of the investment return R if and only if (α,r,γ) ∈Ψ.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The intuition for the complete problem lies in the welfare cost of keeping the consump-
tion in t = 1 non-state-contingent (so that early consumption is risk free), c1H = c1L = c1. Con-
sider the no-default regime: when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is unlikely, there is
more weight on welfare in state L, and thus the average consumption levels in L are higher than
in H . In this case, however, c∗1H is also high (because of the non-state-contingency constraint),
which can only be achieved with high partial liquidation in state H , resulting in low levels of
c∗2H . As a result, the allocation in state H is highly inefficient ex post. Since the utility function
is concave and the allocations in the two states are linked via the non-state-contingent early
consumption constraint, this ex-post inefficiency is spread across both states. Thus, the allo-
cation in state L is also ex-post inefficient. This manifests as a lower degree of liquidity risk
insurance in state L when default is not used to avoid the non-state-contingency constraint,
which decouples the allocations in the two states.
The global bank has one tool for avoiding the constraint of non-state-contingency of early
consumption: default in state H with equal payouts to all consumers. This tool is equivalent to
forcing the global bank to accept a large degree of ex-post inefficiency in state H in order to
break the link across states induced by the non-contingency of the early consumption. This
allows an allocation in state L that is more efficient ex post (characterized by a greater degree
of liquidity risk insurance in L than is possible without default in H). Since a low probability
of an aggregate liquidity demand shock implies a high weight on L, the global bank chooses
default in H for sufficiently low probabilities of the aggregate shock, p < p̆, with an associated
reduction in ex-post inefficiency in L relative to the no-default regime.
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The measure of the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock where default is
optimal depends on other parameters of the problem in an intuitive way. For a small aggregate
liquidity demand shock (low α) or a low penalty on early liquidation of investment (large r ),
the non-state-contingency of consumption levels at the interim date is not costly to maintain3.
There is only a small additional early demand after an aggregate liquidity demand shock, and
early liquidation of investment carries only a small penalty relative to holding more liquidity.
As a result, the ex-post inefficiency without default allocation is small for any given probability
of the aggregate liquidity demand shock; thus there may be no positive probability for which
default is optimal. Therefore, p̆ = 0. Conversely, p̆ > 0 whenever the size of the aggregate liq-
uidity demand shock, α, is large enough and early liquidation return on investment, r , is small
enough.
Figure 3.3 shows parameter regions in the probability (p) and size (α) of the aggregate
liquidity demand shock where the global bank chooses to default in state H . The boundary
between these regions, p̆(α), is characterized in Proposition 3. The figure shows that the shock
needs to be large and improbable for the default regime to be an optimal choice at t = 0. If the
shock is too small, there is no positive probability for which the global bank chooses to default
in state H .
Figure 3.4 shows how the consumption levels and asset portfolio choices vary with the
probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. The key point of interest is the disconti-
nuity in consumption levels and asset portfolio choices at the boundary between the default
regime and the no-default regime.
3The proportion of early consumers in state L, γ, enters the problem analytically in a similar way to α, hence
the impact on the solution character of γ is similar to that of α.
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Figure 3.3: The complete problem of the global bank with observable types. Default in state
H is optimal when the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low
enough, and the size of the shock is large enough. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2,
R = 2, r = 0.5, and γ= 0.3.
3.2 Global bank under asymmetric information
A global bank that cannot observe the types of consumers at date t = 1 must offer incentive-
compatible contracts to avoid a run by late consumers. In contrast, a global bank that can
observe the types of consumers, can simply refuse to pay out to late consumers who attempt
to withdraw in t = 1, hence is not subject to runs by assumption. I assume that the no-run
equilibrium is played whenever multiple equilibria exist; therefore all bank runs are efficient as
in Allen and Gale (1998, 2000).
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Figure 3.4: The complete problem of the global bank: consumption (top panel) and portfolio
(bottom panel) with observable types. Optimal default in state H is chosen when
the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low enough, p < p̆. There
is a discontinuity in each consumption and portfolio choice at the boundary be-
tween the regions where the either the default or no-default regimes are superior.
Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, α= 0.3, R = 2, r = 0.5, and γ= 0.3.
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In the no-default regime, this information constraint implies the following two incentive
compatibility constraints on the global bank under asymmetric information:
c2H ≥ c1, c2L ≥ c1.
Otherwise, a global bank that cannot observe consumer types is identical to a global bank that
can observe consumer types.
Because of free entry, the global bank maximizes the expected utility of an arbitrary con-
sumer in either region. As in the full information case, the problem also has two parts: either
there is default in state H , or there is not. The problem of a global bank under asymmetric


























∣∣∣c2L ≥ c1L} ,
where V GB
F
N D is defined in problem P1a and V
GB F
D is defined in problem P1b.
Proposition 4 characterizes the ranges of parameters where the global bank allocation un-
der full information is incentive compatible and thus equivalent to that of a global bank under
asymmetric information. That is, the inability of the global bank to observe the type of con-
sumer is immaterial for these parameters.
Proposition 4. The allocation of the global bank with observable types is incentive compatible
in the following cases:
(i) if p ≤ p̆, that is when the fully informed global bank chooses to default in state H,
(ii) if p ≥ p̂ IC , where p̂ IC ∈ [0, (R−1)rR−r ) is unique, and
(iii) if state L is realized.
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Whenever the fully informed global bank chooses to default in state H (p ≤ p̆), the alloca-
tion is always incentive compatible. There are two reasons for this. First, in H , default ensures
incentive compatibility by definition, c1H = c2H = y + r x. Second, given c1H = c2H , it is never
optimal for c2L < c1L as c2L = c1L would also be feasible and is strictly preferred due to risk aver-
sion.
Suppose the fully informed global bank chooses not to default in state H (p > p̆) (i.e. the
non-state-contingency constraint on early consumption binds: c1L = c1H = c1). If the proba-
bility of an aggregate liquidity demand shock p is low enough, the average consumption level
in state L is larger than in state H ; therefore c2L > c2H . Since the non-state-contingency con-
straint applies without default, the consumption level c1 in state H has to be large relative to
the average consumption in state H . This can only be achieved through a high amount of costly
partial liquidation, resulting in a very low level of c2H , which may be below c1. Taken together,
for a sufficiently low probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, p < p̂ IC , the alloca-
tion of a fully informed global bank violates incentive compatibility, c∗2H < c∗1 . Lastly, I obtain
p̂ IC < (R−1)rR−r , since c∗2H > c∗2L whenever p > (R−1)rR−r , and the proof of Proposition 4 shows that
c1 < c2L always holds in state L.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results in Proposition 4. If the fully informed global bank does
not fully liquidate, there are three orderings of the consumption levels across states. The con-
sumption allocation in state H is not incentive compatible, c2H < c1, if p < p̂ IC (α). Otherwise,
the levels in both states are incentive compatible with c2L > c2H > c1 if p̂ IC (α) < p < (R−1)rR−r , or
c2H > c2L > c1 if p > (R−1)rR−r . The boundaries between these regions are characterized in the proof
of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 characterizes the optimal choice of a global bank under asymmetric infor-




Figure 3.5: The global bank allocation with observable types and without default in state H :
the optimal allocation in state H is non-incentive compatible if the probability of
the aggregate liquidity demand shock is small enough, and the size of the aggregate
liquidity demand shock is large enough. The boundary, p̂ IC is piecewise defined,
above and below pGB
F
N D
. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 2, r = 0.5, and γ= 0.3.
Proposition 5. If p ∈ (p̆, p̂), the consumption allocation chosen by a global bank that can ob-
serve consumer types is not incentive compatible in state H. There are two cases that characterize
the closest incentive-compatible allocation of a global bank that cannot observe consumer types,




(i) If p̆ < p ≤ pGB A
N D
, a global bank that cannot observe consumer types chooses a portfolio with
partial liquidation only (e∗ = 0), and the optimal allocation is:
y∗ = γr R
γr R +αR + r (1−γ−α)













, the bound below which a global bank that can observe consumer




< p < p̂, a global bank that cannot observe consumer types chooses a portfolio with
excess liquidity and partial liquidation with optimal allocation c2L(y∗) > c2H (y∗) = c1(y∗)
where y∗ uniquely solves:
u′(c2H (y∗)) = (1−p)(r (R(1−α−2γ)− (1−α−γ))+R(R(α+γ)−α))
(1− r )R(γ+ (1−γ)p) u
′(c2L(y∗)).
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Whenever the allocation of a fully informed global bank is not incentive compatible, an
uninformed global bank optimally chooses the closest incentive-compatible allocation to that
of a fully informed global bank. Since an uninformed global bank must offer c2H = c1 when the
a fully informed global bank offers c2H < c1 in state H , an uninformed global bank optimally
uses less partial liquidation than a fully informed global bank. For the same reasons as in the
fully informed global bank case, when p is low, ex-post inefficiency in H is less costly than in
L, so an uninformed global bank uses only partial liquidation in a neighborhood of p = 0. As
p increases, it becomes efficient to start using some excess liquidity sooner for an uninformed
global bank than for a fully informed global bank, since an uninformed global bank always uses







A ≥ eGB F , λGB A ≤λGB F .
Since an uninformed global bank uses less partial liquidation in H than a fully informed












1 also implies that an





2L . Thus, when their allocations differ, an uninformed global bank can
provide less liquidity insurance to risk-averse consumers than a fully informed global bank can.
Figure 3.6 illustrates these features.
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Figure 3.6: Global bank allocation: consumption (top panel) and portfolio (bottom panel) with
unobservable types and without default in state H . For comparison, the solid and
dashed lines show the choices of an uninformed global bank, while dotted lines
show the choices of a fully informed global bank. Below p̂ IC , an uninformed global
bank chooses c2H = c1. An uninformed global bank uses less partial liquidation than
a fully informed global bank, and uses excess liquidity for lower probability than a





. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, α= 0.25




Without banks or financial markets, the idiosyncratic liquidity risk faced by a consumer cannot
be pooled away. Consumers split their endowments between liquidity, y , and productive invest-
ment, x, at t = 0, before they learn their type at t = 1. Their consumption levels are c1 = y + r x
if early and c2 = y +Rx if late. By strict monotonicity, all endowments are invested, y∗ = 1− x∗,
and the consumption levels are a function of the productive investment only, c1(x) = 1−(1−r )x
and c2(x) = 1+ (R −1)x.
Since the effective ex-ante probability at t = 0 of being an early consumer is p ′ ≡ γ+pα,
the problem of consumers (P3) is to choose their portfolios to maximize their expected utility
in autarky:





Proposition 6. The optimal portfolio choice in autarky is determined by the effective probability
of facing the idiosyncratic liquidity shock, p ′. There are three cases:
(i) For a sufficiently high effective probability, p ′ ≥ p Aut ≡ R−1R−r ∈ (0,1), no investment occurs,
x Aut = 0.
(ii) For a sufficiently low effective probability, p ′ ≤ p Aut ≡ (R−1)u′(R)(R−1)u′(R)+(1−r )u′(r ) ∈ (0,1), full in-
vestment occurs, x Aut = 1.
(iii) For intermediate levels, p Aut < p ′ < p Aut , there exists a unique interior portfolio choice
0 < x Aut < 1, implicitly defined by:
p ′ (1− r )u′(c1(x Aut ))= (1−p ′) (R −1)u′(c2(x Aut ))
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
When the effective ex-ante probability of being an early type is high enough, it is not op-
timal to invest at all (x Aut = 0), as this would imply a high likelihood of a consumption level
59
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 3.7: Autarkic optimal consumption allocation and investment. When the effective prob-
ability of being an early consumer is low enough, p ′ ≡ γ+pα≤ p Aut , full investment
occurs and consumption allocation is maximally variable. When the probability is
high enough p ′ ≥ p Aut , no investment occurs and consumption is deterministic.
Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 2, r = 0.5.
of less than unity. Storing all resources in liquidity (y Aut = 1) guarantees c Aut1 = c Aut2 = 1. In
contrast, when the effective ex-ante probability of being an early type is low enough – i.e. the
risk of a consumption level of less than unity is low – it is optimal to invest fully (x Aut = 1), as
the probability of obtaining the highest possible late consumption, c Aut2 = R > 1, is sufficiently
attractive to risk obtaining the lowest possible early consumption, c Aut1 = r < 1.
For intermediate levels of the ex-ante probability of being an early type, an interior in-
vestment is optimal, 0 < x Aut < 1. This provides insurance against obtaining the lowest possi-
ble consumption level if the consumer turns out to be an early type, at the cost of lowering the
consumption level if the consumer turns out to be a late type, r < c Aut1 < 1 < c Aut2 < R. Figure





In each region, there is a representative bank indexed by A and B . Because of free entry within
a region, each bank maximizes the expected utility of regional consumers, subject to non-
negative profits. As a result, all consumers deposit their endowments at their regional bank
at t = 0. Banks simultaneously choose the deposit return on withdrawals in period t = 1, dA, a
portfolio of investment and liquidity, xA and y A, as well as the amount of interbank deposits zA,
subject to the budget constraint at t = 0:
xA + y A + zA = 1+ zB .
At t = 1, state s realizes, consumers learn their type, all early consumers withdraw, and banks
serve withdrawals. Banks choose between using liquidity, withdrawing their interbank position
(denoted by w As), and liquidating their investment. Late consumers withdraw at t = 1 if the
implied contract in state s is not incentive compatible, c2As < dA, which forces bank default
and full liquidation of all assets. Otherwise, the remaining investment matures at t = 2, the re-
maining interbank position is withdrawn, and all resources are paid out to depositors (both late
consumers and the other bank). Therefore, default in state s is avoided if the implied allocation
is incentive compatible, given my focus on essential runs (Allen and Gale, 1998, 2000). In the




4.1 Interbank Market and Contracts
The interbank market consists of interbank deposits at the other bank. As in Allen and Gale
(2000), each bank treats deposits from regional consumers and the other bank identically, so
the interbank deposit contract and the consumer deposit contract have the same payoffs struc-
ture.1
As in Allen and Gale (2000), there is a pecking order. A bank has a preferred sequence
in which it uses its asset portfolio to serve withdrawals: first it uses liquidity, then withdraws
interbank deposits, and then liquidates the investment. This pecking order is optimal for bank
A as long as the relative returns between period 1 and 2 satisfy





where ctB s is the return to any depositor at bank B withdrawing in period t in state s and, there-
fore, c2B sc1B s is the inter-temporal trade-off of the interbank deposit that bank A made in bank B .
The first inequality follows directly from incentive compatibility of the contract offered by bank
B ; the second inequality must be a feature of any deposit contract that provides ex-ante liq-
uidity insurance. Indeed, a consumer without access to a bank also chooses a consumption
allocation that satisfies this inequality, as I show in Appendix A.6.
I restrict the interbank positions to be no greater than the larger of the regional or the per
capita aggregate shock: zmax = max{ε,α}. This is motivated by the fact that this is the largest per
capita transfer that global bank would require to support an allocation without default. Eco-
nomic motivations to bound interbank positions include: (i) larger interbank holdings may be
more costly than smaller ones, from an internal risk management perspective, and (ii) external
1There is surprisingly little empirical guidance as to the exact nature of interbank loan contracts. I assume
that interbank lending is in the form of deposits, but given that about 90% of interbank loans have a maturity of
only one day, the decision not to roll over an existing loan is effectively equivalent to holding demand deposits.
In many countries, the vast majority of interbank loans has a maturity of only one day. For example, Arciero et al.
(2016) study the euro area large value payment system Target2 and find that “From June 2008, one-day transactions
(overnight, tomorrow-next, spot-next) accounted for more than 90% of total transactions”. This is well in line with
Furfine (2003) who studies the US fed funds market and finds that “[. . .] according to a Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (1987) survey, overnight transactions account for 96% of the fed funds market”.
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capital requirements, as interbank loans, carry a positive risk weight. In practice, banks often
net out large interbank positions of equal maturity.
The optimal withdrawal behaviour is as follows. A bank with the lowest regional liquidity
demand keeps its interbank position, w A1 = wB2 = 0. A bank with the highest regional liquidity
demand fully withdraws because it holds as much interbank deposits as necessary to cover this
contingency, w A4 = zA and wB3 = zB . In other states, each bank withdraws what is necessary to
serve withdrawals from both consumers and the other bank. For bank A in state 2 (symmetric
for bank B in state 1), regional consumers require dA(γ+ε) and demand from bank B is zero,
wB2 = 0, available regional liquidity is y A; so the shortfall is dA(γ+ ε)− y A. The return on the
deposit contract at bank B is dB , so the total withdrawal (if positive) is
dA(γ+ε)−y A
dB
. For bank A in
state 3 (for bank B in state 4), the regional consumers require dAγ and bank B fully withdraws,
wB3 = zB ; so the shortfall is dA(γ+zB )− y A and the total withdrawal is dA(γ+zB )−y AdB . I summarize
withdrawals in terms of choices and parameters of the model for bank A (symmetric for bank
B , adjusted for the states in which regional liquidity demand is the same):
w A1 = 0, w A4 = zA, w A2 = dA(γ+ε)− y A
dB
, w A3 = dA(γ+ zB )− y A
dB
. (4.1)
The optimality of this withdrawal scheme follows from the incentive compatibility of contracts
in the absence of default. The only purpose of withdrawing the interbank position at t = 1 is to
serve early withdrawals. If local liquidity, y A, is insufficient to cover local withdrawals at t = 1,
the bank only wants to withdraw what is necessary to cover the shortfall. Since the fixed deposit
return is dA, a larger-than-necessary withdrawal must be held as liquidity to be paid out to late
consumers in t = 2. Given that the contract of bank B is incentive compatible, c2B s ≥ dB , such




The analysis above allows me to state the levels of consumption and expected utility for any
pair of bank choices. Formally, let the vector of bank choices be θk ≡
{
xk , yk , zk ,dk
}
. Each pair
of choices {θA,θB } then implies a state-dependent consumption level for each region,
{c1As ,c2As ,c1B s ,c2B s}
4
s=1 .
Since the resource constraint at t = 0 binds in any equilibrium, x j + y j + z j = 1+ zk , I drop xk
from the vector and state it more compactly as θk ≡
{
yk , zk ,dk
}
. Next, I state these consumption
levels in state s at bank A for two cases: without and with the default of bank A.
No default of bank A. No default requires that the implied consumption allocation is incen-
tive compatible in all states. The total liquidity demand of bank A at t = 1 is dA(νAs + wB s).
This consists of the sum of the measure of early regional consumers (νAs) in region A, and the
optimal withdrawal of wB s by bank B , at the deposit return offered by bank A, dA. The sources
of funding available to bank A to service these withdrawals are: regional liquidity, y A; interbank
withdrawals, w As ; and, partial liquidation of the investment, λAs . Given the returns on each of
these sources, the total available resources available to bank A at t = 1 adds to y A+dB w As+rλAs .
Depending on the total size of withdrawals relative to total available resources, bank A
may end up with excess liquidity, e As = y A+dB w As−dA(νAs+wB s), which will be paid out to late
consumers and bank B at t = 2; or may have to partially liquidate λAs = dA(νAs+wB s )−(y A+dB w As )r
of its investment such that only R(xA −λAs) remains to be paid out to late consumers and bank




In sum, the consumption levels without default are:
c1As(θA,θB ) = dA
c2As(θA,θB ) =
excess liquidity
e As + c2B s(θA,θB )
interbank asset








Default of bank A. Upon default, bank A fully liquidates all of its assets at t = 1. Its interbank
deposits yield c1B s(θB ,θA)zA (which is general to whether bank B also defaults or not). Its in-
vestment yields r xA. Thus, the payout per unit of claim to all claimants, which corresponds to
the liquidation values in Allen and Gale (2000), is:
c1As(θA,θB ) = c2As(θA,θB ) = y A + c1B s(θB ,θA)zA + r xA
1+ zB
.
Therefore, for any pair of choices {θA,θB }, the consumption allocations in state s are:
c1As(θA,θB ) =

dA if A does not default
y A+c1B s (θB ,θA)zA+r xA




e As+c2B s (θB ,θA)(zA−w As )+R(xA−λAs )
(zB−wB s )+1−νAs if A does not default
y A+c1B s (θB ,θA)zA+r xA
1+zB if A defaults
These accounting identities are general to all possible outcomes for both bank A and bank B




A regional bank cannot observe the types of consumers at date t = 1, so it offers incentive-
compatible contracts, c2ks(θA,θB ) ≥ c1ks(θA,θB ).2 The problem of strategic bank A (P4) is to
choose the regional deposit return, its portfolio, and interbank deposit (all summarized by θA)
to maximize the expected utility of regional consumers, taking θB as given:









)+ (1−νAs)u(c2As(θA,θB ))] (P4)
s.t. xA + y A + zA = 1+ zB
e As ,λAs ≥ 0,
c2As(θA,θB ) ≥ c1As(θA,θB )
equations (4.1) and (4.2),
where the superscript SB is used for the problem of the strategic bank, as opposed to the super-
scripts used for the global bank under full information (GB F ) or under asymmetric information
(GB A).
Problem P4 is symmetric across banks ex ante. It is solved simultaneously by bank k
choosing θk in t = 0, taking as given the choice of the other bank. This problem defines a game
G with a pair of symmetric best-response functions that maps a compact subspace U ⊂R3+ (the
set of feasible choices) into itself for each bank: θbr : U → U . My focus is on the symmetric
equilibrium of this game.3
2This incentive compatibility constraint reads as c2ks (θA ,θB ) ≥ dk in all states in which the bank wishes to avoid
default. A bank may choose default in some states, where the allocation is incentive compatible by construction.
Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint c2ks (θA ,θB ) ≥ c1ks (θA ,θB ) is general to both cases.
3While asymmetric equilibria may exist in this environment, I focus on symmetric equilibria motivated by the
symmetry of the problem and the symmetry of the global benchmark allocations.
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Definition 1. A symmetric Nash equilibrium of G is a choice, θ∗, that is a best response to itself.
Equivalently, θ∗ is a fixed point of the symmetric best-response function:
θ∗ = θbr (θ∗).
As in the global bank allocations, there can be more than one equilibrium type. In the
decentralized case, there are three possible types of symmetric equilibria: a no default equilib-
rium (where neither bank defaults in any state), a single default equilibrium (where only the
bank in the region where the aggregate liquidity demand shock realizes defaults), and a mutual
default equilibrium (where both banks default whenever the aggregate liquidity demand shock
realizes in either region).
4.4 Numerical Implementation
4.4.1 Motivating a numerical approach
Solving the game between two strategic banks – one in each region – requires a numerical ap-
proach because a fully analytical solution is infeasible. I expound on this claim below by con-
sidering the impact of the many potentially binding constraints in the decentralized problem
relative to the few that are relevant to the aggregate problems.
Non-negativity constraints. In the no-default regime of the global bank allocation, there are
two possible states. I show in section 3.1 that the non-negativity constraints on excess liquidity
(optimal only in state sL) and partial liquidation (optimal only in state sH ) induce a three-part
solution (one interior and two corner solutions). Analytically, this is still manageable.
In the four-state decentralized problem, however, there are many more possible outcomes.
In any state, as in the benchmarks, a bank may optimally choose to fund late consumption out
of excess liquidity (if the realized liquidity demand is low relative to its expected level), or to fund
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early consumption by partially liquidating the investment (if the realized liquidity demand is
high relative to its expected level). Consider bank A in a no-default equilibrium: it may choose
to hold excess liquidity (e As) in no state, in state 1 only, in states 1 and 3, or in states 1, 2 and 3.
Similarly, there may be partial liquidation (λAs) in no state, in state 4 only, in states 2 and 4, or
in states 2, 3 and 4. It is never optimal to have excess liquidity in the state where the largest liq-
uidity demand occurs, nor to fund the lowest liquidity demand with partial liquidation. There
are thus 6 relevant non-negativity constraints:
{e As ≥ 0}3s=1, {λAs ≥ 0}4s=2
These non-negativity constraints may or may not bind in a number of patterns, inducing
potentially 6 different characterizations of an optimal choice of bank A, given a single choice
of bank B . The full set of possible outcomes across two banks, in the no-default equilibrium,
thus has up to 62 = 36 potentially different characterizations4. Adding the single and mutual
default equilibria (with similarly numerous potential solution types, based on the results of the
benchmarks) renders a fully analytic characterization infeasible.
Incentive compatibility constraints. The global bank problem under asymmetric informa-
tion is equivalent to the global bank problem under full information augmented with an incen-
tive compatibility constraint. My analytical results in section 3.2 show that this induces addi-
tional regions in the parameter set with solutions distinct from those of the global bank under
full information.
Similarly, there are parameter regions for which distinct solution types exist in the decen-
tralized problem: in any state where no default occurs, the optimal allocation may be at a point
where the incentive compatibility constraint for that state, c2As ≥ dA, does or does not bind.
This means the problem has up to four potentially binding incentive compatibility constraints
4I do not claim that there are 36 different characterizations of the equilibrium due to these constraints, but in






Moreover, the incentive compatibility constraints of bank A depend on the choice of bank B .
This further multiplies the number of possibly distinct types of characterization required by a
fully analytic approach: optimal allocations where the incentive compatibility constraint binds
have a different characterization to those where it is slack. Combined with the various patterns
in which the non-negativity constraints (discussed above) may or may not bind, this implies an
an infeasible number of possible outcomes that a fully analytic approach must consider.
By contrast, a numerical approach can deal with all potentially binding constraints in a
simple way: by imposing them on the objective function. The expected utility at any choice
pair in the numerical search space that violates any constraint is numerically penalized to the
extent that only choice pairs that do not violate any constraint survive the search algorithm.
Thus, for any parameter set, a numerical algorithm can find the choice pairs of banks that (i)
maximize ex-ante welfare, and (ii) do not violate any defining constraints, without the need of
considering all possible patterns of potentially binding constraints. This makes the problem
numerically tractable, where an analytic approach is not.
4.4.2 Numerically characterizing the equilibrium
I numerically solve for the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game G , the
fixed point of the symmetric best-response function. I consider a numerical approximation of
this solution concept. The search spaceΘ of the choice variables θ is
Θ≡ {y, z,d |y ∈ [0,1], z ∈ [0,max{α,ε}] and d ∈ [1,R]},
where the bounds on the deposit return ensure bank liquidity provision (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983) and are relevant for a utility function with relative risk aversion above unity.
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Definition 2. A numerically approximate symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of game G
is an iteratively stable fixed point θ∗ ∈Θ of the numerical best-response function θ̂br (θ):
θ∗ = θ̂br (θ∗),
where the iterations θi = θ̂br (θi−1) are computed by direct numerical optimization of the con-
strained expected utility function over choice variables:






νAsu(c1As(θi ,θi−1))+ (1−νAs)u(c2As(θi ,θi−1))
]
s.t. xA + y A + zA = 1+ zB
e As(θi ,θi−1),λAs(θi ,θi−1) ≥ 0,
c2As(θi ,θi−1) ≥ c1As(θi ,θi−1),
and equations (4.1) and (4.2).
4.4.3 Search Algorithm
The search algorithm is an iteration over the numerically constructed best-response function.
In each iteration, the best response of bank A to the choice of bank B is obtained via a global
search method with multiple starting points.5
To simplify the notation, I denote the constrained ex ante expected utility to a consumer
that deposits her unit endowment at bank A from an arbitrary pair of regional choices θA,θB ∈Θ
by:
5Computations were performed on the Stellenbosch University’s High Performance Cluster 1 (Rhasatsha):









νAsu(c1As(θA,θB ))+ (1−νAs)u(c2As(θA,θB ))
]
s.t. xA + y A + zA = 1+ zB
e As(θA,θB ),λAs(θA,θB ) ≥ 0,
c2As(θA,θB ) ≥ c1As(θA,θB ),
and equations (4.1) and (4.2).
In numerical implementation, I set E[u(θA|θB )] to a large negative value if any constraint
is violated, thus encoding the constraints directly into the objective function.
Algorithm 1. The algorithm proceeds in the following steps (schematically represented in Figure
4.1). Fix a parameter set and let the set of equilibrium types be
T ≡ {no default, single default, mutual default}.
Step 1: For each equilibrium type τ ∈T , perform steps 2 - 4.
Step 2: Initialize the choice of bank B at a feasible symmetric and incentive-compatible choice,
θ0 = [y0, z0,d0] ∈Θ. The initial point is found by means of a three-dimensional grid search
of symmetric choices in the search space, with each dimension of Θ partitioned into ng r i d
points. This yields n3g r i d potential initial choices. The potential initial choice that maxi-
mizes expected utility is chosen as the starting point for the algorithm.
Step 3: Find the best response of bank A, θi = [yi , zi ,di ], to the choice of bank B,




The numerical search for θi is done using standard global optimization routines with nst ar t
randomly selected starting points. That is, for a given choice of bank B, θ1−i , I need to find
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the best response, θi . I impose all inequality constraints directly on the objective function
(by setting the value of the objective function to a large negative number at any pair of
choices where a constraint is violated). This means that the numerical objective function
has areas in its domain that are flat. Standard numerical optimization routines typically
fail if they start in a flat area. To overcome this problem, I use a global search method that
uses nst ar t stochastically chosen starting points (in every iteration). The algorithm then se-
lects the final optimal θi as the best among the convergence points of each of the multiple
starting points. Typically, all starting points that lie in an area where the objective function
is not flat converge to the same point.
Step 4: Compute the `1 distance norm6 of the difference between θi and θi−1: δi = ‖θi −θi−1‖1.
Replace the choice of bank B, θi−1, with the best response found, θi . Repeat steps 3 and 4
until one of the exit criteria is met:
1. I label an iteration strongly convergent to a symmetric equilibrium if the change from
one choice to the next in the iteration falls below the convergence tolerance parame-
ter, δi < δcr i t . This case suggests an iteratively stable numerical fixed point of the
best-response function which corresponds to an equilibrium of type τ: {θ∗A,θ
∗
B |τ} =





2. I label an iteration weakly convergent to symmetric equilibrium if the number of iter-
ations exceeds the maximum number of allowed iterations, i > imax , with δi > δcr i t
for all i . In this case, I select the closest sequential pair as the candidate equilibrium
of type τ: {θ∗A,θ
∗
B |τ} = argmin
{θi ,θi−1}





Step 5: Selection of equilibrium type: steps 1-4 yield a candidate equilibrium with associated value
function for each of the three possible equilibrium types τ ∈T . For a given parameter set, I








6The `1 norm is the strictest distance metric I could choose, as it corresponds to δi = |yi − yi−1| + |zi − zi−1| +
|di −di−1|. I choose this norm to ensure that, even in the weaker convergence criterion, the candidate equilibrium
choice is as close to a symmetric equilibrium as possible.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of search algorithm.
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Table 4.1 summarizes the parameters that control the optimization routines.
Table 4.1: Optimization control parameters.
Parameter Name Value
Partition of search space for initial point search (ng r i d ) 25
Number of starting points for best response search (nst ar t ) 2500
Convergence tolerance (δcr i t ) 10−5
Maximum iterations (imax) 128 = 27
For each parameter set, I search a grid of size n3g r i d symmetric choices to find the best
choice at which to initialize the iteration over the best-response function. Then, for each step
within the iteration (i.e., at a given choice for bank B (θi−1)), I use a global search algorithm
with nst ar t stochastically selected starting points for the choice of bank A (θi ) to find the best
response. The final best response of bank A (θi ) is the best among the convergence points of





In this chapter I present my numerical results for the case of regional banks, organized in five
subsections, from specific to general.
The theoretical literature on financial intermediation is dominated by purely analytical
work. One of the contributions of my research is to show that important theoretical insights can
be gained via numerical methods applied to models that are too complicated to be amenable
to comprehensive analytical characterization. An essential viability check on a numerical ap-
proach would entail demonstrating that it can replicate extant analytical results. Section 5.1
shows that the numerical approach to solving my model is able to replicate the analytic results
in Allen and Gale (2000), which is a special case of my model with zero probability of an aggre-
gate liquidity demand shock (p = 0).
The novel feature of the model in this dissertation is the results obtained from studying
contagion over the full range of the probability (p) of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. In
section 5.2 I discuss the results for contagion and the optimal portfolio choices as the shock
probability varies from 0 to 1.
The analytic benchmark results in chapter 3 are focused on the interaction between the
probability (p) and size (α) of the aggregate liquidity demand shock; therefore in section 5.3 I
have replicated this focus numerically for the case of decentralized regional banks, also consid-
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ering how the degree of risk aversion affects the prevalence of contagion.
The most important result of this research is the characterization of the prevalence of
contagion in the most general way possible in a numerical approach. Thus, in section 5.4 I con-
sider the prevalence of contagion based on a large set of random draws from the full parameter
space.
Finally, to complement the results over p andα, I use machine learning techniques in sec-
tion 5.5.2 to provide a comprehensive picture of how the various parameters influence the type
of equilibrium, especially focusing on the values of the model parameters at which contagion
can occur.
For the numerical results I focus on a standard constant relative risk aversion utility func-
tion that obeys the Inada conditions; that is, the constant elasticity of substitution utility func-
tion u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ .
5.1 Replicating the Allen and Gale (2000) results
A minimum requirement for accepting theoretical results obtained by purely computational
means is that the approach is able to reproduce results established analytically. In this section
I show that my solution algorithm for the decentralized banking problem replicates the results
obtained by Allen and Gale (2000). Their model is a special case of mine when the probability
of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is zero (p = 0).
Allen and Gale (2000) argue that, in the absence of aggregate risk (i.e. when p = 0), the
first best is obtained by decentralized banks. In the absence of aggregate risk, the stochastic
structure is described in Table 5.1.
Since the regional shocks cancel out when aggregated across regions, the global risk shar-
ing problem is deterministic. Allen and Gale (2000) show that the first best arrangement satisfies
the first order condition, u′(c AG1 ) = Ru′(c AG2 ). This allocation is feasibly decentralized as follows:
each bank holds interbank position zA = zB = z AG = ε and just enough liquidity to satisfy the
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Table 5.1: Distribution of regional liquidity demand νks without aggregate shock
State Probability Region A Region B
1 12 νA1 = γ−ε νB1 = γ+ε
2 12 νA2 = γ+ε νB2 = γ−ε
average global early liquidity demand y A = yB = y AG = γc AG1 . If state 1 is realized, bank B needs
to withdraw its full interbank holding as it faces regional consumer demand (γ+ε)c AG1 but has
liquidity only sufficient to cover γc AG1 . Bank A does not need to withdraw, as the sum of regional
demand (γ−ε)c AG1 and demand from bank B εc AG1 is equal to liquidity available locally.
If the utility function is of the standard constant relative risk aversion form u(c) = cρ−1−1
ρ−1 ,
the optimal choices are:
y AG = γR
γR + (1−γ)R 1ρ
, z AG = ε, d AG = R
γR + (1−γ)R 1ρ
. (5.1)
My approach to replicating this result proceeds as follows: set p = 0 and for each risk
aversion parameter in the set ρ j = {2,3,4,5,6,7,8}, take the following steps.
Step 1: For ρ j , take a random draw i of the model parameters {R,γ,ε,α}, from independent, uni-
form distributions.
Step 2: For each random draw i of parameters {Ri ,γi ,εi ,αi }
2.1: Calculate the Allen and Gale (2000) allocation and implied expected utility,






i }, using equation (5.1),







i }, via the search algorithm presented in section 4.4.3, and













Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the replication exercise. While there is natu-
rally some numerical variation, the algorithm succeeds in replicating the results of Allen and
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Gale (2000). The normalized expected utility results show this most clearly: the median of the
numerical results is equal to 1, as required, with the mean being only marginally below 1, and
with a very small standard deviation. The skewness of the distribution of the numerical results
is negative, showing that the few instances where the goal was missed can be attributed to the
algorithm ending before reaching the true Nash equilibrium. The normalized choice variables
show somewhat more variability, but are generally centred on unity, except for the normalized
interbank position.
This last result does not imply a failure in the replication exercise, as there is a natural in-
determinacy in the interbank position in symmetric equilibrium. The interbank position in the
Allen and Gale (2000) allocation is equal to the size of the regional shock (ε). When the size of
the aggregate liquidity demand shock (α) is larger than ε, the search space of the algorithm ad-
mits larger than necessary interbank positions. However, as long as the allocation is symmetric,
a larger than necessary interbank deposit still implements the Allen and Gale (2000) allocation.
If some symmetric pair of interbank positions, z∗, feasibly implements a symmetric allocation,
any larger symmetric pair of interbank positions implements the same allocation. Any excess
interbank holdings above what is needed to finance early withdrawals (the only purpose of the
interbank position) will pay out in the second period. Given that the allocations are symmet-
ric in terms of late payouts in the absence of aggregate risk, these second-period payouts will
cancel out and have no welfare implication for consumers.
Additional evidence for the successful replication exercise is presented via scatter plots
in Figure 5.1, where I plot the results of the computed equilibrium against the theoretical val-
ues in the Allen and Gale (2000) allocation. The figure shows the near-perfect correspondence
of the expected utility in numerical equilibrium with the predicted analytical value (top-left
panel). As with the descriptive statistics in Table 5.2, there is much greater variability in the
choice variables than in the expected utility. This illustrates a central feature that complicates
the numerical approach: in the region of the equilibrium, the expected utility surface is ex-
tremely flat, so that even notable variation in choices has little impact on the implied welfare of
the equilibrium. Hence any numerical algorithm will struggle to converge.
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The greatest variability in liquidity (the top-right panel of Figure 5.1) occurs when the ana-
lytical allocation has near-zero liquidity. This occurs when the liquidation return on investment
is near 1, as then investment and liquidity are near substitutes for funding early investment and
the numerical algorithm struggles to pin down the optimal level of liquidity precisely. The in-
terbank deposit (bottom-left panel) is variable in the sense that the numerical equilibrium fre-
quently selects (symmetric) values larger than those predicted by the analytic results. As argued
above, this does not affect welfare, as interbank positions that are too large cancel out in sym-
metric equilibrium. Lastly, the deposit return is most variable when it is predicted to be very
large, which occurs when both the early liquidation return and the return at maturity are large.
Again, even this notable variability has a limited impact on implied welfare.
The final evidence of the successful replication of the benchmark is presented in the form
of regression results in Table 5.3. In this analysis, the computed equilibrium values of each
measure of interest were regressed on the corresponding analytical values in the Allen and Gale
(2000) allocation. I used two methods: the standard ordinary least squares estimator (OLS, in
the left panel of the table) and recursively weighted least squares (RWLS, right panel). RWLS
is robust to outliers, which in this setting are caused by numerical errors in the computational
algorithm. The OLS results show coefficients that are very close to one with very high R2 values.
In the RWLS results, all the coefficients and R2 values are equal to one (rounded to two decimal
places). In the RWLS approach I used a "fair" weighting scheme: the estimation algorithm starts
with OLS (i.e. equal weights on all observations) then uses the estimated residuals to down-
weight observations with large residuals (details in appendix B). This scheme down-weights
outliers, but no observation received a zero weight.
I summarize the evidence in this section as a numerical result:
Numerical Result 1. When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is zero, p = 0,
the numerical algorithm replicates the analytic version of the results in Allen and Gale (2000).
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Table 5.2: Replicating the Allen and Gale (2000) result at p = 0: descriptive statistics of the nor-
malized expected utility and choice variables in numerical equilibrium based on 1856
trials
Choice Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness
Normalized expected utility (
EU∗i
EU∗AG ,i




) 1.021 1 1.368 39.022
Normalized interbank deposit (
z∗i
zAG ,i
) 1.662 1 8.375 26.455
Normalized deposit return (
d∗i
dAG ,i
) 1.008 1 0.0375 7.263
Table 5.3: Replicating the Allen and Gale (2000) result at p = 0: regression results based on 1856
trials. For each of the values of interest, expected utility and the three elements of
the bank choice variable, a pair of independent estimations were performed, regress-
ing the computed equilibrium values on the analytical values of the corresponding
variable in the Allen and Gale (2000) result. Two methods were used: ordinary least
squares (OLS) and recursively weighted least squares (RWLS).
OLS RWLS
Coefficient p-value R2 Coefficient p-value R2
Expected utility 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Liquidity 1.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 0.00 1.00
Interbank deposit 1.02 0.00 0.94 1.00 0.00 1.00
Deposit return 1.02 0.00 0.98 1.00 0.00 1.00
80
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 5.1: Replicating the Allen and Gale (2000) result at p = 0: scatter plots of the equilibrium
expected utility and choice variable values compared with the analytical values in
the Allen and Gale (2000) result based on 1856 trials. Each dot is partially transparent




5.2 Results for the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock
In this section I present the first novel numerical results on the decentralized problem between
two banks studied in this research. I start with results varying over only one parameter, the
probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock (p), as these results provide the strongest
intuition on the nature of the different equilibrium types that emerge in the strategic game G .
The main findings in this section are as follows. First, there are parameter values (e.g.
when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is small enough) for which the no-default equilib-
rium is weakly superior for all positive probability levels. Thus, contagion (mutual-default equi-
librium) is possible only with zero probability (where the no-default and mutual-default equi-
libria achieve the same expected utility). Second, there are also parameter values (e.g. when the
aggregate liquidity demand shock is large enough) where the equilibrium type depends on the
probability of the shock. When the probability is small enough, the mutual-default equilibrium
is superior, so that contagion is possible with positive probability. For intermediate probability
values, the single-default equilibrium is superior, so that only the bank in the region where the
shock is realized defaults, but this does not cause contagion. Lastly, when the probability of the
aggregate liquidity demand shock is large enough, the no-default equilibrium is superior, i.e.
banks choose allocations such that default does not occur when the shock is realized.
My results characterize how the type of equilibrium (no default, single default or mutual
default) and the equilibrium bank choices depend on the full range of probability of the aggre-
gate liquidity demand shock p ∈ [0,1] in two cases: when the aggregate liquidity demand shock
(α) is smaller than, and when it is larger than the regional liquidity demand shock (ε). Table 5.4
summarizes the parameter sets studied in this section.
Figure 5.2 shows the expected utility for each equilibrium type when the local realization
of the aggregate liquidity demand shock (2α) is small, and in particular, when it is smaller than
the regional liquidity demand shock, 2α= 0.02 < ε= 0.1. The no-default equilibrium is strictly
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Table 5.4: Model parameters for results across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock
Parameter Name Symbol Value
Utility function u(c) c
1−ρ−1
1−ρ
Coefficient of risk aversion ρ 2
Investment return at maturity R 5
Investment return at early liquidation r 0.1
Average liquidity demand γ 0.5
Regional liquidity demand shock ε 0.1
Aggregate liquidity demand shock size α 0.01 and 0.15
Aggregate liquidity demand shock probability p [0,1]
superior for all p > 0, while the no-default and mutual-default equilibria are equivalent at p = 0
and attain the expected utility of the Allen and Gale (2000) allocation as in section 5.1. Thus,
parameter sets exist where there is no positive probability at which contagion occurs. The intu-
ition for this is simple. When the aggregate liquidity demand shock is smaller than the regional
shock, any interbank position that is large enough to support the no-default equilibrium in the
absence of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is also large enough to support the no-default
equilibrium when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized.
In contrast, Figure 5.3 shows the expected utility for each equilibrium type when the local
realization of aggregate liquidity demand shock (2α) is large and, in particular, when it is larger
than the regional liquidity demand shock, 2α = 0.3 > ε = 0.1. In this case there are three re-
gions with different equilibrium types across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock. When the probability is low enough (p ∈ [0,0.06)), the mutual-default equilibrium is su-
perior. For intermediate probability values (p ∈ [0.06,0.18])), the single-default equilibrium is
superior. When the probability is high enough (p ∈ (0.18,1]), the no-default equilibrium is su-
83
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
perior. Again, when the probability is zero, the equilibrium attains the same expected utility as
the allocation in Allen and Gale (2000), within numerical precision.
Figure 5.4 shows the numerical accuracy of the results in the form of histograms across the
probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock for each equilibrium type where it is supe-
rior (these results are for the case where the shock is large, as in Figure 5.3). The top panel shows
the `1 norm of the difference between the two consecutive choice vectors that are closest and
constitute my computed equilibrium choice pair. The bottom panel presents the absolute value
of the implied expected utility differences when each bank chooses one of the pair of equilib-
rium choices. The mutual-default equilibrium is accurately computed, while the single-default
equilibrium is the least accurate. For the no-default equilibrium, the accuracy is lower for low
values of the probability (near the boundary with the single equilibrium type). As noted in sec-
tion 5.1, the variability in the expected utility differences of the equilibrium choice pairs are
dramatically smaller than the distances between the corresponding choice pairs themselves.
Again, this indicates that the expected utility hyper-surface is very flat around the equilibrium.
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Figure 5.2: Expected utility at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. In
this parameter set, the aggregate liquidity demand shock is small relative to the re-
gional liquidity demand shock, 2α< ε, and there is effectively only one equilibrium
type (in contrast to the parameter set in Figure 5.3 where 2α > ε). The no-default
equilibrium is weakly superior ∀p ∈ (0,1]. Thus, there is no positive probability at
which mutual default (or contagion) occurs. However, when the probability is zero,
the no-default and mutual-default equilibria are equivalent and attain the same ex-
pected utility as the allocation in Allen and Gale (2000), within numerical precision.
The dots indicate where the algorithm result is strongly convergent. There are two
lines for the expected utility in each equilibrium type, showing where the algorithm
attained the worst convergence. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1,
γ= 0.5, α= 0.01 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.3: Expected utility at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. In this
parameter set, the aggregate liquidity demand shock is large relative to the regional
liquidity demand shock, 2α > ε, and yields three probability regions with different
equilibrium types (in contrast to the parameter set in Figure 5.2 where 2α< ε). When
the probability is low enough (p ∈ [0,0.06)), the mutual-default equilibrium is supe-
rior. For intermediate probability values (p ∈ [0.06,0.18]), the single-default equilib-
rium is superior. When the probability is high enough (p ∈ (0.18,1]), the no-default
equilibrium is superior. Moreover, when the probability is zero, the equilibrium at-
tains the same expected utility as the allocation in Allen and Gale (2000), within nu-
merical precision. The dots indicate where the algorithm result is strongly conver-
gent. There are two lines for the expected utility in each equilibrium type, show-
ing where the algorithm attained the worst convergence. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ ,
ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5, α= 0.15 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.4: Numerical accuracy of the results presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.5 to 5.7. The top
panel shows the `1 norm of the difference between the two choice vectors that con-
stitute the computed equilibrium choice pair for each type of equilibrium, where
each type is superior. The bottom panel shows the distance between the pair of
expected utility values corresponding to the pair of equilibrium choice vectors. Pa-
rameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5, α= 0.15 and ε= 0.1.
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I summarize the findings from these two parameter cases in the following result.
Numerical Result 2. The type of Nash equilibrium depends on parameters.
1. There exist parameter regions (e.g. when α is sufficiently small) where the no-default equi-
librium is weakly superior ∀p ∈ [0,1]; i.e. the mutual-default equilibrium (contagion) can
only occur with probability 0.
2. There exist parameter regions (e.g. when α is sufficiently large) where the equilibrium type
depends on the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock.
(i) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low enough, the
mutual-default equilibrium is superior to the single- and no-default equilibria.
(ii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is intermediate, the
single-default equilibrium is superior to the mutual- and no-default equilibria.
(iii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is high enough, the no-
default equilibrium is superior to the single- and mutual-default equilibria.
The mutual-default equilibrium is also called the contagion case because the decision of
late depositors in one region to run on their bank induces the late depositors in the other region
to also run on their bank. I show that contagion occurs only for a low enough probability of the
aggregate liquidity demand shock. For a higher shock probability, in the single-default equilib-
rium, banks internalize the aggregate liquidity risk to the extent that a run by late depositors of
one bank no longer induces a run by late depositors of the other. For a high probability of the
aggregate liquidity demand shock, banks fully internalize the ex-post risk of a shock ex ante and
the equilibrium choice is such that default never occurs in equilibrium.
The intuition for the various types of equilibrium and their dependence on the probability
of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is similar to the intuition for optimality of the two
regimes, default and no default, of a global bank (chapter 3). This intuition is based on the ex-
post inefficiency of satisfying the constraint of non-state-contingent deposit return across all
states in which a bank does not default.
88
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
When the aggregate liquidity demand shock is large, a non-state-contingent deposit re-
turn in states requires a very low late consumption allocation in states 3 and 4 (where the shock
realizes). This is ex-post inefficient. Thus, when the probability of the aggregate liquidity de-
mand shock is very low (i.e. the weight on states 3 and 4 in ex-ante expected utility is low), it is
efficient for a bank to choose an allocation where it defaults in the any state where the aggregate
liquidity demand realizes. This allows the bank to choose a more efficient risk sharing alloca-
tion with deposit return that is equal across only in states 1 and 2. In other words: maintaining a
non-state-contingent deposit return in all states, means that risk-sharing in all states is ex post
inefficient. If the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low enough, it is ex-
ante efficient to accept an decrease in ex-post efficiency in states 3 and 4 (by defaulting) in order
attain an increase in ex-post efficiency in states 1 and 2. This is a situation where the Nash equi-
librium is characterized by mutual default (contagion), and corresponds to the optimality of
the default regime of a global bank. I show below that in this situation the banks choose mutual
interbank positions that insure only against the regional liquidity demand shock: zA = zB = ε.
In contrast, when the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is very high, the
weight on states 3 and 4 in ex-ante expected utility is high, so default in either of these states is
very costly relative to the cost of maintaining non-state-contingent deposit returns in all states.
Thus both banks choose allocations such that they never default in any state. This is a situation
where the Nash equilibrium is characterized by no default in any state, and corresponds to the
optimality of the no default regime of a global bank. I show below that in this situation the
banks choose mutual interbank positions that insure against the aggregate liquidity demand
shock: zA = zB =α> ε.
Finally, when the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is intermediate,
each bank prefers an allocation where it defaults only in the state where the aggregate liquidity
demand shock hits its own region (state 4 for bank A and state 3 for bank B). This is a situation
where the Nash equilibrium is characterized by a single default. Since a global bank is con-
strained to offer identical allocations in each region in any given state, there is no event in the
benchmark allocation that corresponds to the single default equilibrium in the decentralized
game. I show below that, in this situation, the banks choose mutual interbank positions that
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are smaller than the regional liquidity demand shock: zA = zB < ε<α.
From here on, I focus on the parameter set where there are multiple equilibrium types
across p (i.e. for large α), which is the more interesting case.
Figure 5.5 shows the equilibrium liquidity (y∗) across the probability of the aggregate liq-
uidity demand shock (p) at my approximation of the symmetric Nash equilibrium for each type
of equilibrium (no default, single default or mutual default) where each type is superior. The
figure displays all of the iterates in the application of algorithm 4.4.3 for this parameter set, as
well as the final equilibrium choice pair as a pair of lines.
There is clear evidence of a point of attraction which I interpret as a symmetric equilib-
rium. All iterates fall within a small sub-interval of the search space for this variable, [0,1]. The
figure mirrors the results from Figure 5.4: the mutual-default equilibrium is most accurate, fol-
lowed by the no-default equilibrium and then the single-default equilibrium.
I summarize the findings from Figure 5.5 in the following result:
Numerical Result 3. The symmetric Nash equilibrium liquidity (y∗) is increasing in the proba-
bility of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, with some evidence that it may be discontinuous
across equilibrium types.
(i) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low enough, the mutual-
default equilibrium is superior. At p = 0, it is equal to the liquidity of the Allen and Gale
(2000) allocation. As p increases, y∗ increases until the equilibrium type switches to single
default.
(ii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is intermediate, the single-
default equilibrium is superior. There is suggestive evidence that y∗ decreases discontinu-
ously at the probability boundary with the mutual equilibrium type. As p increases, y∗ is
weakly increasing until the equilibrium type switches to no default.
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Figure 5.5: Liquidity at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional bank prob-
lem across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. The mutual-
default equilibrium is superior for p ∈ [0,0.06), the single-default equilibrium for
p ∈ [0.06,0.18], and the no-default equilibrium for p ∈ (0.18,1]. When the proba-
bility is zero, the equilibrium liquidity is equal to that in the Allen and Gale (2000)
allocation, within numerical precision. Equilibrium liquidity is generally increasing
in p, but with discrete jumps between different equilibrium types. The search space
is: [0,1]. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5, α= 0.15 and ε= 0.1.
(iii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is high enough, the no-
default equilibrium is superior, and y∗ increases discontinuously at the probability bound-
ary with the single equilibrium type. y∗ is increasing in p until p = 1.
Figure 5.6 shows the equilibrium interbank deposit (z∗) across the probability of the ag-
gregate liquidity demand shock (p) at my approximation of the symmetric Nash equilibrium
for each type of equilibrium (no default, single default and mutual default) where each type is
superior. As above, there is large variability in computations of the single-default equilibrium,
where the mutual- and no-default equilibria are more tightly packed. Nevertheless, there is
strong attraction to a symmetric equilibrium as all the iterates fall within a small sub-interval of
the search space for this variable, [0,0.15].
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Figure 5.6: Interbank deposit at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. The
equilibrium interbank deposit is approximately flat within each equilibrium type
with discrete jumps between equilibrium types. When the probability is zero, the
Allen and Gale (2000) allocation is replicated by the mutual-default equilibrium.
When the probability is low enough (p ∈ [0,0.06)), the mutual-default equilibrium
is superior and the symmetric equilibrium interbank deposit is close to the regional
liquidity shock ε. For intermediate probability values (p ∈ [0.06,0.18]), the single-
default equilibrium is superior and the equilibrium interbank deposit is far lower
than ε. When the probability is high enough (p ∈ (0.18,1]), the no-default equilib-
rium is superior and the equilibrium interbank deposit is approximately equal to
the aggregate liquidity demand shock, α. The search space is [0,0.15]. Parameters:
u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5, α= 0.15 and ε= 0.1.
92
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
I summarize the findings from Figure 5.6 in the following numerical result:
Numerical Result 4. The symmetric Nash equilibrium interbank deposit (z∗) is discontinuous
across equilibrium types and there is a clear ranking in the size of the interbank deposit held in
equilibrium. The highest position z∗ ≈ α is held in the no-default equilibrium, an intermediate
level is held in the mutual-default equilibrium z∗ ≈ ε, and the lowest deposit is held in the single-
default equilibrium z∗ < ε.
(i) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low enough, the mutual-
default equilibrium is superior. At p = 0, it is equal to the interbank position of the Allen
and Gale (2000) allocation. z∗ ≈ ε and is non-increasing in p until the equilibrium type
changes to single default.
(ii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is intermediate, the single-
default equilibrium is superior. There is a discontinuous decrease in the interbank deposit
to z∗ < ε at the probability boundary with the mutual-default equilibrium. There is no
evidence of either an increasing or a decreasing tendency in p until the equilibrium type
switches to no default.
(iii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is high enough, the no-
default equilibrium is superior. There is a discontinuous increase in the interbank deposit
to z∗ ≈α at the probability boundary with the single-default equilibrium. z∗ remains ap-
proximately equal to α until p = 1.
Figure 5.7 shows the equilibrium deposit return (d∗) across the probability of the aggre-
gate liquidity demand shock (p) at my numerical approximation of the symmetric Nash equi-
librium for each type of equilibrium where each type is superior. As in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, there
is a clear attraction to a symmetric equilibrium as the iterates fall within a small sub-interval in
the search space for this variable, [1,5].
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Figure 5.7: Deposit return at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional bank
problem across the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. When the
probability is zero, the Allen and Gale (2000) allocation is replicated by the mutual-
default equilibrium. When the probability is low enough (p ∈ [0,0.06)), the mutual-
default equilibrium is superior. For intermediate probability values (p ∈ [0.06,0.18]),
the single-default equilibrium is superior and when the probability is high enough
(p ∈ (0.18,1]), the no-default equilibrium is superior. Within each equilibrium type
the equilibrium deposit return is increasing, with clear downward jumps across
equilibrium types, so that the mutual-default equilibrium has the highest deposit
return, followed by the single- and then the no-default equilibria. The search space
is [1,5]. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5, α= 0.15 and ε= 0.1.
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I summarize the findings from Figure 5.7 in the following numerical result:
Numerical Result 5. The symmetric Nash equilibrium deposit return (d∗) is increasing in p
within each equilibrium type and is discontinuous across equilibrium types. There is a clear
ranking across equilibrium types: the deposit return is highest in the mutual-default equilib-
rium, followed by the single-default and then the no-default equilibria.
(i) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low enough, the mutual-
default equilibrium is superior. At p = 0, the numerical equilibrium attains the value in
the Allen and Gale (2000) allocation. d∗ is increasing in p until the equilibrium switches
to single default.
(ii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is intermediate, the single-
default equilibrium is superior. d∗ decreases discontinuously at the probability bound-
ary with the mutual-default equilibrium. d∗ is increasing in p until the equilibrium type
switches to no default.
(iii) When the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is high enough, the no-
default equilibrium is superior. d∗ decreases discontinuously at the probability boundary
with the single-default equilibrium. d∗ is increasing in p until p = 1.
The discontinuities in the optimal choices obtain when the equilibrium switches from
one type of dominant equilibrium (e.g. mutual-default) to another (e.g. single-default), mir-
roring the discontinuities in the benchmark allocations (chapter 3). These discontinuities are
features of my solution rather than anomalies of the numerical approximation. First, the sym-
metric equilibrium choices of an arbitrary bank in each equilibrium have a continuous char-
acter (up to numerical precision). Second, the discontinuities between equilibrium types are
much larger than any remaining numerical imprecision, which especially can be observed in
Figures 5.6 and 5.7.
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5.3 Results for the probability and size of the aggregate liquid-
ity demand shock, accounting for risk aversion
In this section, I study the prevalence of contagion in terms of the two core parameters of this
research: the probability p and size α of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. Additionally, I
examine how the prevalence of contagion depends on the degree of risk aversion.
The main findings in this section are as follows. Contagion occurs when the size of the ag-
gregate liquidity demand shock is large enough and its probability is small enough. The slope of
the probability boundary between the no-default equilibrium and the other equilibrium types
is positive in the size of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, mirroring the results for the
global bank presented in Figure 3.3. Lastly, the size of the parameter region in α and p in which
either the single- or mutual-default equilibria are superior is decreasing in the degree of risk
aversion (ρ); that is, as consumers become more risk averse, contagion becomes less likely.
The results are presented as a sequence of figures across the full range of p and α for a
range of increasing risk aversion parameters, ρ. In this section I consider a grid of values of
p and α, concentrating on low values of p. That is, I have computed equilibrium types for a
16×16 grid with p ∈ [0,0.1] and α ∈ [0, 1−γ2 ], and for a second 16×16 grid with p ∈ [0.1,1] and
α ∈ [0, 1−γ2 ], yielding 512 parameter sets per risk aversion parameter. Table 5.5 summarizes the
model parameters studied in this section.
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Table 5.5: Model parameters for the results across the probability and size of the aggregate liq-
uidity demand shock.
Parameter Name Symbol Value
Utility function u(c) c
1−ρ−1
1−ρ
Coefficient of risk aversion ρ {2,3, . . . ,6}
Investment return at maturity R 5
Investment return at early liquidation r 0.1
Average liquidity demand γ 0.5
Regional liquidity demand shock ε 0.1
Aggregate liquidity demand shock size α [0,0.25]
Aggregate liquidity demand shock probability p [0,1]
I summarize the findings from Figures 5.8 to 5.12 in the following numerical result which
corresponds to the benchmark result, presented in Figure 3.3:
Numerical Result 6.
(i) Contagion occurs when the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock p is low
enough and the size α of the shock is large enough.
(ii) The parameter space in the probability p and size α of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock where contagion occurs is decreasing in the degree of risk aversion (ρ).
(iii) The boundary p(α) above which no default occurs is increasing in α.
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Figure 5.8: Equilibrium types at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability p and size α of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock for risk aversion parameter ρ = 2. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , R = 5, r = 0.1,
γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.9: Equilibrium types at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability p and size α of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock for risk aversion parameter ρ = 3. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , R = 5, r = 0.1,
γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.10: Equilibrium types at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability p and sizeα of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock for risk aversion parameter ρ = 4. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , R = 5, r = 0.1,
γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.11: Equilibrium types at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability p and sizeα of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock for risk aversion parameter ρ = 5. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ R = 5, r = 0.1,
γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.12: Equilibrium types at the approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional
bank problem across the probability p and sizeα of the aggregate liquidity demand
shock for risk aversion parameter ρ = 6. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ R = 5, r = 0.1,
γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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5.4 Prevalence of contagion across the full parameter space
In order to obtain general results that mimic those found using standard analytical methods,
the entire parameter space must be characterized. Thus, in this section I present results on the
prevalence of contagion across random draws from the full parameter space.
The main finding in this section is that contagion is rare. It is an equilibrium of the de-
centralized problem for only approximately 4% of the parameter space. This is an upper bound
on the prevalence of contagion. Even in a parameter set where contagion is possible, it only
occurs if the aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized, which happens with probability p.
Therefore, I constructed a measure of contagion where its possibility (a parameter set where the
mutual-default equilibrium is superior) is weighted by the probability of the aggregate liquidity
demand shock. This measure gives an ex-ante likelihood for an arbitrary parameter draw of
approximately 0.5%.
Table 5.6 presents the parameter space from which 6781 draws were taken. For each in-
teger value of the risk aversion parameter ρ ∈ {2,3, ...,7}, the other parameters were drawn from
independent, uniform distributions1.
I present results on the prevalence of contagion using three metrics. The first is a direct
numerical measure of the parameter space in which contagion can occur, denoted µcont ag i on .
This metric is simply the frequency of parameter draws that are such that the mutual-default
equilibrium is superior.
The second metric is a weighted numerical measure of the parameter space in which con-
tagion occurs. The weight on each occurrence of a parameter set where the mutual-default
equilibrium is superior is the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock in that param-
eter set. The second metric is denoted µ
cont ag i on
. The third metric, denoted µcont ag i on , is an
intermediate version of the previous two, where probability-weighted measure is standardized
1Since the components of the early liquidity demand specification must sum to less than or equal to one, the
admissible ranges of the regional (ε) and aggregate (α) liquidity demand shocks depend on the draw of the average
liquidity demand in the absence of an aggregate shock (γ). Thus, the independence of the draws are conditional
on their admissible range.
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Table 5.6: Model parameters for results across the full range of parameters
Parameter Name Symbol Value/Range
Utility function u(c) c
1−ρ−1
1−ρ
Risk aversion ρ {2,3, ...,7}
Aggregate liquidity demand shock probability p (0,1)
Investment return at maturity R (1,10)
Investment return at early liquidation r (0,1)
Average liquidity demand γ (0,1)
Aggregate liquidity demand shock size α (0, 1−γ2 )
Regional liquidity demand shock size ε (0,min{α,γ})
Total number of draws N 6784
by the sum of probabilities, rather than by a count of all parameter sets (see the mathematical
definitions of the metrics below).
The first metric of the prevalence of contagion is constructed as follows. For every pa-
rameter draw i , the equilibrium type is computed. I construct an indicator variable icont ag i on ,
where icont ag i on = 1 if the equilibrium type is mutual default (contagion). For the no- or single-
default equilibrium, icont ag i on = 0. The metric is then simply the sum of the indicator variable
standardized by the total number of parameter sets considered:





icont ag i on .
This first metric is an upper bound on the likelihood of contagion. Even within a pa-
rameter draw i where the mutual-default equilibrium is superior, contagion occurs only if the
aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized, which happens with the probability of the aggre-
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gate liquidity demand shock in that particular draw, pi . Thus, the second metric, a lower bound
on the prevalence of contagion, is calculated as the sum of probabilities in the parameter sets
where contagion is possible, standardized by the total number of parameter sets considered:
µ





pi · icont ag i on .
The second metric is a lower bound on the likelihood of contagion. The sum of proba-
bilities is divided by the number of parameter sets. However, this may be too strict. As such, I
consider an intermediate metric which standardizes the sum of probabilities from parameter
sets where contagion occurs by the sum of probabilities in all parameter sets:
µcont ag i on =
∑N
i=1 pi · icont ag i on∑N
i=1 pi
.
Table 5.7: The prevalence of contagion across the full parameter space
Risk aversion parameter ρ
All 2 3 4 5 6 7
N 6784 3206 713 777 715 966 333
µcont ag i on 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.048 0.029 0.027 0.033
µcont ag i on 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.009
µ
cont ag i on
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004
Table 5.7 presents the results on the prevalence of contagion based on the three metrics
described above. I summarize the findings in the following numerical result.
Numerical Result 7. Contagion is rare, occurring in approximately only 4% of the parameter
space of this model. The ex-ante probability of contagion for an arbitrary point in the parameter
space lies between 0.3% and 0.5%.
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5.5 Equilibrium type classification by machine learning
For the final section of results on the strategic bank problem, I collated all computations and
used machine learning to characterize the results over the model parameters. Fundamentally, I
faced a classification problem: determining which parameter sets yield each of the equilibrium
types, including contagion.
I used machine learning to disentangle the effects of the seven model parameters gener-
ally: in sections 5.2 and 5.3 I show results in one or a pair of parameters for carefully selected set
of fixed values of the other parameters. The selection of fixed parameters was done to obtain re-
gions in the varying parameters where each of the equilibrium types has positive measure. For a
fully general characterization, I needed a robust method of constructing the mapping from pa-
rameter set to equilibrium type for the full ranges of all parameters. Machine learning is ideally
suited to this multi-dimensional classification problem.
I used support-vector machines (SVMs) to classify equilibrium types as functions of the
parameters of the model. To this end I provide a simplified review of the method applied to
a case where there are two classes that can be fully separated by two features. Extensions of
these algorithms have been developed to construct the optimal boundaries between multiple
categories that cannot be fully separated (Boser et al., 1992; Cortes and Vapnik, 1995; Fung and
Mangasarian, 2005).
5.5.1 Simulated example: perfect classification by linear support-vector
machine
Consider an artificial example where some variable, c, falls into one of two categories, c =
{−1,1}, as a function of two features, f1, f2 ∈ (0,1). Specifically let:
c =

−1 if f1 < 1− f2
1 if f1 ≥ 1− f2
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I generated 100 draws from this process, with f1,i , f2,i ∼
i .i .d
uniform(0,1) and fitted a linear
SVM to classify the output. The set of observations { f1,i , f2,i ,ci }100i=1 is called the training sample
of patterns. A linear SVM is an algorithm that finds a separating hyperplane D : [0,1]× [0,1] →R
such that D( f1, f2) < 0 implies c( f1, f2) = −1, and D( f1, f2) > 0 implies c( f1, f2) = 1. The hy-
perplane D( f1, f2) is called the decision function and is defined by a subset of patterns in the
training sample, called support vectors. The locus defined by D( f1, f2) = 0 is called the decision
boundary, and the algorithm is built to maximize the margin, which is defined the distance
between the decision boundary and the closest elements of the set of f1,i , f2,i pairs in either
category. The closest elements of the set of f1,i , f2,i pairs in either category are the vectors that
support the separating hyperplane (decision function). The estimated SVM is used predictively
by inputting new feature data and predicting the classification by means of the estimated deci-
sion function
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 illustrate the results of this simple example of fitting an SVM to per-
fectly separable data. Figure 5.13 shows the results in two dimensions. The figure displays the
different categories of outcomes (c), and how these depend on the features ( f1, f2), the deci-
sion boundary (D( f1, f2) = 0) and the support vectors that define the separating hyperplane
(decision function, D( f1, f2)). Figure 5.14 presents the same example in three dimensions, to
illustrate the graph of the decision function D( f1, f2) as a hyperplane in R3.
5.5.2 Results for classification of equilibrium type by support-vector ma-
chines
In this section I show the results of employing SVMs on my computational results to gain insight
into the values of the parameters that yield different equilibrium outcomes. The categories
of outcomes I wish to classify are the three equilibrium types (no default, single default and
mutual default). The features used for the classification are the seven model parameters (see




Figure 5.13: A simple example of classification by a linear support-vector machine in two di-
mensions.




(i) There are three equilibrium types, therefore a multi-category extension of the simple two
category SVM was required,
(ii) Due to numerical error, not all equilibrium types were accurately computed; hence an
SVM algorithm robust to error (also called a "soft-margin" SVM) was necessary, and
(iii) It is not obvious that the parameter boundaries between equilibrium types are best ap-
proximated by linear functions, hence a non-linear extension of the SVM algorithm was
used.
I used the machine learning algorithms provided in Matlab (2017), and applied them to all
the computational results I generated for all of the sub-questions studied in sections 5.1 to 5.4.
The overall accuracy of three SVM specifications trained on a total of 15 552 computed patterns
is presented in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Accuracy of various SVM algorithms in classifying equilibrium type as a function of
model parameters
Type of decision function Accuracy
Linear 91.8% equilibrium types accurately classified
Quadratic 95% equilibrium types accurately classified
Cubic 93.6% equilibrium types accurately classified
I present my findings from training SVMs in Figures 5.15 to 5.17. Since the quadratic SVM
provided the highest accuracy (see Table 5.8), I present all results based on this SVM. Note that
in each case, a set of fixed parameters was chosen to maximize the relative size of all equilibrium
types, in order to build intuition regarding the impact of each parameter for the nature of the
equilibrium type. In each figure, the boundary between equilibrium types corresponds to the
non-linear, multi-category extension of the decision boundary between categories presented in
section 5.5.1. The figures for the pairs of parameters are generated by simulating the predicted
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equilibrium type, based on the fitted SVM on a 500×500 regularly spaced grid for each of the
parameter pairs.
Figure 5.15 presents the SVM-simulated equilibrium types across the size (α) and prob-
ability (p) of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. These results are essentially a replication
of the grid based results presented in section 5.3, except they are based on all computations,
rather than just on a grid in the two parameters with the others fixed. Despite the greater gen-
erality, the results remain the same. Contagion occurs only for low enough probability and
large enough size of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. The single-default equilibrium is
only optimal for an intermediate probability and large enough size of the aggregate liquidity
demand shock. The probability boundary between the no-default equilibrium and the single-
and mutual-default equilibria is increasing in the size of the shock. There is no evidence of a
non-zero slope of the probability boundary in α between the mutual default and single-default
equilibrium types.
Figure 5.16 presents the SVM-simulated equilibrium types across the early liquidation
return (r ) and the return at maturity (R) of investment. For these parameters, I do not have grid
based equivalents as I have for the results presented above. As such, the boundaries between
equilibrium types are likely to be more imprecise, so I do not attempt to give a very strong
interpretation to their slopes where they are irregular.
I restrict my interpretation of these SVM results to the prevalence of contagion in the pa-
rameters r and R. When r = 1, liquidity is redundant, as there is no penalty to early liquidation
of the investment, thus contagion never occurs. Contagion occurs when the early liquidation
return is intermediate and the return at maturity of the investment is large enough, with the
lower bound on R increasing in r . The intuition for this is as follows. When the return at matu-
rity of investment is low, and the early liquidation return is high, investment is closer to liquidity
than otherwise. As such, it is optimal to choose high liquidity holdings, which makes the no-
default equilibrium more likely to be an equilibrium. However, when maturity returns are high
and early returns are intermediate, investment is clearly dominant for financing greater late
consumption. Then it becomes an equilibrium to risk contagion, as a large investment is de-
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Figure 5.15: Simulated equilibrium types across the size, α, and probability, p, of the aggregate
liquidity demand shock based on a fitted quadratic support-vector machine. The
upper bound on p was chosen to focus attention on the region of interest, whereas
the upper bound on α is due to the restriction that α ≤ 1−γ2 . Parameters: u(c) =
c1−ρ−1
1−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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sirable. Lastly, when the early liquidation return is very low but the return at maturity is high
enough, the cost of default becomes very high, and banks choose allocations that do not allow
contagion.
Figure 5.17 presents the SVM-simulated equilibrium types across the average liquidity de-
mand in the absence of an aggregate liquidity demand shock (γ) and the size of the regional liq-
uidity demand shock (ε). Contagion is a Nash equilibrium when both γ and ε are high enough.
First, the largest upper bound on the regional liquidity demand shock is obtained when γ= 0.5,
since the probability features of the model require that ε≤ min{γ,1−γ}. Second, when ε is high,
there is large variation in the number of early consumers across states in the absence of an ag-
gregate liquidity demand shock, which creates a large incentive for mutual liquidity insurance.
This can induce contagion when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized (Note that for
this example the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is low: p = 0.02). By con-
trast, when the regional liquidity demand shock is small, the exposure of one bank to the default
of another is similarly small, and the default of one bank does not tend to cause contagion.
As a final exercise, I repeated the above simulations for a set of increasing risk aversion
parameters, to evaluate the impact of risk aversion on the prevalence of contagion as in section
5.3, but for all the parameters pairs considered in this section. The results are presented in Table
5.9 as the fraction of values in the 500×500 grid where the predicted equilibrium type from the
fitted SVM is mutual default. For comparability with the figures, for each parameter pair in the
grid, the fixed parameters are the same as those of the corresponding figure (Figures 5.15, 5.16
and 5.17), except for the risk aversion parameter. That is, the values in the table are the relative
size of the mutual-default regions in the equivalents of the figures above.
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Figure 5.16: Simulated equilibrium types across the early liquidation return, r , and the return
at maturity, R, of investment based on a fitted quadratic support-vector machine.
Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, p = 0.09, α= 0.1, γ= 0.6 and ε= 0.1.
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Figure 5.17: Simulated equilibrium types across the average liquidity demand in the absence
of an aggregate liquidity demand shock, γ, and the size of the regional liquidity
demand shock, ε, based on a fitted quadratic support-vector machine. The angled
lower bound of the graph is due to the restriction that ε≤ γ, and the upper bound
on γ is due the restriction that γ≤ 1−2α. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, p = 0.02,
α= 0.1, R = 2 and r = 0.9.
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Table 5.9: Fraction of contagion outcomes in pair-wise parameter sets over increasing degrees
of risk aversion.
Risk aversion parameter ρ
2 3 4 5 6 7
Contagion fraction across α and p 0.092 0.070 0.051 0.034 0.018 0.005
(R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1)
Contagion fraction across r and R 0.590 0.463 0.355 0.244 0.121 0.000
(p = 0.09, α= 0.1, γ= 0.6 and ε= 0.1)
Contagion fraction across γ and ε 0.293 0.307 0.323 0.340 0.360 0.383
(p = 0.02, α= 0.1, R = 2 and r = 0.9)
As in section 5.3, the SVM simulations confirm that the fraction of the parameter space
in the probability (p) and size (α) of the aggregate liquidity demand shock in which contagion
occurs is decreasing in the degree of risk aversion. The same is true for the contagion fraction of
the parameter space in the early liquidation return (r ) and the return at maturity of investment
(R).
In contrast, the fraction of the parameter space in the average liquidity demand in the
absence of an aggregate liquidity demand shock (γ) and the regional liquidity demand shock
(ε) in which contagion occurs is increasing in the degree of risk aversion. This can be explained
as follows. The regional liquidity demand shock provides the incentive for liquidity insurance
in the absence of an aggregate liquidity demand shock. As the degree of risk aversion increases,
this insurance incentive increases; thus, exposure to contagion becomes an equilibrium for a
larger parameter space in the regional liquidity demand shock.
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I summarize the findings in this section in the following numerical result:
Numerical Result 8. Contagion occurs when:
(i) the aggregate liquidity demand shock has small enough probability (p) and large enough
size (α),
(ii) investment has an intermediate early liquidation return (r ), and the return at maturity (R)
is large enough relative to the early liquidation return, and
(iii) the average liquidity demand in the absence of aggregate risk (γ) and the regional liquidity
demand shock (ε) are large enough.
Additionally, the fraction of the pair-wise parameter space in which contagion occurs when the
aggregate liquidity demand shock is realized is
(i) decreasing in risk aversion for the probability (p) and size (α) of the aggregate liquidity
demand shock, as well as for the early liquidation return (r ) and the return at maturity (R)
of investment, but
(ii) increasing in risk aversion for the average liquidity demand (γ) and the size of the regional





In this section I compare the welfare implications of the numerical results in chapter 5 with the
analytic benchmarks in chapter 3. There are two key findings. First, the mutual-default and no-
default equilibria achieve very close to the expected utility of the global bank allocation (with
full or asymmetric information), with differences that are small enough to be considered arte-
facts of numerical imprecision. Second, the single-default equilibrium often achieves expected
utility greater than that of the global bank allocation, and these differences are too large to be
due to numerical imprecision. The second finding has the following interpretation: an econ-
omy with a global bank which operates regional branches can be sub-optimal, as it disallows
default in only one region at a time1.
I proceed in two steps. First, I present, in graphical form, a finding across only the proba-
bility of the aggregate liquidity demand shock in order to highlight the main issues, comparable
to the numerical results in section 5.2. Then, to cover the full parameter space, I use all compu-
tational results. I use both graphical and numerical metrics to provide the comparison between
the benchmarks and the decentralized problem.
1This result is tangentially similar to the result in Castiglionesi et al. (2017) who consider a setting without liq-
uidation where integration of regional banks is not always optimal. As banks become more integrated, the returns
that their consumers at different banks receive more correlated returns. In the model presented here, a single
banking entity with regional branches can be roughly seen as the limit of integration where the regional branches
give identical allocations irrespective of region. Wagner (2010) presents a model where banks can diversify into
similar projects, and there as well, full diversification makes banks identical.
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Figure 6.1 shows the expected utility obtained in the three equilibrium types across the
probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock (p) in comparison with the expected utility
in the global bank allocation under asymmetric information2. The expected utility of the global
bank allocation is marginally larger than the expected utility in the mutual-default equilibrium,
where the mutual-default equilibrium is superior to the no-default equilibrium. Similarly, the
expected utility of the global bank is marginally larger than the expected utility in the no-default
equilibrium, where the no-default equilibrium is superior to the mutual-default equilibrium.
However, in the region where the single-default equilibrium is superior, the global bank ex-
pected utility is much lower than that obtained in the strategic bank problem. Thus, in this
parameter region, a global bank with regional branches is inferior as it does not allow default in
only one region.
In Figures 6.2 and 6.3, and in Table 6.1 I consider results from 10207 unique parameter
vectors from all computational results (including the random draws from the full parameter
space from section 5.4).
Figure 6.2 presents scatter plots of the expected utility of the global bank allocation (un-
der asymmetric information) and the expected utility of the three Nash equilibrium types of the
strategic problem against the expected utility of the global bank allocation under full informa-
tion.
In section 3.2 I show that there are parameter regions where the global bank allocation
under asymmetric information differs from the allocation under full information, and therefore
must yield lower expected utility. The top-left panel of Figure 6.2 shows that in the parameters
covered by my computational results these cases are rare and that the expected utility differ-
ences are minor. The reason for the rarity and limited impact is as follows. First, when the
default regime is optimal for the global bank under full information, it is also optimal under
asymmetric information, as it is incentive compatible by construction. The default regime is
optimal when the aggregate liquidity demand shock is large but has low probability (see Figure
3.3). The region where the global bank allocation under full information is not incentive com-




Figure 6.1: Expected utility comparison between that attained by the global bank and at the
approximate symmetric Nash equilibrium of the regional bank problem across the
probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock. The expected utility in the
global bank allocation is marginally larger than in the mutual-default equilibrium
(where the mutual-default equilibrium is superior to no-default equilibrium) and
in the no-default equilibrium (where the no-default equilibrium is superior to the
mutual-default equilibrium). However, in the region where the single-default equi-
librium is superior, the global bank expected utility is lower than that obtained in
the strategic bank problem. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ = 0.5,
α= 0.15 and ε= 0.1.
patible (and thus where the allocation is different under asymmetric information), is also for
low probability values, but ones that are large enough for the no-default regime to be superior
(see appendix A.4). The numerical results show that this region of intermediate probability is
very small.
Figure 3.6 abstracts from default to highlight the differences between the full and asym-
metric information allocations of the the global bank, and shows that the differences, when
they exist, become smaller as p increases. Thus in the small region where there are differences
between the global bank allocations under full and asymmetric information, the differences in
allocations are predicted to be small, leading to negligible expected utility effects.
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The top-right panel of Figure 6.2 shows that the expected utility in the no-default equi-
librium is always weakly lower than the expected utility of the fully informed global bank allo-
cation. The same holds in mutual-default equilibrium in the bottom-right panel of the figure.
However, the bottom-left panel of the figure shows that the expected utility in the single-default
equilibrium is often larger than the expected utility of the fully informed global bank allocation.
In Table 6.1 I present descriptive statistics on the distribution of computed differences
in expected utility with respect to the least constrained benchmark, the global bank under full
information. I denote the expected utility of the global bank allocation under full information
by EUGB
F
. In the table I give descriptive statistic on the quantities EU i −EUGB F , where the
components, EU i , I consider are the expected utility of the global bank allocation under asym-
metric information, EUGB
A
, and the equilibrium expected utility in the three types of Nash
equilibrium of the strategic bank problem, EU N Ej (where j = {nd , sd ,md} for the no-default,
single-default and mutual-default equilibria respectively). I first consider the full distribution
of the difference between each comparison (i.e. the distribution of EU i −EUGB F ) and then split
the distribution into its positive and negative parts (i.e. the distributions of EU i −EUGB F > 0
and EU i −EUGB F < 0).
The positive part of the distribution shows that in 71.85% of cases ( 10621478 ), the single-default
equilibrium yields expected utility larger than that of the global bank allocation under full in-
formation. Moreover as shown in Figure 6.3, these positive utility differences are sizeable –
frequently more that 5 percentage points. In contrast a very small number of cases for the
global bank allocation under asymmetric information ( 610207 = 0.05%), the no-default equilib-
rium ( 368066 = 0.44%) and the mutual-default equilibrium ( 17663 = 2.56%) yield expected utility
greater than that of the global bank allocation under full information. In addition, the average
sizes of these differences are negligible3.
The negative part of the distribution in Table 6.1 is more ambiguous, so as a final piece of
evidence I present t tests of the hypothesis that the mean of the expected utility in the global
bank allocation under full information is equal to each of the other allocations against the al-
3I attribute these discrepancies to numerical imprecision
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Figure 6.2: Expected utility comparison between the global bank allocation under full informa-
tion and four other cases (the global bank allocation under asymmetric informa-
tion and the three different types of Nash equilibria) across computational results
for 10207 unique parameter vectors that cover the full parameter space. In each
case, the expected utility of the global bank under full information is plotted on the
horizontal axis. On the vertical axes are the expected utility of: the global bank al-
location under asymmetric information (top left); the no-default equilibrium (top




Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the distributions of expected utility differences of various al-
locations with that of the global bank allocation under full information, EUGB
F
. I
consider the distributions of differences in expected utility with respect to four al-
locations: the global bank under asymmetric information (EUGB
A − EUGB F ), the
no-default equilibrium (EU N End − EUGB
F
), the single-default equilibrium (EU N Esd −
EUGB
F
), and the mutual-default equilibrium (EU N Emd −EUGB
F
). The table gives the
full distributions (top panel), the positive parts (middle panel) and the negative parts
(bottom panel) of the distributions.
Count Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness
Full distribution
EUGB
A −EUGB F 10207 - 0.0107 0.0002 0 0 0.0002 -30.56
EU N End −EUGB
F
8066 - 0.1148 0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0015 0.0073 -4.061
EU N Esd −EUGB
F
1478 - 0.1226 0.0653 0.0043 0.0029 0.0123 -0.556
EU N Emd −EUGB
F
663 - 0.0594 0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0008 0.0048 -4.615
Positive part
EUGB
A −EUGB F > 0 6 0 0.0002 0 0 0 1.784
EU N End −EUGB
F > 0 36 0 0.0043 0.0002 0 0.0007 5.334
EU N Esd −EUGB
F > 0 1062 0 0.0653 0.009 0.0063 0.0092 2.134
EU N Emd −EUGB
F > 0 17 0 0.0003 0 0 0.0001 1.851
Negative part
EUGB
A −EUGB F ≤ 0 10201 - 0.0107 0 0 0 0 -30.56
EU N End −EUGB
F ≤ 0 8030 - 0.1148 0 -0.0042 -0.0015 0.0073 -4.055
EU N Esd −EUGB
F ≤ 0 416 - 0.1226 0 -0.0077 -0.0037 0.0109 -4.109
EU N Emd −EUGB
F ≤ 0 646 - 0.0594 0 -0.0027 -0.0009 0.0048 -4.573
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Figure 6.3: Histograms of expected utility differences of the no-default, single-default and
mutual-default equilibria with that of the global bank allocation under full informa-




ternative that it is not equal. The tests that the mean of the expected utility of the global bank
allocation under full information is equal to that of the other allocations cannot be rejected (at
the 5% level) for the global bank under asymmetric information (p value 0.9965), the no-default
equilibrium (p value 0.3860) or the mutual-default equilibrium (p value 0.6056). However, the
hypothesis is rejected for the single-default equilibrium (p value 0.0327).
I conclude by summarizing the findings in this section as my final numerical result:
Numerical Result 9. The numerical comparison between the expected utility of the aggregate
benchmarks and the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between two banks yields
the following conclusions:
(i) Whenever the Nash equilibrium of the game is characterized by no default or mutual de-
fault, there is no evidence that the decentralized outcome is welfare inferior to the bench-
marks.
(ii) When the Nash equilibrium of the game is characterized by single default, however, there is




This dissertation presents a model of the mechanisms of contagion among financial interme-
diaries. Several novel results are contributed to the literature, specifically to the strand focusing
on contagion among deposit taking banks following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and
Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000) and Castiglionesi (2007).
The economy in this dissertation is subject to pure liquidity risk, in the form of both re-
gional and aggregate liquidity demand shocks. Liquidity risk often plays a central role in bank-
ing crises, including the global financial crisis of 2007/8 (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton and Met-
rick, 2012; Copeland et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2014). Many papers
have considered contagion in the face of aggregate liquidity risk combined with other types of
risk, but in the context of pure liquidity risk, this work is the first to both study the sources of
contagion and quantify the prevalence of contagion in the full parameter space of a model of
strategic banks.
The model economy has two regions, each with a local bank. There are three periods and
two types of assets: liquidity and a productive investment. Liquidity is a storage technology that
transfers the consumption good from one period to the next at zero net return. The productive
asset has a higher return than liquidity if held to maturity (until the final period), but a lower
return than liquidity if liquidated early (in the intermediate period). All investment decisions
occur in the first period, before any shock realizes. In the intermediate period, shocks real-




Consumers in each region are subject to liquidity demand uncertainty. Consumers do
not know whether they will need liquidity to consume in the short run (in the intermediate
period, labelled early consumers) or whether they could use the productive investment to con-
sume more in the long run (in the final period, labelled late consumers). This liquidity demand
uncertainty creates a role for a bank, which can offer insurance to consumers against their liq-
uidity demand risk by pooling resources of all regional consumers and offering a consumption
allocation that is superior to the allocation that consumers without access to a bank could ob-
tain.
Banks are defined as financial intermediaries that offer demand deposit contracts. The
demand deposit contract of a bank provides a risk-free return to early consumers, except when
the bank defaults due to a bank run (which occurs when all depositors, early and late, attempt
to withdraw their deposits in the intermediate period). If a bank does default, it is fully liq-
uidated and all proceeds are distributed pro rata to all claimants. Banks in this literature are
typically also assumed to be subject to an information constraint: they cannot observe the type
of consumer (early or late) that withdraws in the intermediate period.
From the perspective of a regional bank there are two types of liquidity demand shocks,
which induce randomness in the proportion of early and late consumers. First, there is a re-
gional liquidity demand shock that is perfectly negatively correlated across regions, which does
not impact the average global liquidity demand. The regional liquidity demand shock provides
an incentive for a regional bank to insure itself against the regional liquidity risk by holding a
positive amount of the deposit contract of the bank in the other region. Second, there is an
aggregate liquidity demand shock which increases the average global liquidity demand. This
shock may hit either region with equal probability. The aggregate liquidity demand shock may
cause contagion, which is defined as follows: contagion occurs when the bank hit by the ag-
gregate liquidity demand shock defaults, and the liquidation value of that bank is so low that
the counter party bank also fails. This is due to the reduction in the value of the claims on
the interbank deposit of the bank in the region hit by the shock. My contribution to the litera-
ture lies in characterizing the consequences of an aggregate liquidity demand shock across the




In this model economy, I present a novel aggregate benchmark allocation that provides a
welfare comparison for the outcomes that are obtained in the decentralized equilibrium. This
benchmark is labelled a global bank and is motivated as a single bank that operates a branch in
each of the two regions. This means that consumers that deposit at the regional branches are
treated identically. The global benchmark is studied in two cases. The first case is a global bank
with full information, where the global bank can observe the type of consumer that withdraws
in the intermediate period (i.e. the bank is not subject to the typical information constraint
imposed on banks). In this case, the bank can prevent a run by assumption. The second case
is a global bank under asymmetric, where the bank cannot observe the type of consumer that
withdraws in the intermediate period. In this case, the global bank must offer an incentive com-
patible consumption allocation to avoid a run by late consumers in the intermediate period.
The global bank is always subject only to the constraint of having to offer an early con-
sumption level that is non-state-contingent except if the bank defaults. Default in the inter-
mediate period is therefore benchmark equivalent of contagion in the decentralized case. It
is the only tool in this model whereby a global bank can transfer consumption risk from late
consumers to early consumers.
The benchmark allocation is novel in the sense that it combines two essential features
that have not been simultaneously imposed on aggregate benchmarks in the literature. These
features are that (i) the global bank benchmark is constrained to offer non-state-contingent
early consumption in the absence of default (which is novel relative to e.g. Castiglionesi et al.
(2017)), and that (ii) the benchmark allows default as a potentially optimal outcome (this is
novel relative to, for example Allen et al. (2009)).
The first benchmark contribution is to show that, even in a model with only liquidity de-
mand risk, default (and therefore contagion) can be an optimal outcome. This is similar to the
result in Allen and Gale (1998), except that they considered a setting with competitive banks
that face both liquidity and investment risk. The only constraint necessary for this result is that
early consumption must be non-state-contingent in the absence of default. This adds to the
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results of Allen et al. (2009) and Castiglionesi et al. (2017) who do not allow contagion to be
potentially optimal.
The second benchmark contribution is to show that, in the absence of default, a global
bank achieves an optimal consumption allocation by balancing the ex post inefficiencies of
two tools: excess liquidity or partial liquidation of the investment. Excess liquidity occurs when
the the aggregate liquidity demand turns out to be small, so that late consumption is partially
funded out of liquidity rather than solely out of the productive investment, which would have
been more efficient ex post. Partial liquidation of the productive investment occurs when the
aggregate liquidity demand turns out to be large, so that early consumption is funded partially
by the ex post inefficient early liquidation of the productive investment.
The final benchmark result shows that the information constraint – which distinguishes
the global bank allocations under full and asymmetric information – is important. The differ-
ences between the benchmark allocations are characterized, as well as the parameter regions
where they differ. The results show that, when the allocations differ, a global bank under asym-
metric information can offer less liquidity risk insurance to consumers than under full infor-
mation.
The most important results relate to the decentralized problem. These results character-
ize the outcomes when two non-cooperative banks choose their portfolios and deposit returns
independently. The solution concept is the Nash equilibrium of the strategic game between two
representative banks, one in each of the two regions.
The decentralized problem inherits the constraints from the benchmarks: deposit returns
must be risk free (except in the case of bank default), and the contracts offered must be incen-
tive compatible in order to avoid a bank run (i.e. regional banks cannot observe the consumer
types). In the aggregate benchmark, the global bank aggregates across regions, which reduces
the problem to one with only two states and two potentially binding incentive compatibility
constraints due to the information asymmetry. In this situation, the benchmark problems are
amenable to analytic solutions. In the decentralized problem, however, there are four states
and several potentially binding constraints. This necessitates a numerical approach, as a fully
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analytical approach is infeasible.
The results for the symmetric decentralized banking equilibrium are computational, given
that a fully analytic treatment is infeasible. The approach is to use a numeric algorithm to solve
for the Nash equilibrium of the game between two strategic banks facing both regional and
aggregate liquidity demand shocks. The algorithm finds the numerically approximated fixed
point of the best response choice of portfolio and deposit return of the bank in one region in
response to the choice of the bank in another region.
The computational approach yields several results that are novel in the literature on fi-
nancial contagion. In a broader sense, one of the general contributions of the dissertation is to
show that the numerical/computational study of theoretical problems in the microeconomics
of financial intermediation is a productive option. Numerical results are common in macroeco-
nomics, but far less so in this microeconomic literature. This dissertation serves as an example
of the power of using computational methods to provide insight into economic situations that
are not amenable to purely analytic methods.
The numerical results on the decentralized banking problem can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, there is no evidence of asymmetric equilibria in this game, even though the algo-
rithm is robust to finding them. Second, as the probability of aggregate risk approaches zero,
the symmetric Nash equilibrium converges on the deterministic first-best allocation of Allen
and Gale (2000), within numerical precision. Third, the symmetric Nash equilibrium can have
three different characterizations: if the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is
small enough and the shock is large enough, the equilibrium is characterized by both banks
defaulting if the aggregate shock realizes in either region (i.e. contagion occurs). If the prob-
ability is intermediate, the equilibrium is characterized by only one bank defaulting (the one
hit by the aggregate liquidity demand shock). Thus, a bank default occurs, but without causing
contagion. If the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock is high enough, the banks
choose symmetric portfolios and deposit returns such that neither bank ever defaults. Finally,
at the parameter boundary where one equilibrium type switches to another, there are discon-
tinuities in the optimal choices. This mirrors similar discontinuities in the aggregate bench-
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mark allocations when the solution switches from one regime to another (i.e. when the optimal
choice switches from default when the aggregate liquidity demand shock hits, to no default).
Arguably the most important result is related to the overall prevalence of financial conta-
gion. When banks are able to internalize the aggregate liquidity demand risk, financial conta-
gion is a very rare phenomenon in this model. In an exercise where parameter sets were drawn
at random from their possible ranges, contagion was only possible in approximately 4% of the
draws. Moreover, one of these randomly drawn parameters is the probability of an aggregate
liquidity demand shock, which must realize for contagion to occur. Taking into account the
probability of an aggregate liquidity demand shock occurring, the ex-ante likelihood of conta-
gion falls to approximately 0.5%.
The final results in this dissertation are a set of welfare comparisons between the Nash
equilibrium of the decentralized banking problem and the solutions to the aggregate bench-
marks. When the Nash equilibrium is characterized either by no default or by mutual default
(contagion), there is no evidence that the decentralized equilibrium is inferior to the aggregate
benchmarks. The differences that are there may be due to numerical imprecision. However,
when the Nash equilibrium is characterized by single default (i.e. default without contagion),
there is strong evidence that the aggregate benchmarks are inferior to the solution in the de-
centralized case. This is tangentially similar to the results on the inefficient integration or di-
versification of banks found by Wagner (2010) and Castiglionesi et al. (2017) in different model
settings. The fact that the global bank aggregates over regions and treats consumers in different
regions identically, means that default can only be applied in both regions or neither region.
In the decentralized case, there is an additional degree of freedom as it is possible for only one
bank to default while the other survives.
The fact that the aggregate benchmarks are never superior to the decentralized outcomes,
and sometimes inferior, means there is little that the model can say about simple, central-
planning type policies to improve outcomes in this model. Indeed, since contagion is optimal
when it occurs, any aggregate policies, such as forcing banks to hold more liquidity to avoid
contagion, will be welfare reducing. The next direction that research could take, therefore, is
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to consider whether other policies (such as deposit insurance) can improve on welfare, but this
will require a different benchmark as motivation for the possibility of welfare improvement.
For instance, the central assumption of non-contingent deposit returns will probably have to
be relaxed as in Castiglionesi (2007) and Castiglionesi et al. (2017).
Other extensions are also likely to yield important results. First, in this dissertation the two
regions are fully symmetric. If the regions were asymmetric, it would be possible to study the ef-
fects of the interactions between smaller and larger regional banks. For instance, one could ask
whether a smaller bank could cause contagious effects on a larger bank. Second, the model only
considered two regions in order to keep the analysis of the decentralized game tractable, but
since the solutions were obtained computationally, it should be possible to extend the solution
algorithm to include more banks. This would allow for a richer study of endogenous interbank
network formation. Finally, for tractability and for comparability to the seminal model of Allen
and Gale (2000), the deposit contract treated banks and consumers identically. A more realistic
extension would be to make the interbank deposit market distinct from the consumer deposit
contract, in both return and seniority. The study of the simultaneous solution to the bank-
ing problem with a fully strategic interbank market structure would be a valuable approach to
modelling features like over-the-counter interbank market transactions. I will consider these
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I characterize several benchmarks in terms of the bounds on the probability of the aggregate




Table A.1: Summary of bounds on p (probability of aggregate liquidity shock)




If p < pGB F
N D
, the global bank with full information (GB F ) chooses zero




N D If p > pGB
F
N D , the global bank with full information chooses zero partial





If p < pGB F
D
, the global bank with full information chooses zero excess
liquidity in the default regime (D). Otherwise, excess liquidity is positive.
pGB
F
D If p > pGB
F
D , the global bank with full information chooses zero investment
in the default regime. Otherwise, investment is positive.
p̆ If p < p̆, the global bank with full information chooses to default in state
H , otherwise it chooses not to default in state H .
p̂ IC If p̆ < p < p̂ IC , the allocation of a global bank with full information is not
incentive compatible (IC ) and, hence, the allocation of a global bank with
asymmetric information differs from that of a fully informed global bank.




If p̆ < p < p̂ IC and p < pGB AN D , a global bank under asymmetric information
(GB A) chooses zero excess liquidity. Otherwise, if p̆ < p < p̂ IC and
p > pGB A
N D
, a global bank under asymmetric information chooses positive
excess liquidity and partial liquidation.
p Aut , p Aut If p ′ = γ+pα< p Aut , a consumer in autarky (Aut ) invests fully. If
p ′ > p Aut , a consumer in autarky does not invest at all. Otherwise, if
p Aut < p < p Aut , the allocation is interior.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The problem of a global bank that can observe consumer types who is constrained from de-
fault in state H , is to choose a consumption allocation to maximize ex ante expected utility
of an arbitrary region subject to a non-state-contingency constraint on early consumption:
c1L = c1H ≡ c1. The consumption allocation need not be incentive compatible, as the global
bank can observe consumer types and can disallow a run by assumption.
In principle, a fully informed global bank that does not default in state S can use any com-
bination of liquidity or investment to fund any part of the necessary consumption allocation,
c1,c2L and c2H . However, it was shown in the text that it is never optimal for such a bank to
use partial liquidation of investment to fund c1 in state L, nor to use liquidity to fund any part
of c2H . Thus, it may be optimal to use excess liquidity e to partially fund c2L , or to use partial
liquidation of investment λ to partially fund c1 in state H , or both.
Using the accounting identities, e ≡ y − γc1 and λ ≡ (γ+α)c1−yr , I solve for the portfolio
choice y = γ+αα e +
γr
α λ and express the consumption levels (c1,c2L ,c2H ) as (linear) functions of
(e,λ):


































As a result, I can also express the expected utility in terms of (e,λ):
W GB
F
N D (e,λ) = (γ+pα)u(c1(e,λ))+ (1−p)(1−γ)u(c2L(e,λ))+p(1−γ−α)u(c2H (e,λ). (A.4)
Inserting the expressions for consumption levels yields an unconstrained problem in choice




























At p = 0, the first-order conditions (A.5) and (A.6) become:
γu′(c1) ≤
(
γR + (R −1)α)u′(c2L) (A.7)
γu′(c1) ≤ γRu′(c2L). (A.8)
Since (R−1)α> 0, condition (A.7) is slack when (A.8) binds. Thus e∗ = 0 and ∂e∗
∂p (p = 0) = 0.
















Because of the Inada conditions, and since the left-hand side increases in λ, while the right-




. The bounds are values of λ
consistent with zero consumption in the expression of marginal utilities on both sides of (A.9).
The envelope theorem implies that e∗ is continuous in p so ∂e
∗
∂p = 0 in a neighbourhood
of p = 0; hence, there exists a pGB F
N D
∈ (0,1] such that the optimum is characterized by e∗ = 0 and
λ∗ > 0 if 0 ≤ p ≤ pGB F
N D






































. Note that condition (A.10) con-
tains an additional marginal utility term relative to condition (A.9). The argument of the new




At p = 1, the first-order conditions become:







Since r < 1, condition (A.12) is slack when condition (A.11) binds. Thusλ∗ = 0 and ∂λ∗∂p (p =



















Because of the Inada conditions, and since the left-hand side increases in e, while the right-





. The bounds are values of
e consistent with zero consumption in the marginal utilities on both sides of equation (A.13).
The envelope theorem implies that λ∗ is continuous in p with ∂λ
∗
∂p = 0 in a neighbourhood
of p = 1; hence, there exists a pGB FN D ∈ [0,1) such that the optimum is characterized by λ∗ = 0 and


































. Note that condition (A.14) con-
tains an additional marginal utility term relative to condition (A.13). The argument of the new




Unique bounds on the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock
Next, I establish ∂e
∗
∂p ≥ 0 and ∂λ
∗
∂p ≤ 0, with strict inequality for positive levels of the choice vari-





N D are unique.
Case 1: e∗ > 0 and λ∗ = 0
Total differentiation of the first-order condition in (A.5) with respect to p implies that
∂e∗
∂p > 0 whenever
u′ (c2L) > Rγ(
Rγ+ (R −1)α)u′ (c2H ) ,


















e∗ < ẽ ≡ αR
(R −1)(γ+α)+1.
At e = ẽ, I obtain c1(ẽ) = c2L(ẽ) = c2H (ẽ) = c̃ and dW
GBF
N D
de (e = ẽ,λ= 0) =−
(γ+α)(R−1)
α
u′(c̃) < 0. Thus
e∗ < ẽ whenever λ∗ = 0 and ∂e∗
∂p > 0 in case 1.
Case 2: λ∗ > 0 and e∗ = 0
Total differentiation of the first-order condition (A.6) implies that ∂λ
∗
∂p < 0 whenever
u′ (c2H ) > r (γ+α)
rγ+α u



















1−γ−α+ rγλ∗ > 0,
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which always holds since λ∗ ≥ 0 and 1−γ−α> 0. Thus, ∂λ∗
∂p < 0 in case 2.
Case 3: e∗ > 0 and λ∗ > 0













since the common denominator is negative,
D1 = u′′(c1)(γ+αp)(1−p)r 2(R −1)2(1−α−γ)u′′(c2L) > 0
D2 = u′′(c1)(γ+αp)(1−γ)p(1− r )2R2u′′(c2H ) > 0
D3 = (1−p)pR2u′′(c2H )u′′(c2L)(γ(R − r )+α(R −1))2 > 0
D = −p(1− r )(γ+αp) (D1 +D2 +D3) < 0,
while the numerator of ∂e
∗
∂p is negative,
N e1 = −(1−γ)p2(1− r )R(α+γ)u′′(c2H )(α+γr ) > 0
N e2 = −γ2(1−p)2r 2(R −1)(1−α−γ)u′′(c2L) > 0
N e3 = −(1−γ)(1− r )r 2(R −1)(1−α−γ)u′′(c1)(γ+αp)2 > 0
N e = −u′(c2L)
(
R(γ(R − r )+α(R −1))(N e1 +N e2 )+N e3 )< 0,
and the numerator of ∂λ
∗
∂p is positive,
Nλ1 = −(1−γ)p2(1− r )R2(α+γ)2u′′(c2H ) > 0
Nλ2 = −γ(1−p)2r (R −1)(1−α−γ)u′′(c2L)(α(R −1)+γR) > 0
Nλ3 = −(1−γ)(1− r )r (R −1)(1−α−γ)(γ+αp)2u′′(c1) > 0
Nλ = u′(c2L)
(
(γ(R − r )+α(R −1))(Nλ1 +Nλ2 )+Nλ3
)
> 0.
Given these monotonicity results, I can define the following unique bounds on the probability
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≡ max{p|e∗ = 0} , pGB FN D ≡ min{p|λ∗ = 0} .
Finally, I show that pGB
F
N D > pGB
F
N D
. The proof is by contradiction. If pGB
F
N D
≥ pGB FN D , then there








with corresponding optimal choice of e∗ = 0 and λ∗ = 0. However,
this implies c∗1 = 0 which contradicts optimality. Thus, pGB
F
N D > pGB
F
N D










the optimum is characterized by e∗ > 0 and λ∗ > 0 that jointly solve conditions (A.5) and (A.6)
when set equal to zero.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The problem facing a global bank that can observe customer types, that is constrained to default
and pro-rata pay-out in state H , but which is not constrained to offer non-state-contingent
early consumption, is to choose y ∈ [0,1] and e ∈ [0, y] to maximize the ex-ante expected utility
of consumers subject only to the constraint that c1H = c2H = y + r (1− y).
Using the resource constraint x + y = 1 and the definition of excess liquidity in state L,
e = y −γc1L ≥ 0, I can express all levels of consumption in terms of the total liquidity choice y
and excess liquidity e in state L:
c1L(y,e) = y −e
γ
c2L(y,e) = e +R(1− y)
1−γ
c1H = c2H ≡ cH (y,e) = y + r (1− y).
As a result, I can also express the expected utility in terms of y and e:
W GB
F







As in section A.1, the solution to this problem has potential corner solutions. Note that
y = 0 implies e = 0, and thus c1L = 0 and cannot be optimal. This yields three remaining cases
that characterize the optimal allocation in the default regime of a global bank that can observe
consumer types:







p=1 = (1 − r )u′
(
y + r (1 − y)) > 0 ∀y ∈ [0,1], a non-zero measure interval
[pGB
F
D ,1] must exist such that y
∗
D (p ≥ pGB
F
D ) = 1. This implies that c∗2L = c∗1L = c∗H = 1 and thus
e∗D (p ≥ pGB
F
D ) = 1−γ> 0 in this case.
Next, suppose that p < pGB FD . The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for optimality are as








D ) = 0, whereby a unique interior so-
lution y∗D ∈ (0,1) exists, since the objective function is continuous in liquidity, strictly concave,






+p (1− r )u′(y∗D + r (1− y∗D ))= (1−p)Ru′ (e∗D +R(1− y∗D )1−γ
)
(A.16)








D ) 6 0 as e 1 0. Thus,
e∗D is implicitly defined by:
u′
(









Case 2: no excess liquidity (0 < y∗D < 1,e∗D = 0)







D ) = 0 yields u′(c1L(y∗D ,e∗D )) = R u′(c2L(y∗D ,e∗D )).
Since R > 1, this implies u′(c1L(y∗D ,e∗D )) > u′(c2L(y∗D ,e∗D )) so condition (A.17) is slack. Hence,
e∗D (p = 0) = 0 and
∂e∗D
∂p (p = 0) = 0. Since e∗D is continuous in p, by the theorem of the maximum,
there must exist a non-zero measure neighbourhood [0, pGB
F
D




Moreover, 0 < y∗D < 1, e∗D = 0 and γ< 1 implies c2L(y∗D ,0) > c1L(y∗D ,0) > cH (y∗D ,0).
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Case 3: interior liquidity and excess liquidity (y∗D ∈ (0,1),e∗D > 0)

















Moreover, 0 < y∗D < 1,e∗D > 0 and c2L(y∗D ,e∗D ) = c1L(y∗D ,e∗D ) imply that c2L(y∗D ,e∗D ) = c1L(y∗D ,e∗D ) =
y∗D +R(1− y∗D ) > 1 > y∗D + r (1− y∗D ) = cH (y∗D ,e∗D ).
Establishing uniqueness of bounds
Total differentiation of condition (A.16) with respect to p where e∗D > 0 yields:
d y∗D
d p
= − (1− r )u
′(c∗H )+ (R −1)u′(c∗L )
p(1− r )2u′′(c∗H )+ (1−p)(R −1)2u′′(c∗L )










and each is unique.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let c1,N D , c2L,N D and c2H ,N D be the optimal consumption allocation that solves problem (P1a),
the no-default (N D) regime problem of a global bank under full information (GB F ). Therefore,
I can state the no-default regime value function as:
V GB
F
N D ≡ (1−p)
[




(γ+α)u(c1,N D )+ (1−γ−α)u(c2H ,N D )
]
.
Let c1L,D , c2L,D and cH ,D be the optimal allocation that solves problem (P1b), the default regime
(D) problem of a global bank under full information (GB F ). Therefore, I can state the default
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γu(c1L,D )+ (1−γ)u(c2L,D )
]
+pu(cH ,D ).
At p = 0, the fully informed global bank can do no better than the default regime allo-
cation, since the default regime allocation is less constrained in state L than the no-default
regime allocation. Even though the outcome in state H has zero weight, the definition of the
no-default regime allocation still requires that early consumption be identical across the two
states. This imposes a shadow cost on the no-default regime allocation relative to the default
regime allocation. Specifically, that c2L,N D − c1,N D > c2L,D − c1L,D – i.e. the there is less liquid-





p = 0)≥V GB FN D (p = 0).
Similarly, the fully informed global bank will not choose the default regime allocation
when p = 1, as this will imply certain default, and consumption levels less than unity for all




p = 1)<V GB FN D (p = 1).
Both V GB
F
N D and V
GB F
D are continuous in p by the theorem of the maximum. Therefore
these value functions must intersect at some p̆ ∈ [0,1).
Next I establish that p̆ is unique, and characterize it as a function of the other parameters
of the model.


















= u(cH ,D )−
[
γu(c1L,D )+ (1−γ)u(c2L,D )
]
.
First note that both of these partial derivatives are non-positive. In other words, in both
the default and no-default regimes, the maximum welfare attainable is non-increasing in the
probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock.
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In the default regime this is obvious since cH ,D < 1 < c1L,D < c2L,D . In no-default regime
this is less obvious, but still intuitive: when the aggregate liquidity demand shock realizes, there
is a smaller fraction of late consumers, hence less opportunity to exploit the high returns from
the productive investment, thus the average utility in the high aggregate liquidity demand state















)≡V GB FN D (p̆), I obtain:
(i) u(cF LH ) <
[
(γ+α)u(c1,N D )+(1−γ−α)u(c2H ,N D )
]
, since partial liquidation must yield higher







γu(c1,N D )+(1−γ)u(c2L,N D )
]
, since in state L the F L alloca-
tion is less constrained than the N F L allocation, which is constrained by facing a trade-off
with the allocation in state H .













) = V GB FN D (p̆). Therefore, the
intersection point p̆ is unique. Figure A.1 illustrates this result.
Combining the results above: there always exists a p̆ (which may be equal to zero) such
that V GB
F
D (p) ≥ V GB
F
N D (p)∀p ≤ p̆ and V GB
F
D (p) < V GB
F
N D (p)∀p > p̆. In words, there always exists
a probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, p̆ ≥ 0 whereby the default regime of the
fully informed global bank is superior for all p ≤ p̆, but the no-default regime is superior for all
larger p. Since the switch from one regime to another occurs at a unique intersection point of
the distinct value functions of the regimes that make up the complete problem, the value func-
tion that defines the solution to the complete problem is absolutely continuous, even though
the optimal choice variables and consumption allocations may jump discontinuously at the
transition from one optimal regime to the other.
Finally, I characterize p̆ as a function of α, r , and γ. At α = 0, for any γ ∈ [0,1], r ≤ 1 and
R > 1, the no-default regime must be weakly better than the default regime. This is because
the consumption allocation in the default regime in state H is bounded above by 1, while the
149
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Figure A.1: The value function of the complete problem of the global bank with observable
types. The figure shows the individual value functions for each regime over the
full range of the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock p, as well as
the value function of the complete problem which is the upper envelope of the two
regime specific value functions. When the probability is low (p < 0.10) the default
regime is superior (with value function V GB
F
D , the dotted red line). When the proba-
bility is high (p > 0.10) the no-default regime is superior (with value function V GB FN D ,
the dashed blow line). The value function of the complete problem, V GB
F
(solid
green line), is the absolutely continuous upper envelope of the two regime specific
value functions. Parameters: u(c) = c1−ρ−11−ρ , ρ = 2, R = 5, r = 0.1, γ= 0.5 and ε= 0.1.
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state H allocation in the no-default regime is effectively no more constrained than in L. In
the (near) zero aggregate risk case, it must be that c2L ≥ c2H > c1 otherwise the investment is
not optimally exploited, because (almost) any allocation that satisfies R > c2L = c2H ≥ c1 ≥ r
is feasible and weakly better than R > c2L ≥ c2H = c1 = r . Hence, there must exist a non-zero
measure neighbourhood around α = 0, where default regime is not optimal. Similarly, when
α = 1−γ (or in a neighbourhood), there are (almost) no late consumers to provide for in H ,
hence the shadow cost of maintaining constant early consumption while providing for some
c2H 6= c1 is very high. As such, the default regime is superior in this region (for p low enough).
Similar arguments hold for γ. Thus I can define: ᾰ ≡
{




, with V GB
F
N D (α) <
V GB
F
D (α) for α> ᾰ. Similarly, γ̆≡
{




, with V GB
F
N D (γ) <V GB
F
D (γ) for γ> γ̆.
At r = 1 (or in a neighbourhood), partial liquidation of the investment is (almost) with-
out penalty relative to liquidity in financing early consumption. Hence c2L ,c2H > c1 can be
supported in the no-default regime, which thus dominates the default regime. On the other
hand, when r is in a neighbourhood of 0, maintaining the non-contingent early payout in the
no-default regime is very costly, and thus the default regime dominates (for low enough p and
high enough α and γ). I can thus define r̆ ≡
{




, with V GB
F
N D (r ) >V GB
F
D (r ) for
r > r̆ .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
First, suppose that the parameters are such that default in state H is optimal for a fully informed
global bank. The allocation in state H is trivially incentive compatible, since c∗2H = c∗1H = c∗H by
construction (pro-rata resolution under default). The incentive compatibility of the allocation
in L: c∗2L ≥ c∗1L , follows directly from the characterization in the proof of Proposition 2:




≤ p < pGB FD , c∗2L = c∗1L > 1;
(iii) If p < pGB F
D
, c∗2L > c∗1L .
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Second, suppose that the parameters are such that default in state H is not optimal for
a fully informed global bank (see Proposition 1). I consider the three cases characterized in
Proposition 1 in turn.
Case 1: p ≥ pGB FN D so that λ∗ = 0 and e∗ > 0. Proposition 1 establishes that the optimal
level of excess liquidity e∗ in this case satisfies e∗ < ẽ, where at ẽ, c1(ẽ) = c2L(ẽ) = c2H (ẽ). By
construction, ∂c1
∂e > 0, ∂c2L∂e < 0 and ∂c2H∂e < 0, therefore e∗ < ẽ implies c∗2L ,c∗2H > c∗1 in this case.









)= (1−p) (α (R −1)+γ (R − r ))








α (R −1)+γ (R − r ))
(R −1)(γ+pα) u′ (c∗2H ) (A.19)




1−p ≤ 1 and R ≥ 1 this condition is
always satisfied. Therefore, c∗2L ≥ c∗1 in this case.
Condition (A.19) implies that c∗2H < c∗1 in this case only if
p < p̂(1)IC ≡
γr (R −1)
(R − r )(α(R −1)+γR) . (A.20)
Hence, p ≥ p̂(1)IC is necessary and sufficient for incentive compatibility in this case.
Case 3: p < pGB F
N D
so that λ∗ > 0 and e∗ = 0. Proposition 1 establishes that c∗2L > c∗2H in this






, this implies c∗2L > c∗1 . Given that e∗ = 0, the accounting
identities imply that c∗2H < c∗1 if
λ∗ > λ̂≡ αR
r (γR +1−α−γ)+αR .
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Since Proposition 1 establishes that ∂λ
∗
∂p < 0 in this case, and by construction ∂c1∂λ > 0 and
∂c2H
∂λ < 0, there exists a unique p̂(2)IC ≡
{
p
∣∣λ∗(p) = λ̂} such that the consumption allocation is
incentive compatible if and only if p ≥ p̂(2)IC .
Last, I establish continuity of the incentive compatibility boundary across different cases:













Then there must exist a sequence p ′n < p̂(2)IC converging to ṗ = pGB
F
N D
< p̂(2)IC from below, so that
c∗2H (p
′








n) > c∗1 (p ′′n) for all p ′′n . But then there must be a discontinuity in
the consumption allocation (and hence in the optimal portfolio) at ṗ, which contradicts the
result from the theorem of the maximum that the maximizers of a continuous problem must be
continuous. A similar argument would hold for the opposite inequality.
Thus, I conclude that there is a unique, continuous boundary p̂ IC where the optimal allo-
cation is characterized by c∗2H (p̂ IC ) = c∗1 (p̂ IC ), where
p̂ IC =

p̂(1)IC if p > pGB
F
N D
p̂(2)IC if p ≤ pGB
F
N D
Figure 3.5 illustrates the regions where the hierarchy of consumption levels differs, as well
as the piece-wise defined but continuous nature of the incentive compatibility bound, p̂ IC .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The allocation chosen by a global bank that cannot observe consumer types is identical to the
allocation chosen by a global bank that can observe consumer types whenever the latter is in-
centive compatible. Proposition 4 establishes that the optimal allocation chosen by a global
bank that can observe consumer types is always incentive compatible when the default regime
is optimal (i.e. when p ≤ p̆). Therefore I need to consider only the no-default regime.
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The no-default regime of a global bank that cannot observe consumer types (called a
global bank under asymmetric information, denoted by GB A), is subject to constraint that early
consumption must be non-state-contingent c1L = c1H = c1. The problem in this regime (P2a) is
defined by the value function:
V GB
A









subject to: x + y = 1,









c2L ,c2H ≥ c1.
As in the case of a global bank that can observe consumer types, it is convenient to state
the problem in terms of excess liquidity in state L and partial liquidation in state H . In princi-
ple, the optimal allocation of a global bank that cannot observe consumer types will have the
same three cases as that of a global bank that can observe consumer types. Therefore, there are
corner solutions: for some parameter ranges, either of the choice variables may be zero at the
optimum. However, in the global bank problem under full information, Proposition 4 shows
that there is never a violation of incentive compatibility when zero partial liquidation is opti-







< p < pGB FN D ).
Proposition 4 shows that incentive compatibility is violated in these cases if and only if
p < p̂ IC . Moreover, incentive compatibility is violated only in the state H allocation. Con-
sider the parameter values where this is the case. When incentive compatibility is violated
in state H in the allocation of a global bank under full information (i.e. when c2H < c1), the
closest weakly incentive-compatible allocation to that that a global bank can achieve under
asymmetric information is characterized by c2H = c1 ≡ cH , in which case the expected utility re-




p + (1−p)γ)u (cH )+(1−p)(1−γ)u (c2L). The character of the solution of the
global bank problem under asymmetric information differs between the two cases identified by
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a bound on the probability of the aggregate liquidity demand shock, denoted pGB
A
N D
∈ (0, pGB F
N D
).
Case 1: p ≤ pGB A
N D
, p̂ IC , therefore λ∗ > 0 and e∗ = 0. In this case, there is no default or
excess liquidity in L, so that the only way to ensure constant consumption in t = 1 is forλ= αrγ y .
Adding the accounting identity c1 = y+rλγ+α = (
1−y−λ)R
1−γ−α = c2H fully determines the solution, which
is independent of the utility function and the probability of the aggregate liquidity shock:
y∗ = γr R
γr R +αR + r (1−γ−α) ,









< p < p̂ IC , so e∗ > 0 and λ∗ > 0. Using c1 = c2H , the problem can be stated in
terms of y alone:
e = y(r (γR +1−α−γ)+αR)−γr R
r (1−α−γ)+R(α+γ) , λ=
R(α+γ)− y((R −1)(α+γ)+1)
r (1−α−γ)+R(α+γ)
cH = (1− r )R y + r R
r (1−α−γ)+R(α+γ)





r R(1−α−2γ)+R2(α+γ)−αR − r (1−α−γ))
(1−γ)(r (1−α−γ)+R(α+γ)) ,
yielding the optimality condition u′(cH ) = (1−p)(r (R(1−α−2γ)−(1−α−γ))+R(R(α+γ)−α))(1−r )R(γ+(1−γ)p) u′(c2L). Since
∂cH
∂λ < 0 and ∂c2L∂λ > 0, there exists a unique λ∗ > 0 that solves this problem.








(see section 1) and is therefore omitted.
Since a global bank under asymmetric information must offer c2H = c1 when a global bank
under full information offers c2H < c1, a global bank under asymmetric information optimally
chooses less partial liquidation than under full information. For the same reasons as in the full
information case, when p is low, ex-post inefficiency in H is less costly than in L, thus, a global
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bank under asymmetric information uses only partial liquidation in a neighbourhood of p = 0.
However, since a global bank uses less partial liquidation under asymmetric information than
under full information, as p increases it becomes efficient to start using some excess liquidity






A.6 Proof of proposition 6
The effective probability at t = 0 of being an early consumer is p ′ ≡ γ+pα. The problem of the






If p ′ (1− r )u′(c1(x))> (1−p ′) (R −1)u′(c2(x)) for all x, then it is optimal for the consumer
not to invest at all. Thus, c Aut1 = c Aut2 = 1 and the optimality condition reduces to an inequality
constraint on the effective probability, p ′ > p Aut ≡ R−1R−r ∈ (0,1).
If p ′ (1−r )u′(c1(x))< (1−p ′) (R−1)u′(c2(x)) for all x, it is optimal for the consumer to fully
invest. Thus, c Aut1 = r and c Aut2 = R and the optimality condition again reduces to an inequality
constraint on the effective probability, p ′ < p Aut ≡ (R−1)u′(R)(R−1)u′(R)+(1−r )u′(r ) ∈ (0,1).
Otherwise, there must exist an x ∈ (0,1) where p ′ (1−r )u′(c1(x))= (1−p ′) (R−1)u′(c2(x)),
which implicitly defines the optimal level of investment 0 < x Aut < 1. This implies that the
consumption levels are r < c Aut1 < 1 < c Aut2 < R.
Lastly, p Aut < p Aut because p Aut ≡ (R−1)u′(R)(R−1)u′(R)+(1−r )u′(r ) < (R−1)u
′(R)
(1−r )u′(r ) < (R−1)u
′(1)




Recursively Weighted Least Squares
To test my replication of the Allen and Gale (2000) results, I use recursively weighted least
squares (RWLS) regressions with a fair weighting scheme as implemented in Matlab (2017).
RWLS proceeds in the following steps for an arbitrary linear regression.
step 1: Initialize estimates by estimating the regression by ordinary least squares, and construct
the following statistics from the estimated residuals ui of the regression:
(i) the vector of leverage values hi , and
(ii) an estimate of the standard deviation of the error term, given by the bias corrected
median absolute deviation (M AD) estimator: σ= M AD0.6745 ,
where M AD = medi an(|ui −medi an(ui )|).
step 2: Construct a weight for each observation. I use the fair weighting scheme, which assigns












The factor 1.4 in the definition of φi is the default tuning parameter suggested by the
algorithm in Matlab (2017). Thus, the weights on observations with larger residuals are
smaller than the weights on observations with smaller residuals.
step 3: Perform weighted least squares using the observation weights ωi and recalculate weights
as in step 2.
step 4: Repeat step 3 until convergence (i.e. until the change in weights falls below a critical
threshold).
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